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Abstract 
Three Essays on Financial Decision-Making of Older Households 
by  
Minjoon Lee 
 
Chair: Matthew D. Shapiro 
 
With the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans, good portfolio 
management becomes crucial for sustaining financial well-being in retirement.  Using the 
Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI), a novel linked survey-administrative dataset, this 
dissertation examines various aspects of older households’ portfolio choices.  
The first chapter investigates the effect of late-in-life risks on the portfolio choices of 
older households.  Older households face health-related risks, including risk of being in need of 
long-term care and mortality risk.  Portfolio choice depends on the interaction between these 
health-related risks and household preferences for long-term care and bequests.  Using the VRI, 
this chapter finds that the desire to have enough resources for long-term care and bequests are 
overall strong but also heterogeneous across households.  The estimated relationship between 
actual stock share of households and the strength of these preferences is qualitatively similar but 
quantitatively much weaker compared to the predictions from the life-cycle model with the 
estimated preference heterogeneity.   
 The second chapter studies the relationship between stock share and expectations and risk 
preferences.  The VRI survey allows individual-level, quantitative estimates of risk tolerance and 
of the perceived mean and variance of stock returns.  Estimated risk tolerance, expected return, 
xii 
 
and expected risk have economically and statistically significant explanatory power for the 
distribution of stock shares across households.  The results imply that household portfolio 
choices respond to individual-level differences in preferences and beliefs proportionately with 
the predictions of benchmark theories, but that the response of portfolios is substantially 
attenuated relative to theoretical predictions. 
The third chapter discusses what makes the VRI more suitable for answering research 
questions such as those in the first two chapters of this thesis.  First, it has a comprehensive 
survey measure of wealth, based on an account-by-account approach.  The accuracy of this 
measure is validated by comparison with the administrative records.  Second, it has ample 
observations of older households in a wealth range relevant for research on key financial 
decision-making issues.  To illustrate the value of the VRI, this chapter examines the non-linear 
relationship between wealth and expected retirement date. 
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Chapter 1.  Portfolio Allocation over Life-Cycle with Multiple Late-in-Life 
Saving Motives 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Older households face multiple risks in retirement.  Most importantly, they face health-related 
risks, including considerable expenditure risk associated with long-term care (LTC) and 
mortality risk.  Given the high cost of LTC, the risk of being in need of LTC effectively 
increases households’ risk aversion, limiting their ability to take additional risks in the financial 
market for a higher expected return.  Mortality risk adds another layer of uncertainty that may 
further reduce room for risky assets in households’ financial portfolio.  In household portfolio 
choice literature, relatively little attention has been given to the implications of these health-
related background risks on portfolio choice, in particular on the choice of the share of risky 
assets. Instead, most research on household portfolio choice has focused on the effects of labor 
income uncertainty (see Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2007; Bodie, Merton, and 
Samuelson, 1992; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; and Viceira, 2001, among others), which 
is not a major source of background risk for households that are near or in retirement.  This study 
addresses this gap in the literature by examining how these health-related background risks affect 
portfolio allocation over the life-cycle.   
 Health-related risks have complex effects on decisionmaking of households because they 
likely affect preferences directly.  Hence, how they affect asset accumulation, portfolio choices, 
and spending will depend on preferences about related expenditures.  For example, for 
households who have a preference for high-quality, expensive service when they need LTC, the 
same probability of being in need of LTC implies effectively a much larger expenditure risk.  
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Similarly, two households with equal mortality risk may choose different portfolios depending 
on the strength of the bequest motive. Moreover, the paper will show that there are complicated 
and subtle interactions of preferences over LTC and bequests with health-related risks. 
 This paper uses distinctive modeling approach and measurement infrastructure to study 
the financial decisionmaking of households facing these late-in-life risks.  The approach uses 
novel survey instruments to identify preferences relevant to late-in-life portfolio choices.  It uses 
survey responses to quantify the distribution of these preferences in the population and then to 
relate these preferences to choices and outcomes in a new dataset—the Vanguard Research 
Initiative (VRI)—that combines survey and administrative account information on a large 
population of older Americans who have sufficient financial assets to make these portfolio 
choices highly relevant. 
 Specifically, I first estimate households’ preferences for expenditures in the LTC state 
and bequests using responses to hypothetical survey questions.  Estimated utility functions for 
LTC expenditures and bequests not only show the strength of the precautionary saving motive 
for LTC and the bequest motive over the life-cycle, but also govern households’ exposure to 
health-related background risks for a given amount of resources.  I then investigate the empirical 
relationship between the estimated strength of these two saving motives and actual stock share of 
households to see whether households’ actual portfolio choice responds to health-related 
background risks.  I also study how the optimal stock share should respond to the strength of 
these saving motives using a life-cycle portfolio choice model with the estimated preference 
heterogeneity.  Lastly, I contrast the findings from the empirical and theoretical analyses to 
derive implications for a better design of financial advice and financial products.  
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I begin by finding empirical evidence that the preferences for LTC expenditures and 
bequests are both strong but also heterogeneous among households.  For many households, the 
estimated preference parameters suggest that their life-cycle saving is mainly driven by a 
precautionary motive associated with LTC or a bequest motive.  On the other hand, a non-trivial 
fraction of households appear to put much larger weight on their consumption in the state of 
good health than LTC expenditures or bequests.  
 My analysis using the life-cycle model with the estimated preference heterogeneity 
suggests that both a stronger preference for LTC expenditures and a stronger bequest motive 
imply lower optimal stock share.  The more households care about expenditures in the LTC state, 
the more painful a combination of a negative stock return shock and an LTC shock is.  The 
impact of the LTC preference is limited for households with fewer resources, because for them 
publicly-funded nursing home functions as a partial insurance against negative stock return 
shocks.  The mechanism behind the effect of the bequest motive is more subtle.  On one hand, 
most households consider bequest as a luxury good, which effectively makes households who 
put more weight on bequests than consumption less risk averse.  On the other hand, the existence 
of retirement income and LTC risk under the presence of mortality risk makes households with a 
stronger bequest motive more reluctant to take risks in the financial market, compared to 
households who mainly care about own consumption.  I show that the latter effect dominates the 
former in my calibrated model, so a stronger bequest motive lowers the optimal stock share.  
I find that the relationship between observed actual household portfolio choice and 
estimated preferences is qualitatively similar but quantitatively weaker than suggested by the 
life-cycle model.  To be specific, a stronger preference for LTC expenditure is associated with 
lower stock share, though the size of the estimated effect is overall much smaller than the 
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predictions from the model.  I do not find a significant relationship between the preference for 
bequests and actual stock share.  The discrepancy between the empirical results and the 
theoretical results might indicate that what households actually do is different from what they 
should do, which, in turn, suggests a necessity for better design of financial instruments 
(Campbell, 2006).  Using simulated life-cycle profiles from the model solutions, I show that 
financial instruments need to incorporate implications of the estimated preference heterogeneity 
not only in determining the initial level of stock market exposure but also in the adjustment of 
stock share over the life-cycle.  
 The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 1.2 discusses the related 
literature.  Section 1.3 presents a stylized two-period model to explain the mechanism behind the 
effect of the health-related risks and the health-state-dependent preferences on the portfolio 
choice.  Section 1.4 describes the VRI.  In Section 1.5, I explain my methodology of structural 
preference parameter estimation and present the estimation results. The empirical relationship 
between household stock share and the preference parameters is discussed in Section 1.6.  In 
Section 1.7, I derive the theoretical effects of preference heterogeneity on portfolio choices using 
a life-cycle model.  I discuss the implications of the gap between empirical and theoretical 
findings in Section 1.8.  
 
1.2 Literature 
The preference parameter estimation in this paper is based on the methodology of Barsky, Juster, 
Kimball, and Shapiro (1997, hereafter BJKS) and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008, hereafter 
KSS).  They estimate the distribution of risk preference parameter using survey responses and 
allowing for survey response errors.  KSS also construct individual cardinal proxies for the risk 
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preference parameters using the estimates from the structural model, which can be used as a 
right-hand side variable in a linear regression without concerns about an attenuation bias.  This 
paper extends their methodology to the case with multiple preference parameters.  
This paper is also related to the literature on the estimation of health-state-dependent and 
bequest utility functions. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and van 
Nieuwerburgh (2011), Lockwood (2014) and Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti 
(2015a) estimate preference parameters for a health-state-dependent utility function and/or 
bequest utility function by either using a structural model only or combining a structural model 
with SSQs, but they do not allow for heterogeneity in these preferences.  Ameriks, Briggs, 
Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b) estimate heterogeneity in risk preference, precautionary 
saving motive for LTC, and bequest motive using the SSQs from the VRI.  This study differs 
from theirs in that I examine the impact of preferences on portfolio allocations, while they 
examine the impact of preferences on demand for LTC insurance as well as annuities.  In 
addition, I estimate the population distribution of the preference parameters following the 
method outlined in KSS, while Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b) estimate 
their parameters at the individual level.  In Appendix 1-D, I provide a detailed comparison of the 
two estimation methodologies. Finally, my study addresses Finkelstein, Luttmer, and 
Notowidigdo’s (2009) conclusion that using the observed demand for assets with state-dependent 
returns is the most promising approach in estimating health-state-dependent utility. The SSQs 
allow us to use this approach in this study. 
This paper also adds to the literature that empirically analyzes the effects of health-
related risks and bequest motives on households’ stock share by distinguishing the role played by 
preference heterogeneity from that due to other channels.  There is a large body of research, 
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including Rosen and Wu (2004), Berkowitz and Qiu (2006), Fan and Zhao (2009), Love and 
Smith (2010), and Goldman and Maestas (2013), that studies how actual changes in health status 
(or expected health-related expenditures) affect the stock holdings of households.  The literature 
suggests either no effect or a small negative effect.  There is not as much work on the effect of 
bequest motives on stock share.  Hurd (2002) finds no evidence that intended bequests have an 
effect on stock share, while Spaenjers and Spira (2014) find that households with children tend to 
have a higher stock share.  In most of these empirical studies, the main explanatory variables are 
remote proxies for (expected) health expenditures and bequests.  The remote nature of these 
proxies makes it challenging to identify the channel behind any observed effect.  This paper 
clearly identifies the effects of preference heterogeneity, controlling for other channels such as 
effects of different economic and demographic conditions, using responses to the SSQs.  
 Finally, this paper contributes to the theoretical life-cycle portfolio choice literature by 
investigating the implications of heterogeneous saving motives.  Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson 
(1992), Viceira (2001), Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and 
Goldstein (2007) use a life-cycle portfolio choice model to analyze the effect of labor income on 
the optimal stock share.  In these papers, retirement is simply considered to be a period without 
background risk.  By contrast, my study provides a more precise understanding of older 
households by examining how health-expenditure and mortality risk impact portfolio choices.  
Ding, Kingston, and Purcal (2014) investigate the effect of a bequest motive on the optimal stock 
share in the absence of health expenditure shocks and income flow.  Pang and Warshawsky 
(2010) and Reichling and Smetters (2015) study annuity demand using a life-cycle model with 
exogenous health expenditure risk and bequest motives.  This paper solves for the optimal stock 
share under a life-cycle model that features realistically-calibrated processes for health and 
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income, options for LTC service, and, most importantly, preference heterogeneity estimated 
from the VRI data.   
 
1.3 A Stylized Two-Period Model 
This section presents a stylized two-period model to intuitively illustrate the mechanism behind 
the effect of health-related risks and health-state-dependent preferences on the portfolio choice of 
households. In particular, I focus on why households who care to have more resources in an LTC 
state might want to invest a smaller share of their wealth in the stock market. 
 Let us assume that the household cares only about the consumption in the second period 
(
2C ).  Let W denote the amount of wealth that the household has in the first period.  The 
household invests either in a safe asset, which guarantees gross return of R, or a risky asset, of 
which return is R     where   is the risk premium and   is the uncertain part of the return.  
For simplicity, let us assume that   takes value of either   or  , with a fifty-fifty chance.  
 The households may or may not need an LTC service in the second period.  If it does not 
need an LTC service, its utility is determined by a log-utility function 
2(log( ))C ; if it does need 
an LTC service, the utility function becomes 2log( )LTC LTCC  , where 0LTC   determines the 
overall strength of the preference for LTC expenditures compared to that for expenditures in the 
good-health state.  Note that this is a special case of a more general LTC-state utility function 
that will be introduced in the next section.
1
 
 Let   be the chance that the household needs an LTC service in the second period.  If   
is 0, then the household solves:  
                                                          
1
 The qualitative results in this section do not depend on the additional assumptions made on the form of 
utility function in this section.  Those assumptions only facilitate deriving a closed form solution.  
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1 2
2
log( )
     . . (1 ) ( )
Max E C
s t C WR W R

       
  (1.1) 
where   is the share of wealth invested in the risky assets.  Then the optimal share of wealth 
invested in the risky assets, 
O , is determined as:  
  
2
.
( )( )
O
R

   

 
  (1.2) 
If   is 1, then the household solves the problem that is the same as (1.1), except for that the 
LTC-state utility function is used instead of the healthy-state utility function.  To simplify the 
algebra, let us further assume that 
LTC mW   .  The solution in this case, LTC , is determined 
as:  
 
2 ( )
,
( )( )
LTC
R m

   


 
  (1.3) 
which is apparently smaller than 
O .  When m is larger, the gap between O  and LTC  gets 
larger.  
 Now, suppose (0,1)  .  The household solves the same problem as (1), except for that 
the objective function is now  2 2(1 ) log( ) log( )LTC LTCC C     .  The first order condition of 
this maximization problem becomes:   
 
1 1
(1 ){ }
2 ( ) 2 ( )
1 1
{ } 0.
2 ( ) 2 ( )
LTC
R R
R m R m
   

     
   

     
 
 
   
 
  
     
  (1.4) 
It is straightforward to show that  O  makes the first term of the LHS zero, while the second 
term becomes positive.  Similarly, LTC  makes the second term zero, while the first term 
becomes negative.  Given that the LHS of (1.4) is continuous and monotonic in  , the solution 
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for this problem, * , is between  
O  and LTC .  Finally, as   or  LTC  becomes larger, 
*  gets 
closer to 
LTC , because  the household puts a larger weight on the first order condition derived 
from the LTC state.  
 The above example shows that a higher level of minimum expenditure in the LTC state 
leads the household to reduce its exposure to financial risk.  The effect of the same minimum 
expenditure becomes stronger when the household puts a larger weight on the utility from the 
LTC state compared to that from the healthy state.  Hence, to fully understand how a household 
would react to the risk of being in need of LTC in terms of their portfolio choice, we need to 
estimate relevant elements in its preferences. I begin to discuss how one can estimate these 
elements using survey responses starting from the next section. 
  
1.4 Data 
The paper uses the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) to estimate the distribution of the 
structural preference parameters as well as the empirical relationship between households’ stock 
share and heterogeneous preferences for LTC expenditures and bequests.  The VRI is a linked 
survey-administrative dataset on more than 9,000 Vanguard account holders who are at least 55 
years old.  The VRI is an Internet survey.  There have been three surveys to date on different 
subject areas.  The administrative account data provides both the sample frame and monthly 
account balance data.  
This dataset is appropriate for the research question of this paper for several reasons.  
First, it contains ample observations of wealthholders, for whom LTC precautionary saving 
motives and bequest motives are operative.  Second, the Strategic Survey Question responses 
from the VRI survey allow us to estimate preference parameters using survey responses.  Finally, 
10 
 
it includes comprehensive and accurate measures of wealth and stock shares for the account 
holders.  In the following, I discuss each of these features in greater detail.
2
  
1.4.1  Sample Composition: Ample Observations of Wealthholders 
 
By design, the VRI collects data on households with non-negligible wealth that are facing key 
financial decisions in retirement such as annuitization, the purchase of long-term care insurance, 
or portfolio allocation choices. In contrast, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the leading 
representative survey of older Americans, has a large fraction of households with not enough 
financial wealth to face such decisions (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2011).   
The goal of obtaining ample observations of wealthholders is achieved as the VRI is 
roughly representative of top 50 percent of households in the wealth distribution.  The sampling 
screen that is used to target wealthholders—the requirement that they have at least $10,000 in 
their Vanguard accounts—made the VRI sample wealthier by its construction than the more 
representative samples, such as the HRS and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  Ameriks, 
Caplin, Lee, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2014) show that the VRI is broadly representative of the top 
half of the wealth distribution and with the similar sampling screens HRS and SCF respondents 
have similar characteristics as the VRI.  In addition, about half of the VRI sample between the 
ages of 55 and 64 is composed of those who have only employer-sponsored accounts at 
Vanguard.  For this group the selection would be less an issue, and Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, 
Shapiro, and Tonetti (2014) actually show that their characteristics are even closer to those of the 
comparable subsets of the HRS and SCF.     
                                                          
2
 See Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2014) for complete description. 
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1.4.2 Strategic Survey Questions 
In its second survey (conducted in winter 2014), the VRI implemented Strategic Survey 
Questions (SSQs) to elicit information regarding preferences about risk, expenditures on LTC, 
and bequests.  In the following I briefly introduce aspects of the SSQs that are relevant for this 
paper (see Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti, 2015b for a thorough description of 
these SSQs).   
SSQs put respondents in hypothetical situations so that cross-sectional differences in 
responses can be interpreted as signals of preference heterogeneity.  Under hypothetical 
situations that are not related to their actual financial situations and demographics (including age 
and health conditions), respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical financial products.   
This paper uses three types of SSQs:   
 A gamble on consumption to elicit risk preference (SSQ1) 
 A trade-off between expenditures in a state of good health versus those in the LTC state, 
to elicit state-dependent preference for LTC (SSQ2) 
 A trade-off between expenditures in the LTC state and bequests to measure the strength 
of the bequest motive (SSQ3)   
The responses to SSQs can be used to identify the preference parameters in the three 
utility functions, one for expenditures in the healthy state, one for expenditures in the LTC state, 
and one for bequests.  To do so, I use the fully parametric functional forms: 
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where the X is expenditure in each health state, i.e., good health, LTC state, and bequest/death. γ 
is risk tolerance parameter, θ is a utility multiplier governing the strengths of the precautionary 
LTC saving and bequest motives, and κ is a necessity parameter for each utility function, 
determining whether the expenditures are considered necessities or luxuries (κ being negative 
means the expenditures are necessaries, while it being positive means they are luxuries).  The 
functional form for the LTC state and bequest utility functions are the same as those in Ameriks, 
Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015a, 2015b).  For reasons that will be clear, this paper 
includes a necessity parameter κ in the healthy state utility function to explain the increase in risk 
aversion with lower resources found in SSQ1.   
In the following, I describe key aspects of setups of each SSQ and distribution of 
responses.  (Table 1-A1 in Appendix 1-A shows the exact setups and wording for each SSQ.)  I 
will also discuss which moment of the SSQ response distributions mainly identifies each 
preference parameter. I defer more detailed explanation on the modeling of preference 
heterogeneity, the modeling of survey response errors and the preference parameter estimation 
procedure to Section 1.5.  
In SSQ1, the key elements of the hypothetical situation are as following.  Respondents 
are at age 65; they live alone and rent their home; it is assumed that they will be healthy for the 
following year.  Respondents have to choose between Plan A and Plan B, where Plan A 
guarantees a fixed level of consumption ($W) while Plan B has a 50 percent chance of doubling 
it ($2W) and a 50 percent chance of reducing it by x percent ($ (1 0.01 )x W ) for the following 
year.  Since the question is asked for a sequence of values of x where the sequence depends on 
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the respondent’s previous responses, it provides a risk range ([xmin, xmax]) which encapsulates the 
respondent’s indifference point.3   
Figure 1.1(a) shows two noticeable patterns in the distribution of responses to the SSQ1. 
The vast majority of respondents are not willing to take more than 33 percent of risk to have a 
chance to double their consumption, implying they are overall quite risk intolerant.  In addition, 
when the same question is asked with a relatively lower initial consumption level ($50,000 
instead of $100,000), the results show that respondents tend to be more risk averse.  This 
phenomenon is inconsistent with a homothetic utility function under which we should observe 
the same response distribution regardless of initial consumption level, motivating the necessity 
parameter in the healthy-state utility function. In terms of mapping to the preference parameters 
in the healthy-state utility function, the overall level of risk a respondent is willing to take in 
SSQ1 identifies γ while how much she become more risk averse with a lower initial consumption 
level identifies κ.  
In SSQ2, it is assumed that respondents will need a LTC service with probability   in 
the coming year.  There is no publicly-funded LTC service and no one can take care of the 
respondent for free.  They have to allocate the given resources ($W) between Plan C and Plan D, 
where Plan C pays the respondent $(1/ ) for every $1 of investment only if the respondent 
needs an LTC service and Plan D pays $1 for every $1 of investment only if the respondent is 
healthy in the coming year.  In the LTC state, respondents need to finance both their LTC 
expenditures and their other consumption needs out of returns from Plan C.  Responses to SSQ2 
are measured as the amount of money they choose to invest in Plan C.   
                                                          
3 The setup of SSQ1 draws on the hypothetical question used in BJKS and KSS, with a difference that the 
question used in their papers is about a gamble on income not consumption.  
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Figure 1.1(b) shows that, in SSQ2, the median respondent allocates resources in such a 
way that they secure more resources in the LTC state than in the healthy state.  For example, 
when respondents are given $100,000W  with an LTC probability of 1/ 4  , to have the 
same amount of resources across two states, they should invest $20,000 in Plan C.  That is 
indeed close to one of two modal allocations in the distribution, but the majority of respondents 
invest more than that.  This implies level of LTC  greater than one.  How much the share 
allocated to Plan C changes across different values of W and   identifies LTC .  
  Lastly, in SSQ3, respondents are assumed to be in the last year of their lives and in need 
of an LTC service for the entire year.  Again there is no publicly-funded LTC service and no 
informal care.  Respondents need to allocate the given resources ($W) between Plan E and Plan F, 
where money in Plan E will be used to finance their own needs while that in Plan F will be 
bequeathed.  Responses to SSQ3 are measured as the amount of money they choose to put in 
Plan E.   
 Figure 1.1(c) shows that, in SSQ3, when the given resources (W ) is $100,000, many 
respondents choose not to leave a bequest, but the number of respondents choosing to leave a 
bequest increases as W increases.  This suggests that bequests may be perceived as luxury goods 
rather than necessary expenditures (hence Beq  is positive).  Among those who leave bequests, 
many leave sizeable bequests, implying that once the bequest motive becomes active (i.e., once 
they have enough resources) it tends to be strong (hence Beq is greater than one).   
The SSQs have the following common features for eliciting preferences.  Each type of 
SSQ is asked multiple times with different amounts of given initial resources ($W) and/or with 
the likelihood of relevant events (π).  In addition to identifying preference parameters as just 
discussed, this test-retest feature enables us to separately identify the distribution of survey 
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response errors.  The SSQ scenarios are also stationary questions embedded in a life-cycle 
setting.  Except for SSQ3 (where it is assumed that respondents die at the end of the following 
year), it is assumed that the same situation repeats at the end of the following year.  Respondents 
do not have any other resources than what is given in the assumed situations; they are not 
allowed to either borrow from future or save for future.  By shutting down borrowing and 
lending, responses to SSQs can be interpreted as solutions of single-period maximization 
problems.
4
  
The VRI survey takes a number of steps to make the SSQ scenarios more understandable.  
In the administration of the survey, respondents are provided with the scenario-specific rules 
prior to making their decisions. They are also allowed to refer back to the rules via a hover 
button at any point in the decision process. The survey also tests understanding of scenarios 
before asking SSQs.  A majority of respondents were able to give correct answers to more than 
80 percent of the verification questions.   
  Since the survey is conducted on the Internet, it takes advantage of the ability to 
visualize the trade-offs of the SSQs.  In SSQ2 and SSQ3, participants are asked to make their 
choices using a novel slider interface (see Figure 1-A1 in Appendix 1-A). This interface 
dynamically informs participants of the resources they will have in each state as a result of the 
current allocation.
5
   
                                                          
4 Note that with constant amount of resources, the life-cycle solution will not involve much borrowing or 
lending unless the interest rate is different from time discount rate, so the assumption of no borrowing and 
lending is not drastically counterfactual.  
5 See Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b) for more detail about verification of rule 
understanding, the slider interface, and the other mechanisms used for the SSQs.  They also show that the 
SSQ responses are coherent both internally (i.e., there is a strong positive correlation among answers 
within each SSQ type) and externally (i.e., characteristics that might affect relevant preferences do have 
predictive power on responses).    
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1.4.3. Wealth and Stock Share Measurement 
The wealth and stock share measures are from the first survey of the VRI (conducted in fall 
2013).  The measures cover the entire financial portfolio and housing wealth of the households.  
The wealth and stock share measures of the VRI are based on a comprehensive account-
by-account approach.  Respondents are asked about the types of accounts they have (e.g., IRAs, 
savings, mutual funds), the number of accounts of each type, and the balance and stock share of 
each account.  This account-by-account format matches the way respondents keep track of their 
own wealth and does not require them to sum balances across accounts to provide total figures 
for asset categories that are familiar to economists but not necessarily to survey respondents.   
The accuracy of the wealth and stock measures is validated by comparing them to the 
Vanguard administrative account records for those accounts they indicate are held at Vanguard.  
The comparison shows that the survey measure of wealth is very accurate: the median percentage 
difference between the survey and administrative measures of total assets held at Vanguard is 
essentially zero while the length of the interquartile range is only several percentage points.
6
     
This paper uses the stock share of households’ entire financial portfolio measured from 
the survey as the main dependent variable in the empirical analysis.  
 
1.4.4.  Characteristics of the Sample 
In addition to the SSQ responses and wealth measures, I use information on household 
demographics as well as subjective probability measures regarding their longevity and future 
need for a LTC service. Table 1.1 presents the distribution of the variables used in this study 
beyond the SSQs. 
                                                          
6 See Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2014) for more details on the wealth measurement in 
the VRI.  
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Almost everyone in the VRI is a stock holder, which is not surprising given that the 
sample is composed of Vanguard clients.  Therefore, the identification of any effect on stock 
holding comes through the intensive margin rather than through the extensive margin, so the 
interpretation of results of this paper is free from participation cost issues (see Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2002).  The demographic composition of the VRI sample is as follows.  About two-thirds are 
coupled and two-thirds are male.  By design, the VRI respondents are evenly distributed across 
the following age bins: [55, 59], [60, 64], ……, and 75+.   Furthermore, again by design, about 
half of those below age 65 are from the employer-sponsored sample.  Most 401(k) participants 
roll over to an IRA when they retire, so there are few employer-sponsored accounts for those 
aged over 65.  As a result, about 20 percent of the entire sample are from the employer-
sponsored sample.  In terms of health, the vast majority of the sample report that their health is 
better than or equal to good (using a five-point scale excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor).  
About 40 percent have a post college degree while another 33 percent have a college degree.  
Finally, the median (mean) household annual income and financial wealth are $83,443 ($126,132) 
and $723,665 ($1,101,468).    
As another measure of heterogeneity in household health, the VRI survey asks each 
participant to estimate her probability of needing at least one year of LTC service as well as his 
prediction of how likely it is that he will reach a certain age. The results for the VRI sample 
show that 45 percent expect to require at least one year of LTC service, with remarkable 
heterogeneity across responses (the interquartile range is [15%, 75%]).  The subjective 
probability questions about reaching certain ages are asked for a set of ages determined as
 75,  85,  9 )5( { |  5}t t current age   .  The median response for the lowest age asked (the 
measure used in this study) is 85 percent.     
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Finally, to control for the heterogeneous exposure to LTC expenditure risk caused by 
LTC insurance, I include the indicator variable of having LTC insurance.  Twenty-three percent 
of the respondents have a LTC insurance policy.  
 
1.5. Estimation of Structural Preference Parameters 
In this section I estimate distributions of the structural preference parameters that govern the 
preferences for LTC expenditures and bequests, based on the methodology of Barsky, Juster, 
Kimball, and Shapiro (1997, hereafter BJKS) and Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008, hereafter 
KSS).  The estimates obtained in this section are used to construct the regressors in the empirical 
analysis in Section 1.6 and to calibrate the life-cycle model in Section 1.7.   
1.5.1. Methodology 
I extend the methodology of BJKS and KSS to estimate joint distribution of multiple preference 
parameters.  I model the respective strengths of the preference for LTC expenditure and that for 
bequests using a utility multiplier and a necessity parameter for the utility function representing 
each motivation.  Using MLE, I jointly estimate the distributions of these parameters as well as 
that of the risk preference parameter.  Having multiple observations for each type of SSQ enables 
us also to identify the distribution of the survey response errors.
7
  Cardinal proxies for the 
preference parameters are calculated as the conditional expectations using the estimated 
distributions.  In the following, I explain each element of the estimation methodology in detail.   
Utility functions As I previewed in Section 1.4, I assume three utility functions, one for 
expenditures in the healthy state, one for expenditures in the LTC state, and one for bequests:  
                                                          
7 To be more specific, to identify distributions of N parameters in addition to survey response errors, we 
need at least N+1 observed responses per individual.  In other words, the distribution of SSQ responses 
should have at least one more degree of freedom than can be explained solely by the distributions of the 
true preference parameters, to allow room for survey response errors. 
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where subscript i denotes each individual.  
The necessity parameter ( ) in the healthy-state utility function has important 
implications for portfolio choice.  Merton (1971) shows that, in a continuous-time model with 
stock return risk (modeled as an i.i.d. process) as the only uncertainty, for a household with the 
utility function I assume for the state of good health, the optimal stock share is determined as:  
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    (1.7)  
where s  is the risk premium,  is the standard deviation of the stock return, Y is the income 
flow without uncertainty, t is the current time, T is the end of the investment horizon, and W is 
current wealth.  The role of κ is obtained through the ratio between income plus κ and wealth 
(
Y
W

).  Intuitively, we expect that a higher income-to-wealth ratio should imply a higher 
optimal stock share, as the present value of the income flow (human capital) becomes a close 
substitute for a risk-free asset in the absence of income uncertainty.
8
  According to (2), what is 
compared to wealth is not the gross level of income but rather the income net of the subsistence 
level of consumption (negative of κ).9   
                                                          
8 This intuition holds even with income uncertainty as long as income shocks are not highly correlated 
with stock return shocks (Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). 
9 It should be noted that a negative κ (-κ) can also be interpreted as (slow-moving) habit in consumption.  
Habit formation has been used to explain macroeconomic phenomena such as a high risk premium 
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999).  Both Gomes and Michaelides (2003) and Polkovnichenko (2007) 
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Identification  Here I briefly review which moment of the SSQ response distribution 
mainly identifies each preference parameter.
10
  The risk tolerance parameter (γ) is mainly 
identified by the level of risk that respondents are willing to take in SSQ1.  The necessity 
parameter in the healthy state utility function (κ) is identified by the effect of the initial resource 
level on the responses in SSQ1.  It should be noted that since SSQ1 consists of only two 
questions, we cannot estimate the distributions of both σ and κ and identify survey response 
errors at the same time.   Therefore, I assume that there is heterogeneity only in γ (hence no 
subscript i for κ in (1.6)).11  The utility multipliers for LTC state expenditure ( LTC ) and bequest 
( Beq ) are mainly identified by the average share of resources that respondents allocate for LTC 
expenditures and bequests in SSQ2 and SSQ3.  The necessity parameters for those two utility 
functions ( ,LTC Beq  ) are mainly identified by how the level of given resources affects responses 
in SSQ2 and SSQ3.   
Modeling heterogeneity in preference parameters Following KSS, I model the cross-person 
heterogeneity of preference parameter as draws from probability distributions. I assume the 
distribution of the risk tolerance parameter and those of the utility multipliers on LTC 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
examine the effect of habit formation on household portfolio choices, while Brunnermeier and Nagel 
(2008) test the microeconomic implications of habit formation. Although I do not explicitly model (the 
negative of) κ as a time-varying habit, this study provides empirical evidence for this necessity parameter.  
In a related paper, Wachter and Yogo (2010) explain why more affluent households have a higher stock 
share using a two-good—basic and luxury—model, where households are less risk averse over luxury 
good consumption.  κ can be considered to be a reduced form representation of this two-good model, 
since both models generate lower risk aversion for households with larger wealth.   
10 The full relationship between survey responses and preference parameters is complex and non-linear, in 
particular under the presence of survey response errors.  Later in this section, I provide detailed 
explanations regarding how I model preference heterogeneity and the survey response process.   
11
 When I estimate the distributions of the parameters conditional on the covariates used in the stock share 
regression, I assume that κ is homogenous conditional on the covariates (i.e., κ is a deterministic function 
of these covariates).  The motivation for estimating the distributions conditional on the covariates is 
explained in Section 1.6.  
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expenditure and bequest to be log-normal, while those of the necessity parameters for LTC 
expenditure and bequest to be normal:  
 
2log( ) ~ ( , )i N      (1.8) 
 
2
,log( ) ~ ( , )LTC i LTC LTCN     (1.9) 
 
2
,log( ) ~ ( , )Beq i Beq BeqN     (1.10) 
 
2
, , ,~ ( , )LTC i LTC LTCN       (1.11) 
 
2
, , ,~ ( , ).Beq i Beq BeqN       (1.12) 
Log-normality assumption prevents the risk preference parameter and utility multipliers from 
being negative.  These functional form assumptions are also consistent with shape of survey 
responses distributions shown in Figure 1.1.  I also assume that the preference parameters are 
statistically independent, except for potential dependence through observed covariates.
12
  
Modeling of survey responses  I model the survey responses as the sum of the solutions of 
the underlying optimization problems for the SSQs and “trembling-hand” type survey response 
errors, where “trembling-hand” means that error terms are added to the survey responses (instead 
of preference parameters).  Given the realizations of the preference parameters from (1.8)–(1.12), 
we can determine the solutions of the optimization problems underlying the SSQs.  I assume that 
survey response errors are independent across questions and normally distributed with a mean of 
zero:  
 , ,~ (0, ),i kj kjN     (1.13) 
                                                          
12 As will be explained below, in one version of estimation I model the mean (μ) parameter of each of 
these distributions as a linear function of all the covariates used in the stock share regression.  Hence I do 
allow for correlations between preference parameters through these covariates.  
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where kj denotes the j
th
 question of SSQ type k.   
In the following, I show how to map the SSQ responses to the solutions of the 
corresponding optimization problems under the presence of the survey response errors.  
1) SSQ1:  Let 1 jW  be the amount of consumption given in the j
th
 question in SSQ1.  Given i  
and  , the level of risk (in terms of the percentage loss associated with the risky gamble) at 
which individual i becomes indifferent between the risky gamble and the guaranteed 
consumption can be determined as 
*
,1i jx ,
13
 such that:  
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The indifference point that is actually used in answering the survey question, ,1i jx , is determined 
as:  
 
*
,1 ,1 ,1i j i j i jx x   .  (1.15) 
This determines the risk range within which the observed response falls.  
2) SSQ2: The underlying optimization problem for the j-th question of SSQ2 is:  
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where ,2i jx  is the amount invested in Plan C that pays the respondent when she needs a LTC 
service and 2 j  is the likelihood of being in need of a LTC service for in following year.  Let 
*
,2i jx denote the individual i’s solution for (1.16).  We can then denote the observed response as: 
                                                          
13
 Note that the unit of x is share, not percentage.  
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*
,2 ,2 ,2 2min(max(0, ), )
br
i j i j i j jR x W  , which is the sum of the optimal solution and a survey 
response error subject to the boundary conditions, where br indicates the response is before 
rounding.  Rounding responses is prevalent in SSQ2 and SSQ3, so in the estimation procedure I 
need to address the issue of rounding in the estimation procedure.  I explain how I do so after 
introducing the model for SSQ3.    
3) SSQ3: The structure for the optimization problem for SSQ3 is similar to that of SSQ2.  The 
underlying maximization problem for the j-th question of SSQ3 is:  
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The observed response, before rounding, is assumed to be generated through 
*
,3 ,3 ,3 3min(max( ,0), )
br
i j i j i j jR x W  , where 
*
,3i jx  is the solution for (1.17). 
4) Rounding of responses: The distribution of SSQ responses suggests that participants round 
their answers. For example, Figure 1.1 shows a bunching of responses at $100,000 in the second 
question of SSQ3. This bunching likely reflects rounding since the number of these responses is 
too high to be generated from smooth distributions of the underlying parameters and survey 
response errors.   
To address this issue, I follow Manski and Molinari (2010) and define the degree of 
rounding for each respondent using the highest level of precision the respondent provides, 
separately for SSQ2 and SSQ3.  For SSQ2, I set three levels of precision: rounding to multiples 
of $25K, rounding to multiples of $10K, and no rounding.  For example, if all of a respondent’s 
answers are multiples of $25K, then I determine that this is her level of rounding.  Then, for this 
respondent, ,2 $50i jR K  would imply that ,2 [$50 $12.5 ,$50 $12.5 ]
br
i jR K K K K   , with the 
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latter interval used to calculate the likelihood function.  If a respondent gives an answer that is 
neither a multiple of $25K nor of $10K, then I assume that she does not round her responses.  
Using this procedure, I find that 7 percent of respondents round to multiples of $25K and 8 
percent round to multiples of $10K for SSQ2.  For SSQ3, I apply the same logic but allow a 
higher level of rounding to multiples of $50K.  Doing so, I find that 20 percent of respondents 
round to multiples of $50K, 9 percent to multiples of $25K, and 19 percent to multiples of $10K.  
Maximum likelihood estimation algorithm  Let ,i mjR  be the response observed for the j-th 
question of SSQ type m, for individual i ( {1,2,3}m  and {1,2,3}j  ( {1,2}j  for 1m  )).  
Given the parameter values governing the distribution of the preference parameters and survey 
response errors, , , , , ,{ , , , , , , , , , , ,{ } }LTC LTC LTC LTC Beq Beq Beq Beq mj m j                  , I can 
calculate the likelihood of having the observed responses in the data.  I estimate   by maximum 
likelihood estimation. The following summarizes the algorithm.  
1.  Guess initial values for  .14 
2.  Given  , generate K nodes 1{ , , , , }
k k k k k K
LTC Beq LTC Beq k       in the preference parameter 
distribution and corresponding probabilities 1{ }
K
k k   such that 
1
1
K
k
k


  , using Gaussian 
Quadrature.  
3.  For each node k and individual i , calculate 
*
, ,{ }i mj k mj   such that these realizations of the 
survey response error support the observed responses under 1{ , , , , }
k k k k k K
LTC Beq LTC Beq k      .
15
  
                                                          
14 I tried various sets of values for initial guesses and found that the estimation results are robust with 
respect to the initial guess.  
15 In SSQ2 and SSQ3, if the respondent provides an internal response and we determine that she does not 
round her responses, the corresponding survey response error takes a single value.  For all the other cases, 
including all the cases for SSQ1, the survey response error takes values in an interval.  
25 
 
4.  Calculate the joint likelihood of the realization of the error terms in step 3. If ,i k
  denotes this 
joint likelihood, then:  
 , , , , ,i k m j i mj k
     (1.18) 
where , ,i mj k
 is the likelihood of drawing *, ,i mj k .
16
    
5. Calculate the likelihood function for individual i  as: 
 
,
1
K
i i k k
k
L  

 .  (1.19) 
Then the likelihood function for the entire set of observations is calculated as i iL L . 
6.   Using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm (Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman, 1974), 
update the guess for  . If the new guess is sufficiently close to values assumed in step 1, stop.  
Otherwise go back to step 2 with the updated values.    
Construction of the Cardinal Proxies for the Preference Parameters  Once I obtain the 
estimates ˆ , I then calculate the cardinal proxies for the preference parameters conditional on 
observed responses using Bayes’s rule:  
                                                          
16 SSQ1 has two questions while SSQ2 and SSQ3 have three questions.  Hence, I weight the likelihood 
from SSQ1, i.e., I use 
3/2
, ,1( )i mj
 in place of , ,1i mj
 .  Then the likelihood function evenly represents the 
information contained in each type of SSQ.  Intuitively, this weighting scheme is equivalent to assuming 
that there is a third question in SSQ1 that contains exactly the same information as in the first two 
questions of SSQ1.  Note that the weighting does not have any direct effect on the estimation of 
parameters related to LTC or bequest preferences, because SSQ1 does not involve these parameters 
(although it can indirectly affect the estimation of these parameters through the estimation of the SSQ1-
related parameters).  Without weighting, the estimate for  is not in line with the pattern we observe in 
SSQ1, though the identification of that parameter should mainly come from SSQ1.  One alternative to 
weighting is to estimate  using SSQ1 only, and impose this estimate in the joint estimation.  The results 
for the stock share regression based on this approach are fairly similar to those obtained from the 
estimation based on weighting. 
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L
  
 

  (1.20) 
for {log ,log ,log , , }LTC Beq LTC Beq      .
17
   Note that when I estimate the distributions 
conditional on the covariates used in the stock-share regression, the same algorithm applies, but 
the means of the preference parameter distributions , ,{ , , , , }LTC LTC Beq Beq       and κ are 
modeled as linear functions of those covariates.  
1.5.2. Estimation Results 
In this section, I present the results of the estimation. The results in Table 1.2 show the estimated 
distributions of the preference parameters and survey response errors.  (Appendix 1-B shows the 
estimates conditional on the covariates.)  Panel (a) of Table 1.2 shows the estimated moments of 
the distributions while Panel (b) shows the distributions of the preference parameters implied by 
these moments.  
 The necessity parameter for the healthy-state utility function, κ, is estimated to be 
$10.82K  , implying that $10.82K per year is the subsistence level of consumption.  The 
interquartile range for the risk tolerance parameter is [0.17, 0.43], which can be translated into a 
relative risk aversion of [0.15, 0.37] ([0.13, 0.33]) under the estimated κ and an income level of 
$100K ($50K).  Although this range is slightly higher than the interquartile range from the KSS 
estimates ([0.10, 0.26]) that are obtained from the entire HRS sample, the difference is small.  
 The fact that the VRI and HRS have similar distribution of risk preference has the 
following two important implications.  First, it suggests that low stock holdings in the HRS is 
mainly due to low wealth level or other economic factor, not different risk preference than found 
                                                          
17 For parameters that I assume to be log-normally distributed, I use log of the parameters in the empirical 
analysis in Section 1.6.  In calculating cardinal proxies for these cases, I use log
k  instead of k  in (15).  
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in the VRI.  Second, it suggests that the findings from the VRI sample can be extrapolated to the 
population because risk preference is similar to that found in a representative population despite 
the higher wealth and education of the VRI population.  
 Furthermore, we see from the estimation results that there is a substantial heterogeneity in 
each of the utility multipliers.  At the 10th percentiles, respondents do not put much weight on 
LTC expenditures/bequests ( LTC = 0.19, Beq = 0.12) compared to expenditure in the healthy 
state.  By contrast, at the 90th percentiles, respondents place great weight on these expenditures 
( LTC =70.91, Beq = 1134.69). For respondents with these preference parameter values, the 
importance of expenditure in the healthy state is dwarfed by the importance of these expenditures.   
For the necessity parameters of LTC-state and bequest utility functions ( LTC  and Beq ), 
the mean of the former is smaller than  and that for the latter is larger than  , implying that the 
average respondent considers LTC expenditures as a necessity and bequests as a luxury in 
comparison to spending in the state of good health.  But there are also strong heterogeneities in 
both of these parameters.  The interquartile ranges are [-52.61K, -19.33K] for LTC  and [8.32K, 
69.16K] for Beq .  There are also some households that consider expenditures in the LTC state as 
a luxury good compared to spending in the state of good health (i.e., LTC  ), as well as some 
households that consider bequests as a necessity compared to spending in the healthy state (i.e., 
Beq  ).   
 Given that both the utility multipliers and the necessity parameters govern the respective 
strengths of the saving motivations, just looking at the distribution of each parameter separately 
is not enough to understand the degree of heterogeneities in these motivations.  To show the 
implications of the estimated distributions of the parameters more clearly, in Appendix 1-C I 
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solve a static optimization problem for a one-year period where each household allocates its 
given wealth into expenditures in the healthy state, expenditures in the LTC state, and bequest 
and present the distribution of these allocations. 
 
1.6 The Empirical Relationship between Stock Share and Saving Motives 
How does the estimated strong heterogeneity in preferences relate to the actual portfolio choices 
of households? In this section I answer this question by relating stock share to SSQ responses, 
both using the raw SSQ responses as a reduced form analysis and the cardinal proxies for the 
preference parameters as a structural analysis.  
1.6.1.  Analysis Using Raw SSQ Responses 
For the reduced form analysis, I define the SSQ1 regressor based on categories of how much risk 
the respondent is willing to take to have a 50 percent chance of doubling her income, with 
1 $100W K  (the most risk averse category, i.e., 0–10%, is the omitted category).  For SSQ2, I 
use the fraction of wealth that the respondent allocates to the LTC state (averaged over three 
questions).  Finally, for SSQ3, I use the share of wealth bequeathed (averaged over three 
questions).   
 The results in Table 1.3 show a statistically significant relationship between the 
proportion of stock in a household’s portfolio and the raw responses to SSQ1 and SSQ2.  
Specifically, I find that risk tolerance is positively related to the stock share.  Willingness to take 
the risk of losing 33–50% of income, compared to 0–10%, increases the stock share by 6 
percentage points (5 percentage points after controlling for the covariates).  I also find that the 
willingness to allocate more resources to LTC expenditures, proxied by SSQ2, is negatively 
related to the stock share; this result becomes only marginally significant at the 10% level when I 
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control for covariates.  Giving 10% more of wealth to the LTC state in SSQ2 is associated with 
an approximate 0.5 percentage point (0.3 when using the covariates) decrease in the stock share.  
Finally, I find no significant relation between the willingness to bequeath, proxied by SSQ3, and 
the stock share, with point estimates close to zero.  
 While these results are indicative of the effect of preference heterogeneity on stock share 
of households, the use of raw responses limits analysis due to attenuation bias caused by survey 
response errors as well as the difficulty in quantitatively interpreting the regression results 
without mapping the SSQ responses to the structural preference parameters.  For these reasons, I 
turn to analyses using the cardinal proxies for the preference parameters.  
1.6.2.  Analysis Using Cardinal Proxies 
The cardinal proxies are generated regressors.  Nonetheless, we can still obtain unbiased 
estimates using them.  If the difference between a generated regressor and the true variable is a 
classical measurement error then using the generated regressor instead of the true variable yields 
an attenuation bias.  The cardinal proxies for the preference parameters constructed under the 
estimation methodology of this paper, however, are free from this issue.  They are calculated as 
conditional expectations, so by construction, the difference between the latent variables and the 
proxies is uncorrelated with the proxies.  Appendix 1-D extends this discussion.  
Table 1.4 shows the results from analyses using the cardinal proxies for the preference 
parameters.  Specification 1 includes only the cardinal proxies while Specification 2 also 
includes the control variables.  For Specification 2, I use the cardinal proxies from the structural 
preference parameter estimations conditional on these same controls.  As stressed by KSS, when 
the preference parameter proxies are to be included as a regressor in an equation of interest, the 
proxies must be constructed conditional on all the covariates in the question of interest.  
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Otherwise, deviation of the proxy from its true value will be correlated with covariates, which 
biases the coefficient estimates in the equation of interest.  
These analyses yield qualitatively similar results to those using the raw responses. That is, 
I again find that risk tolerance is positively correlated with the stock share while the utility 
multiplier for the LTC state is negatively correlated with the stock share.  The relation between 
risk tolerance and the stock share is similar to what theoretical models predict (see (1.7) for 
example).  For LTC expenditures, given the same probability of being in need of a LTC service, 
a larger LTC  is related to the larger effective size of the expenditure shock associated with this 
health shock.  Finally, I find that neither the necessity parameter for the LTC state ( LTC ) nor the 
multiplier ( Beq ) or necessity parameter ( Beq ) for the bequest utility has an effect on portfolio 
composition.  
Since the coefficients in Table 1.4 do not clearly show the quantitative implications of 
preference heterogeneity on portfolio composition, I calculate the implied change in the stock 
share when each cardinal proxy is increased by two standard deviations and present the results in 
Table 1.5.  Two-standard-deviation increase in   increases the stock share by about 3.7 
percentage points.  The increase yields a slightly larger effect for  LTC , decreasing the stock 
share by about 4.6 percentage points.  The other parameters yield smaller effects.   
In this section I showed how actual stock share responds to the preference heterogeneity 
in the VRI sample.  In the following section I will investigate the theoretical implication of the 
preference heterogeneity and then compare those findings with the empirical findings.  
 
31 
 
1.7  Life-cycle Portfolio Choice Model with Multiple Late-in-Life Saving Motives 
To investigate the theoretical implications of heterogeneous saving motives on the optimal stock 
share of a household’s portfolio, I build a life-cycle portfolio choice model featuring the 
preference heterogeneity estimated from the VRI.  Overall, the results from the model are 
qualitatively in line with the empirical results.   But I also find that the theoretical model predicts 
larger quantitative effects of the heterogeneous saving motives on portfolio choices than those 
found in the empirical analysis.   
1.7.1. Model 
In the life-cycle portfolio choice model, households are subject to aggregate stock market return 
risk as well as idiosyncratic health, mortality and labor income risks. In each period in the model, 
households must determine how much to save and consume and how much of their savings to be 
invested in stocks.  Households in an LTC state must also determine whether to use a private 
LTC service after paying costs out of pocket or a means-tested, publically-funded LTC service 
after forfeiting the entire wealth.  The amount of LTC expenditures in the case of using a private 
LTC service is endogenously determined, based on the utility function for the LTC state.  Any 
wealth remaining at the end of life is assumed to be bequeathed.  To assess the effect of 
heterogeneous saving motives on the optimal stock share, I compare the policy functions across 
individuals who differ only in their preference parameters.  
Health transitions and preferences In this model, a household is composed of a single 
member.
18
  The model starts from age 55, which is the lowest age observed in the VRI, and the 
household can live up to age 110.  Each period, the health status (s) of a household takes one 
value from the set {G, B, LTC, D}, where each state means good health, bad health, LTC state, 
                                                          
18  This is to avoid complications arising from modeling joint survival probabilities and spousal benefits 
for Social Security and defined benefit pension plans.  The estimated relationship between the stock share 
and preference parameters is not appreciably different between single households and coupled households.  
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and death, respectively.  The health state evolves following a first-order Markov process with the 
transition matrix 'ss  where D is an absorbent state. The transition matrix 'ss  is also a function 
of age (t) and gender (g).  Households discount the next period utility by the time discount factor 
 .  
 In this model, the utility function depends on the health state, as specified in (1.5).  When 
s = G or B, the utility function is iU , while with s = LTC it becomes ,LTC iU .  In the LTC state, 
the (subjective) minimum required LTC expenditure is captured in the negative of the necessity 
parameter ,( )LTC i .  The amount a household chooses to spend on LTC service in addition to
,LTC i  depends on other parameter values, in particular ,LTC i .
19
  In the LTC state, a household 
also has the option of using a publicly-funded LTC service after forfeiting all of its wealth.  In 
this case, the value of the public LTC service expressed in the expenditure equivalence is 
parameterized as PC, so that the corresponding utility becomes , ( )LTC iU PC .
20
  When a 
household draws s = D for the first time, it leaves all its wealth as bequests, with the utility 
determined by ,Beq iU  and no utility obtained in subsequent periods.   
The labor income process The model assumes that a household retires at age 65.  Until then, 
its labor income is exogenously determined as:  
 
2log( ) log( ) ,  ~ (0, ) for 65,it i it itY y N t       (1.21) 
where it  is a temporary shock.  Given that households have only 10 years until retirement in 
this model, I abstract from permanent income shocks.  After retirement, a household receives a 
                                                          
19  Other than ,LTC i and  , I do not explicitly model mandatory and uninsured health cost.   
20 I do not explicitly model welfare in the other health states given that the sample is affluent enough to 
finance expenditures of at least -  every period.  In the model, the lowest support for the income process 
is set to be larger than - for all the ages considered.  
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retirement income that captures both Social Security income and a defined benefit pension 
income and hence comes with no uncertainty.  This annuity income is modeled as a fraction ( ) 
of the mean income before retirement:  
 log( ) log( ) log( ) for 65.it iY y t     (1.22) 
Financial assets Households can invest in two different assets: a riskless asset and a risky 
asset, where the latter represents stocks.
21
  The gross real return on the risk-free asset is set as the 
constant fR .  The distribution of the real gross return on the risky asset, tR ,  is modeled as:  
 
2,  ~ (0, )t s f t tR R N         (1.23) 
where s  is the risk premium and t  is an i.i.d. stock return shock.  Following Cocco, Gomes, 
and Maenhout (2005), I assume that the aggregate stock return shock is uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic labor income shock.   
Optimization problem of households  To specify the optimization problem, I begin by 
letting Wit represent the beginning-of-period financial wealth of a household, and it  be the share 
of savings invested in stocks, with itGov  indicating whether a household chooses to use a 
publicly-funded LTC service in the LTC state ( 1itGov   means it uses a publicly funded LTC 
service, while 0itGov   means it purchases a private service).  The optimization problem, 
omitting the subscripts i and t, can then be written as:  
                                                          
21 I abstract from housing wealth in this model.   
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Note that I do not allow borrowing or the short-sale of stocks; hence the last constraint is 
imposed.  
Computation I solve for the optimal policy function numerically using backward induction.  
Since the last period maximization problem is static the value function is trivially obtained.  This 
value function is used as a continuation value for the maximization problem of the penultimate 
period.  I repeat this until the maximization problem at the first period is solved.   
For the choice over continuous spaces (i.e., over X and  ), the optimization is done 
using a grid search.  Normal distributions for labor income and stock return risks are 
approximated as discrete processes using a Gaussian quadrature.   
Calibration To understand the effects of heterogeneous preferences on the optimal stock share 
of a household’s portfolio, I solve the model for various sets of preference parameter values that 
reflect the range of estimates in the VRI.  I focus on the effect of being one standard deviation 
away (both up and down) from the mean of each preference parameter distribution, so that I can 
compare the effect of two-standard-deviation difference in each preference parameter to the 
results in Table 1.5.  The necessity parameter for the ordinary utility function ( ) is fixed at the 
value estimated from the VRI (-10.82K).  The time discount factor (  ) is set at 0.96, a value 
typically used in the literature for annual models.  I calibrate the value of a publicly-funded 
' , , '
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nursing home to be equivalent to that of spending slightly more than the subjective minimum 
expenditure on a private LTC service ( 10LTCPC K   ).
22
   
The health transition Markov process matrix 'ss  is estimated from the HRS (1994–2010).  
I first estimate a multinomial logit model for the biannual transition process conditional on age, 
gender, and current health status, and then transform the estimated biannual transition matrix into 
annual one.  See Appendix E for a detailed explanation of this estimation process.   
 The calibration of asset returns is mainly based on Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).  
A risk-free return ( fR ) is set at 1.02.  The standard deviation of the risky asset return (  ) is set 
at 0.17.  Since the focus of this paper is to analyze the effects of different saving motives at the 
intensive margin rather than solving the risk premium puzzle, I set the risk premium ( s ) to be 
lower (0.02) than the 0.04 used in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
23,24
  With this risk 
premium, the stock share in the model around the median level of financial wealth observed in 
the VRI (about $700K) is close to the mean value in the VRI (about 0.55).  
 I use three values for the mean annual income before retirement ( y ): $45K, $90K, and 
$120K.  These values are the median and the interquartile income distribution range in the VRI.  
To calibrate the replacement rate after retirement (  ), I calculate the ratio between the expected 
                                                          
22 Note that, at the median of LTC , this value of PC becomes close to what Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, 
Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b) estimate using a SSQ not used in this paper. 
23
 When 0.04s  , for the range of the risk preference parameter estimated from the VRI, households 
choose to invest their entire savings in stocks, not allowing variations at the intensive margin.  Cocco, 
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) still obtain an interior solution with this risk premium by calibrating the 
relative risk aversion at 10.  However, this value is out of the range supported by the VRI estimates.  
24
 A lower risk premium can be considered a reduced form representation of ambiguity aversion among 
households with respect to the mean of stock return distribution.  In addition to the risk modeled in (18), 
if there is additional uncertainty (ambiguity) about the value of s , and if respondents have aversions to 
this ambiguity, their portfolio choice should resemble that of those who believe s  to be low without 
ambiguity (see Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2005). 
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annuity income (Social Security income plus the defined benefit pension income) and the current 
household income.  The parameter is calibrated to the mean of the distribution of this ratio, 0.5.  
Finally, the transitory income shock variance (
2
 ) is set at 0.07, close to the value used in Cocco, 
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
25
  
 Table 1.6 outlines the parameter calibration.  Panel A summarizes the values used for the 
heterogeneous preference parameters while Panel B shows the other parameter values.  
1.7.2. Results 
By comparing policy functions across households with different preference parameters, I first 
find that both a stronger precautionary saving motive for LTC and a stronger bequest motive 
lower the optimal stock share.  I then investigate the mechanism behind these effects by shutting 
off some risks in the model.  I also find that the slope of the life-cycle profile of stock share 
depends on the strength of each saving motivation.   
1.7.2.1. Effect of Preference Heterogeneity on the Optimal Stock Share 
To put the results in the context of the literature, I first investigate how the optimal stock share 
changes over income, wealth, and age for households with the median values for all the 
preference parameters.  Figure 1.2 shows the stock share policy functions for males in good 
health with median preferences.  Panel (a) is for age 55, while (b) is for age 80.     
 The main driving force behind the differences in the optimal stock share in this figure is 
the ratio between a household’s financial wealth and the value of human capital, where the latter 
is a present value sum of labor and retirement income.  When there is no risk in retirement 
income, and when labor income risk is not correlated with stock returns—human capital 
                                                          
25 They estimate this to be 0.058 for college graduates.  I set it slightly higher here given that my model 
does not have permanent income shocks.  
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functions as a close substitute for risk-free assets.
26
  In this case, a household with more human 
capital should have a higher optimal stock share in its financial portfolio.  Hence, higher wealth 
should be associated with a lower stock share given income levels, while higher income and a 
younger age should be associated with a higher stock share given wealth levels.  This is the 
mechanism that Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Viceira (2001) focus on.  
 Now I investigate the effects of the preference heterogeneity.  Figure 1.3 shows how the 
optimal stock share changes when we increase risk tolerance and decrease the strength of each 
saving motive (i.e., decrease each utility multiplier and increase each necessity parameter), for 
age 55 and selected combinations of wealth and income. When I analyze the effect of one 
preference parameter, the other parameters are set at the median values.  The changes reflect the 
effects of two-standard-deviation changes in the preference parameters for ease in comparing 
them to the empirical estimates in Table 1.5.   
Qualitatively, the results for the effect of the risk tolerance and the precautionary saving 
motive for LTC are similar to what I find from the empirical analysis. Being more risk tolerant 
increases the optimal stock share, while having a higher LTC  implies a lower stock share, as in 
the empirical analysis.  For the other parameters, I find patterns that are not found in the 
empirical analysis.  A lower LTC  has an effect similar to a higher LTC : when the subjective 
minimum requirement expenditure in the LTC state is higher, the optimal stock share is lower.  
The effects of both Beq  and Beq  show that a stronger bequest motive is associated with a lower 
stock share.   
                                                          
26 Viceira (2001) shows that this is still the case even with moderate correlation between labor income and 
stock return processes.  
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For all the parameters, the model predicts greater effects than found in the actual 
behavior of the VRI sample.  Increasing risk tolerance by two standard deviations in the model is 
associated with a more than 40 percentage point increase in the stock share across wealth and 
income levels, compared to the 3.2 percentage point increase found in the empirical analysis in 
Section 1.6.  The heterogeneity in the other parameters have smaller but still substantial effects.  
For example, heterogeneity in precautionary saving motives for LTC, expressed as differences in 
LTC , creates about a 7 percentage point difference in the stock share for many wealth and 
income levels, while the difference can be as large as 15 percentage points.
27
  The corresponding 
numbers for LTC  are much larger—10 percentage points for many wealth-income combinations 
and more than 20 percentage points for some cases.  Note that the numbers from the empirical 
analysis were similar (though somewhat smaller) in the case of  LTC  (4.1 percentage points), 
while negligible for LTC  (1.7 percentage points).  Finally, the effects of heterogeneity in Beq  
and Beq  are smaller compared to that of LTC  and LTC , but in many cases they are still larger 
than the numbers from the empirical analysis and the direction is actually opposite to what the 
point estimates from the empirical analysis suggest.   
I find almost the same pattern for age 80 (Figure 1.4).  Overall, the size of the effect is 
reduced in terms of percentage point differences, but this is mainly due to that older households 
have a lower stock share than younger households because of the reduced value of human capital 
(see Figure 1.2(b)).  In terms of percent difference (not percentage point difference) in stock 
                                                          
27
 When the income level is high and the wealth level is low, the effect is zero, since for these households, 
under the range of values of LTC  used in this analysis, the optimal stock share is 100 percent.  Large 
effect of heterogeneity in LTC for these households will be obtained if I allow for leveraging.  The same 
caveat applies to the analyses for the other preference parameters.  
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share, the effects have similar magnitudes.  Notice that the chance of having a negative health 
shock increases with age, but at the same time the chance of having a long sequence of LTC 
shock (which is the most catastrophic event) decreases due to increased mortality risk.  Given 
that an LTC shock plays an important role in the negative effect of both of the saving motives, as 
will be explained below, the similar results for the age 55 and age 80 groups may reflect these 
factors canceling each other out for the older group.  
1.7.2.2 Mechanisms Behind the Effects  
Negative impact of a stronger LTC precautionary motive on the optimal stock share  A higher 
LTC  or lower LTC  means that households face larger background risk, since an endogenously-
determined LTC expenditure is larger when households are hit by an LTC shock.  Therefore, 
those with higher LTC  or lower LTC  want to reduce their exposure to financial market risk.   
 For those who do not have enough resources, the availability of publicly-funded LTC 
service reduces this effect.  This fact is well demonstrated in the effect of LTC  at age 80.  For 
the low-wealth and low-income combination, larger required expenditures in the LTC state (i.e., 
lower LTC ) is associated with a higher optimal stock share (see Figure 1.4(e)). When both the 
wealth and income levels are low, and if they are going to spend significant money on LTC 
service when they are hit by a LTC shock, it is more likely that they will end up using the option 
of a public LTC service.  Consequently, this household would be less affected by the 
combination of a negative stock return shock and an LTC shock since it would forfeit its wealth 
anyway upon choosing to use the public LTC service.   
Negative impact of a stronger bequest motive on the optimal stock share  The negative 
effect of a stronger bequest motive on the optimal stock share, in particular that of Beq , may 
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seem puzzling given that the medium value of Beq  is positive.  Since a bequest is a luxury good, 
higher weight on the bequest motive should imply lower effective risk aversion.  Ding, Kingston, 
and Purcal (2014) have a similar finding in an environment without health and mortality risks 
and income.   
The negative effect comes from the two elements of the model: the existence of 
retirement income and LTC risk under the presence of mortality risk.  First, to understand the 
role played by the retirement income, suppose that a household that invested its entire wealth in 
stocks experiences a negative ten percent stock return.  If that household has mainly been saving 
to finance its own consumption rather than to bequeath its wealth, this loss of stock value will 
not translate into a ten percent reduction in permanent consumption as long as the household has 
significant retirement income from either Social Security or defined benefit pensions, which is 
not affected by the stock market performance.  If that household has mainly saved to leave 
bequests, however, the loss in stock value can be translated into about a ten percent reduction in 
bequests, in particular when the household dies soon after that, because unrealized retirement 
income cannot be bequeathed.  In short, the existence of unrealized retirement income and 
mortality risk can increase the effective risk of a negative stock market return for those with 
stronger bequest motives.
28
 
 Second, the effective risk of the same LTC shock is larger for a household with larger
Beq  because when a household is hit by a LTC shock, the amount of wealth that can be 
bequeathed is dramatically reduced and, at the same time, mortality risk is increased.  They 
would not have enough time to accumulate their wealth again until they die.  For those who 
                                                          
28 It is clear that the size of this effect should depend on the replacement rate (λ) of retirement income.  
Hence, we can predict that the transition from a DB-pension to a DC-pension system should reduce the 
effect of this channel.  
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mainly care about their own consumption (i.e., those with lower Beq ), however, the fact that an 
LTC shock accompanies the increase mortality risk is functioning as an insurance since the 
chance that they will outlive their resources is reduced with the higher mortality risk.  
To measure the effect of an LTC shock on bequests, I ran 10,000 simulations for each 
value of Beq  and calculated the average bequest conditional on the age at death, Beq , and also 
on whether the household ever had an LTC shock in its lifetime or not (see Section 1.7.2.3 for 
details on the setup of the simulations).  Figure 1.5(a) shows the result. (Figure 1.5(b) plots the 
survival rate up to each age to show the likelihoods of dying at different ages.)  Having an LTC 
shock in their lives reduces bequests on average about $100K for all the Beq  values and for most 
of ages at death, while the effect gets larger for those whose age at death is higher than 95.  In 
terms of proportion rather than absolute value, the size of the shock on bequest gets larger as 
they die at higher ages.  And this shock is more painful to those with high Beq  values.  
To test the strength of these channels, I shut off LTC and bequest risks and revisit the 
effect of Beq  (Figure 1.5(c)).  In the absence of these risks, we see that the stronger bequest 
motive implies higher stock share, as in Ding, Kingston, and Purcal (2014), though the effect is 
generally very small.   
Small effect of bequest motive  Though a strong bequest motive lowers the optimal stock 
share, overall the size of the effect is not large.  To investigate the reason for this small effect, in 
Figure 1.6 I separately calculate the effect of one-standard-deviation differences of Beq in its 
lower range (low Beq  - medium Beq ) and higher range (medium Beq  - high Beq ).  The figure 
shows that the effect of Beq  is non-linear: the effect is almost null until it becomes large enough. 
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Almost the entire effects of two-standard-deviation differences in Beq  are from the one-standard 
deviation differences in its higher range.  Since the median LTC precautionary saving motive is 
already strong enough to leave sizeable accidental bequests as long as they do not live up to very 
high ages and/or they are not hit by a long sequence of LTC shocks, when the bequest motive is 
not strong, it is already saturated with these accidental bequests.  This can be seen from the fact 
that one-standard-deviation difference in Beq  in its lower range does not affect the accumulation 
of wealth and hence in the amount of accidental bequests (Figure 1.5(a)).  Once Beq  is large 
enough, it starts to affect both wealth accumulation and portfolio allocation. 
1.7.2.3 Life-Cycle Profile of Stock Share  
To summarize the effect of the preference heterogeneity on stock share of households over life-
cycle, I generate life-cycle profiles of stock share by simulating the model to investigate the 
model’s implications for the design of life-cycle financial advice.  For each combination of 
parameter values considered in Figure 1.3 and 1.4, I simulate 10,000 households using the policy 
functions for saving and portfolio choices and then take the average to obtain the profiles.  The 
simulation starts from age 55 with a wealth level of $700K.  I set y  to be $90,000.  In Figure 1.6, 
I show profiles across different LTC (Panel (a) and (b)) and Beq (Panel (c) and (d)). 
 In Panel (a) I first show the average wealth profile since different preference parameter 
values affect wealth-to-income ratio and the latter, in turn, affects the optimal stock share.  
Households accumulate wealth before retirement (age 65) and then decumulate afterward.  With 
a stronger precautionary saving motive associated with LTC (i.e. higher LTC ), the accumulation 
rate is faster while the decumulation rate is slower, leading to an overall higher wealth level.  
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 Accumulation of wealth and approaching retirement together can explain the downward 
sloping stock share profile before retirement depicted in Panel (b).  In this phase, the slope is the 
same across different values of LTC .  Furthermore, the profile in this phase is fairly close to the 
often-mentioned rule of thumb for life-cycle funds, which says that stock share in terms of 
percentage should be determined by subtracting one’s age from 100. 
   After retirement, however, the slope depends on the strength of the precautionary saving 
motive.  At the median preference, the slope becomes flat after retirement.  With a strong 
precautionary saving motive for LTC, the slope is negative; the opposite is true when this saving 
motive is weak.  Differences in the slopes, again, mainly reflect differences in the wealth-to-
human-capital ratio across different groups.  Those with a stronger precautionary saving motive 
for LTC save more, and an increased wealth-to-human-capital ratio implies a lower stock share.   
 Panel (c) and (d) show that I obtain similar results over Beq .  One noticeable difference 
is that until Beq becomes large enough, the effect of that preference parameter on both wealth 
accumulation and portfolio allocation is limited, given the strength of the median precautionary 
saving motive for LTC.  
 This exercise shows that there is no uniform rule for stock share adjustment over the life-
cycle that can be applied to every household.  The rules, on the one hand, should consider 
differences in optimal stock share, given wealth level, across households with different 
motivations for saving (reflected in different initial levels of stock share profiles in Figure 1.7(b) 
and 1.7(d)), and on the other hand, the rules should also consider different wealth-to-human 
capital ratios that result from the heterogeneity in motivations for saving (reflected in different 
slopes of stock share profiles in Figure 1.7(b) and 1.7(d)).  
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1.8 Conclusion 
I find evidence that both the preferences for LTC expenditures and bequests are overall strong 
but also heterogeneous across households.  The former implies that older households are on 
average substantially exposed to health-related risks including LTC risk and mortality risk, while 
the latter implies that there is large heterogeneity in their exposures to these risks.  The life-cycle 
portfolio choice model with the estimated preference heterogeneity predicts that the optimal 
stock share is lower for a household with either a stronger LTC precautionary saving motive or a 
stronger bequest motive.  I find a qualitatively similar pattern in the relationship between the 
households’ actual stock share and the estimated preference parameters.  The size of the response, 
however, turns out to be much smaller than the prediction from the model.    
 This paper has three broad findings concerning LTC risk.  First, the interaction of LTC 
risk and health-dependent utility substantially affects portfolio choice and wealth accumulation 
in an otherwise standard life-cycle model.  Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in 
preferences for spending in the LTC state.  Put together, these findings imply that household 
portfolio choices should be strongly affected by these preferences and should vary across 
households in accordance with their preferences.  The third finding, however, is that in a large 
sample of households with sufficient financial resources where these choices and risks should be 
highly relevant, the actual response of portfolios to preference heterogeneity is in the direction 
implied by the life-cycle model, but substantially attenuated relative to the predictions from the 
model.  One possible reason for this low-powered response of choices to the stated preference is 
that financial advice does not sufficiently take into account of LTC risk.  This risk can take the 
form either of high probability of needing LTC or, as this paper emphasizes, preference for large 
spending should LTC be needed.  The theoretical findings of this paper imply that portfolio 
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advice should be conditioned on these preferences and risks.  The paper, by documenting the 
heterogeneity in preferences and by showing its implications for portfolios for households in 
different circumstances, provides a roadmap for improving the financial advice to and financial 
products for households who need to manage financial assets during retirement while facing 
multiple risks.  
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics  
 
 
Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Stock Share 0.548 0.189 0.378 0.553 0.743 0.905 
Coupled 0.673      
Male 0.647      
Age 68.0 58 62 67 73 78 
Employer-
sponsored sample 0.219      
Health (≥ Good) 0.948      
Education  
(Post college) 0.404      
Education  
(College) 0.330      
Income ($) 126,132 28,740 50,000 83,443 125,000 250,000 
Financial Wealth($) 1,101,468 153,000 344,000 723,665 1,356,211 2,399,317 
Prob. need LTC
a 
0.430 0.05 0.15 0.45 0.75 0.85 
Prob. live approx. 
10 more years
b 
0.753 0.45 0.65 0.85 0.95 0.95 
Having LTC 
insurance  0.234      
Note: The tabulation is conditioned on having responses to all the variables used in this paper (all the SSQs in 
addition to the variables in this table).  N=5,471 
a
  The subjective probability of being in need of a LTC service at least for 1 year in the remaining life.   
b  
The subjective probability of living up to at least age  75,  85,  95min( { | 5})t t age   .  For example, for a 
respondent whose age is 75, it is the probability of living up to age 85. 
  
51 
 
Table 1.2.  Estimated Distributions of the Preference Parameters and Survey Response Errors  
(a) Estimated distribution parameters 
 
 
(b) Implied distributions of preference parameters 
 Percentiles  
Parameter 10 25 50 75 90 Mean 
i   0.11 0.17 0.27 0.43 0.65 0.34 
,LTC i  0.19 0.76 3.64 17.37 70.91 53.32 
,Beq i  0.12 1.10 12.03 131.65 1134.69 6510.37 
LTC  -67.59K -52.61K -35.97K -19.33K -4.35K -35.97K 
Beq  -19.06K 8.32K 38.74K 69.16K 96.54K 38.74K 
  
Parameter Estimate S.E. 
  -1.322 (0.013) 
  0.691 (0.007) 
  -10.82K (0.43K) 
LTC  1.292 (0.034) 
LTC  2.317 (0.029) 
,LTC  -35.97K (0.64K) 
,LTC  24.67K (0.29K) 
Beq  2.487 (0.042) 
Beq  3.548 (0.047) 
,Beq  38.74K (1.11K) 
,Beq  45.10K (0.69K) 
11  0.177 (0.002) 
12  0.109 (0.001) 
21  14.98K (0.14K) 
22  11.98K (0.15K) 
23  8.11K (0.09K) 
31  15.24K (0.14K) 
32  9.84K (0.17K) 
33  19.33K (0.25K) 
N 5,471  
Log-likelihood -125,903  
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Table 1.3.  Stock Share Regression: Using Raw Responses to SSQs 
 1 2 
SSQ1 (10-20%) 0.028*** 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
SSQ1 (20-33%) 0.048*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
SSQ1 (33-50%) 0.059*** 0.046*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
SSQ1 (50-75%) 0.081*** 0.070*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
SSQ1 (75-100%) 0.037 0.037 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
SSQ2  -0.048** -0.034* 
(Share of wealth for LTC) (0.020) (0.020) 
SSQ3 0.008 0.015 
(Share of wealth for bequest) (0.015) (0.015) 
Coupled  -0.017** 
  (0.008) 
Male  0.024*** 
  (0.008) 
Age  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
Employer-sponsored  -0.046*** 
  (0.009) 
Health (≥Good)  -0.020 
  (0.016) 
Post college degree  0.034** 
  (0.015) 
College degree  0.027* 
  (0.014) 
Log income  0.014*** 
  (0.005) 
Log wealth  0.015*** 
  (0.004) 
LTC prob.  -0.023** 
  (0.012) 
Longevity prob.   0.044*** 
  (0.017) 
LTCI  -0.013 
  (0.008) 
N 5471 5471 
R2 0.011 0.031 
Note: For SSQ1, the most risk averse category (i.e., willing to risk 0–10% of their income to have a 50% 
chance of doubling income) is the omitted category.  For SSQ2 the raw response is defined as the share of 
wealth the respondent allots for the LTC state, averaged over the three questions. For SSQ3, it is the share 
of wealth bequeathed, averaged over the three questions.  For a description of the controls, see the note to 
Table 1.1.  
*= p<0.1, **=p<0.05,  ***=p<0.01 
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Table 1.4.  Stock Share Regression: Using Estimated Preference Parameters (Cardinal Proxies)  
 1 2 
log   0.027*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
log LTC  -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
log Beq  0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
LTC   0.034 0.038 
(in $100K) (0.023) (0.023) 
Beq  -0.029* -0.010 
(in $100K) (0.015) (0.016) 
Coupled  -0.016 
  (0.010) 
Male  0.014 
  (0.011) 
Age  -0.000 
  (0.001) 
Employer-sponsored  -0.036** 
  (0.015) 
Health (≥Good)  -0.011 
  (0.020) 
Post college degree  0.020 
  (0.018) 
College degree  0.020 
  (0.016) 
Log income  0.012* 
  (0.007) 
Log wealth  0.015*** 
  (0.005) 
LTC prob.  -0.032*** 
  (0.010) 
Longevity prob.   0.035* 
  (0.019) 
LTCI  -0.011 
  (0.008) 
N 5471 5471 
R2 0.009 0.029 
Note: See Section 1.5 for construction of the cardinal proxies.  For a description of the controls, see the 
note to Table 1.1. Standard errors are bootstrapped, with 100 repetitions.   
*= p<0.1, **=p<0.05,  ***=p<0.01 
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Table 1.5.  Implied Change in Stock Share by a Two-standard-deviation Increase in Each 
Preference Parameters 
 1 
(without control) 
2 
(with control) 
log   0.037 0.032 
log LTC  -0.046 -0.041 
log Beq  0.012 0.011 
LTC   0.017 0.019 
Beq  -0.026 -0.009 
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Table 1.6.  Calibration of Parameters for Baseline Model 
A. Heterogeneous preference parameters 
Parameters  Value 
   High 0.53 
 Medium 0.27 
 Low 0.13 
LTC   High 36.93 
 Medium 3.64 
 Low 0.36 
Beq  High 418.80 
 Medium 12.03 
 Low 0.34 
LTC  High -11.30K 
 Medium -35.97K 
 Low -60.64K 
Beq  High 83.84K 
 Medium 38.74K 
 Low -6.36K 
Note:  For each parameter, medium value is the mean value of the distribution (exponential of mean if the 
distribution of the parameter is log-normal) while high (low) value is the mean plus (minus) one standard 
deviation (again exponential of those values if the distribution of the parameters is log-normal).  
B. Other parameters 
Parameters Value Target/Source 
  -10.82K VRI estimation 
  0.96 Standard 
PC 10LTC K    Ameriks et al. (2015b) 
'ss   HRS estimation 
fR  1.02 Cocco et al. (2005) 
  0.17 Cocco et al. (2005) 
s  0.02 VRI stock share level 
y  {$45K, $90K, $120K} VRI data 
  0.5 VRI data 
2
  0.07 Cocco et al. (2005) 
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Figure 1.1.  Distribution of Responses to SSQs (N=5,471) 
(a) SSQ1 
 
Note: Risk categories show the downside risk that is accepted for a 50 percent chance of doubling income. 
0–10% is the most risk averse group while 75–100% is the most risk tolerant one.  
 
(b) SSQ2  
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(c) SSQ3 
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Figure 1.2.  Stock Share Policy Functions (with the median preference parameters) 
(a) Age 55 
 
(b) Age 80 
 
Note: Figure shows the optimal stock share policy function for healthy males, under various values of 
average income and median preferences.  The horizontal axis is financial wealth at the beginning of the 
period (in $1,000s), and the vertical axis is the optimal stock share.   
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Figure 1.3. Effects of heterogeneous preference parameters on optimal stock share (age 55, 
healthy, male)  
(a) Effect of γ 
 
(b) Effect of LTC  
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(c) Effect of 
Beq  
 
(d) Effect of LTC  
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(e) Effect of 
Beq  
 
Note: Figure shows the difference in the optimal stock share across different values for preference 
parameters, under various wealth and mean income levels, at age 55 for healthy males.   
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Figure 1.4. Effects of heterogeneous preference parameters on optimal stock share (age 80, 
healthy, male)  
(a) Effect of γ 
 
(b) Effect of LTC  
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(c) Effect of 
Beq  
 
(d) Effect of LTC  
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(e) Effect of 
Beq  
 
Note: Figure shows the difference in the optimal stock share across different values for preference 
parameters, under various wealth and mean income levels, at age 80 for healthy males.   
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Figure 1.5. Mechanism behind the effect of 
Beq  
(a) Effect of LTC shock on bequests 
 
Note: Figure shows the average amount of bequest conditional on age at death, Beq , and whether the 
household ever had LTC shock during its lifetime. Averages are calculated from 10,000 simulations for 
each Beq value. Each simulation starts with wealth of $700,000 and $90,000y  .  
(b) Survival rate  
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(c) Effect of 
Beq under no health-related risks 
  
Note: Figure shows the difference in the optimal stock share across different values Beq  under no LTC 
risk and mortality risk.  A household lives up to age 110 and then dies with probability one.  The figure is 
drawn for healthy males at age 55, with y  $90,000, under various wealth levels.  
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Figure 1.6. Effect of one-standard-deviation difference in 
Beq  
(a) Limited effects in the lower range of 
Beq  
 
(b) Larger effects at the higher range of Beq  
 
Note:  Figure is constructed in the same way as in Figure 1.5(c), but in this Figure I calculate the 
effect of one-standard-deviation differences in Beq .  
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Figure 1.7. Life-cycle profiles for wealth and stock share under various LTC  and Beq  
(a) Wealth with various LTC  
 
(b) Stock share with various LTC  
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(c) Wealth with various Beq  
 
(d) Stock share with various Beq  
 
Note: Figure shows the life-cycle profiles of wealth and stock share under various values of LTC .  
Profiles are calculated from 1,000 simulations for each parameter value.  Each simulation starts 
with wealth of $700,000 and $90,000y  .  
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Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation with Multiple Late-in-Life Saving Motives 
Appendix 
1-A. Details on Strategic Survey Questions (SSQs)  
Table 1-A1 shows the exact wordings and parameter values used for each type of SSQ.  Each 
type is asked multiple times with different amounts of given resources (W) and/or different 
likelihoods of relevant events (π).  
Figure 1-A1 shows an example of the interface—a bar with a slider—that is used in 
SSQ2 and SSQ3 to help respondents understand the underlying trade-off in allocating their 
resources.  In this figure, a respondent is answering the first question of SSQ2 (allocating 
$100,000 between Plan C and Plan D, where the chance of needing a LTC service in the next 
year is 25%).  When the respondent first sees this screen, it does not have a slider and there is 
only an empty bar.  Once the respondent clicks on the bar, the slider appears where she clicked.  
The purpose of this design is to prevent any anchoring effect of an arbitrarily-chosen initial 
location.  After the initial click, the respondent can move the slider to the left and right to adjust 
the allocation.  Whenever the slider is moved, the numbers below the bar, which show the 
amount of resources available for each state under the current allocation, automatically update.  
In this way, the respondent can see the consequence of her decision without needing to make 
complex calculations.   
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Table 1-A1.  Strategic Survey Questions  
SSQ1 (Risk tolerance)  
Set up Suppose you are 80 years old.  Suppose, further, that for the next year:  
 You live alone, rent your home, and pay all your own bills.  
 You are in good health and will remain in good health.  
 You will have no medical bills or other unexpected expenses.  
 You do not work.  
 
Hypothetical 
financial 
products 
 Plan A guarantees that you will have $W for spending next year.  
 Plan B will possibly provide you with more money, but is less certain.  
There is a 50% chance that Plan B would double your money, leaving 
you with $2W, and a 50% chance that it would cut it by x%, leaving 
you with $ (1 0.01 )x W  .   
Rules   You have no other assets or income, and so the only money you have 
available for all your spending next year is from either Plan A or Plan 
B.  
 Any money that is not spent at the end of next year cannot be saved for 
the future.  
 You cannot give any money away or leave it as a bequest.  
 If you need anything next year, you have to pay for it.  No one else can 
buy anything for you.  
 At the end of next year you will be offered the same choice with 
another $W for following year. 
Parameters 
asked 
100,000W  and 50,000.   
SSQ2 (LTC-state utility function) 
Set up  You are 80 years old, live alone, rent your home, and pay all your own 
bills.  
 There is a π chance that you will need help with ADLs for all of next 
year.  
 There is a (1- π) chance that you will not need any help at all with 
ADLs for all of next year.  
 You have $W to divide between two plans for the next year.  
 At the end of next year you will be offered the same choice with 
another $W for following year.  
Hypothetical 
financial 
products 
 Plan C is hypothetical ADL insurance that gives you $(1/ π) for each 
dollar invested if you do need help with ADLs.  
 Plan D gives you $1 for each dollar invested only if you do not need 
help with ADLs.    
Rules   You can only spend money from Plan C or Plan D next year.  You do 
not have any other money.  
 Any money that is not spent at the end of next year cannot be saved for 
the future, given away, or left as a bequest.  
 Regardless of whether or not you need help with ADLs, your hospital, 
72 
 
doctor bills, and medications are completely paid by insurance.   
 Other than Plan C, you have no other resources available to help with 
your long-term care.  You have to pay for any long-term care you may 
need from Plan C.  
 There is no public-care option or Medicaid if you do not have enough 
money to pay for a nursing home or other long-term care.  
 An impartial third party that you trust will verify whether or not you 
need help with ADLs immediately, impartially, and with complete 
accuracy.  
Parameters 
asked 
(W, π) = (100,000, 25%), (100,000, 50%) and (50,000, 25%). 
SSQ3 (Bequest utility function) 
Set up   You are 85 years old, live alone, rent your home, and pay all your own 
bills.   
 You know with certainty that you will live for only 12 more months 
and that you will need help with ADLs for the entire 12 months.  
 You have $W to split into the following two plans.  
Hypothetical 
financial 
products 
 Plan E is reserved for your spending.  From Plan E, you will need to 
pay all of your expenses, including long-term care and any other wants, 
needs, and discretionary purchases.  
 Plan F is an irrevocable bequest.  
Rules  You have no money other than $W.  
 No one—including friends or family—can take care of you for free.  
Long-term care must be purchased at market rates.  
 Any money in Plan E that you do not spend cannot be given away or 
left as a bequest. 
 Bequests from Plan F are not subject to any taxation.  
 You have full insurance that covers all of your hospital, doctor, and 
medications, but you have no long-term care insurance.  
 There is no public-care option or Medicaid if you do not have enough 
money to pay for a nursing home or other long-term care.  
Parameters 
asked 
W = 100,000, 150,000 and 200,000. 
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Figure 1-A1.  Example of the SSQ Interface  
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1-B.  Estimation of Preference Parameter Distribution Conditional on Covariates 
Table 1-B1 shows the results from the estimation conditional on the covariates.  For most of the 
covariates, they have offsetting effects on the multiplier and the necessity parameter so their 
effect on each saving motivation is ambiguous.  For example, for more educated respondents, the 
utility multiplier for the LTC state tends to be smaller while the corresponding necessity 
parameter tends to be more negative (i.e., the minimum expenditure in the LTC state increases).  
 The following variables have unambiguous effects on the saving motives.  Older 
respondents tend to be more risk averse.   They also have a stronger precautionary saving motive 
for LTC and a stronger bequest motive.  The strength of the bequest motive is also associated 
with a more pessimistic expectation regarding their own health (both LTC and longevity 
expectations) and a lower income level.  
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Table 1-B1. Estimated Distributions of the Preference Parameters and Survey Response Errors, 
Conditional on Covariates 
 Preference parameters 
      LTC  ,LTC  Beq  ,Beq  
Constant -1.147*** -12.473* 2.693*** -16.710 4.140*** 16.937 
 
(0.214) (7.192) (0.558) (10.242) (0.761) (16.451) 
Coupled -0.025 2.594*** 0.077 2.704** 0.641*** 1.498 
 (0.025) (0.883) (0.072) (1.210) (0.088) (1.678) 
Male 0.239*** -1.475* -0.798*** -9.527*** -0.579*** -15.097*** 
 (0.023) (0.849) (0.071) (1.238) (0.091) (1.731) 
Age -0.003* -0.118* 0.033*** -0.099 0.032*** -0.352*** 
 (0.002) (0.061) (0.005) (0.079) (0.006) (0.122) 
Employer-sponsored -0.108*** 6.624*** 0.496*** 12.407*** 0.424*** 0.596 
 (0.030) (1.147) (0.077) (2.077) (0.097) (2.127) 
Health (≥Good) -0.219*** 8.963*** 0.489*** 14.679*** 1.238*** 18.509*** 
 (0.049) (1.491) (0.162) (2.077) (0.200) (2.607) 
Post college degree 0.205*** -9.270*** -0.778*** -15.812*** -0.741*** -10.092*** 
 (0.037) (1.543) (0.114) (2.192) (0.152) (3.443) 
College degree 0.085** -5.000*** -0.558*** -7.088*** -0.558*** -7.771** 
 (0.034) (1.497) (0.103) (2.102) (0.145) (3.300) 
Log income 0.015 -0.589 -0.261*** -2.211** -0.277** 0.209 
 (0.014) (0.494) (0.029) (0.734) (0.054) (1.263) 
Log wealth -0.028*** 0.113 0.027 1.851*** -0.084** -5.913*** 
 (0.011) (0.400) (0.025) (0.560) (0.034) (0.795) 
LTC prob. 0.061* -1.726 -0.296** -12.479*** 0.409*** -7.569*** 
 (0.034) (1.177) (0.102) (1.674) (0.122) (2.344) 
Longevity prob.  0.316*** -7.851*** -0.650*** -11.733*** -0.861*** 3.876 
 (0.046) (1.728) (0.143) (2.383) (0.174) (3.680) 
LTCI -0.119*** 3.590*** -0.199** -2.340* -0.173* -2.961 
 (0.025) (0.952) (0.089) (1.314) (0.105) (1.910) 
Heterogeneity       
   0.679*** n/a 2.286*** 24.599*** 3.530*** 43.332*** 
  (0.007)  (0.029) (0.405) (0.046) (0.674) 
Measurement error     
11e  0.176*** 
 (0.002) 
12e  0.109*** 
 (0.001) 
21e  14.660*** 
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 (0.138) 
22e  11.834*** 
 (0.147) 
23e  7.994*** 
 (0.091) 
31e  15.081*** 
 (0.147) 
32e  9.703*** 
 (0.164) 
33e  19.204*** 
 (0.234) 
Log-likelihood -125,659   
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1-C.  Distribution of Expenditure Shares from a Static Problem  
To show the implications of the estimated parameter distributions more clearly, following 
Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015a), I conduct the following exercise. I 
assume the following maximization problem:  
 
1 1/1 1/1 1/
1 2 ,2 ,1
1, 2 , ,
1 2
( )( )( )
1 1/ 1 1/ 1 1/
. .   0 ,
iii
Beq iLTC i
x x LTC i Beq i
i i i
W x xxx
Max
s t x x W
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
  (1-C.1) 
which is a static problem with no uncertainty.  The household should divide the given resource 
W into three expenditures: expenditures in the healthy state ( 1x ), expenditures in the LTC state 
( 2 )x , and bequests ( 1 2W x x  ).  Although this problem is unrealistic, the solution can 
demonstrate the strength of each saving motivation under the estimated parameters.  For each 
individual, I solve (1-C.1) under W=$400K and $1M and the proxy values of the preference 
parameters.
29
  
In Figure 1-C1, I show the distribution of expenditure shares.  Under W=$400K, many 
respondents spend more than 40 percent of their wealth for expenditure in the LTC state.  About 
                                                          
29 For the parameters that are assumed to have log-normal distribution, I take the expectation of log of the 
parameters and take the exponential of it, to avoid Jensen’s inequality.  The proxy calculated in this way 
matches the median of the estimated distribution, though it misses the mean, in terms of the level of the 
parameter.  Furthermore, since the proxies are calculated as conditional expectations, it has mean 
reversion compared to the estimated distribution.  Hence plugging these proxies directly into (1-C.1) 
would yield less heterogeneity in saving motives compared to what the estimated distributions imply.  To 
correct this problem, in the case of log-normally distributed parameters, before I take exponential of the 
conditional expectation of the log of the parameter, I convert it by log ' log (log )
h
h h h 



    
where log h is the expected value of the log of the parameter,   is the estimated mean of the log-normal 
distribution, h is the standard deviation of log h and  is the estimated standard deviation of the log-
normal distribution.  Then I take the exponential of log 'h to calculate cardinal proxies for this exercise.  
For normally distributed parameters, I apply the same procedure except for that log operators are dropped 
in the above formula and do not take exponential at the end.   
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30 percent of respondents do not leave any bequests.  Not many respondents spend a large 
fraction of their resources in the healthy state.  When they have more resources (W=$1M), the 
share of expenditure in the LTC state tends to go down while the share of bequest tends to go up.  
These changes are driven by the differences in the necessity parameters, which make—on 
average—bequests luxury goods, and expenditures in the LTC state necessary goods.  
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Figure 1-C1.  Distribution of Expenditure Share in the Static Problem (N=5,471)  
(a) Share of expenditure in the healthy state 
 
(b) Share of expenditure in the LTC state 
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(c) Share of bequest 
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1-D.  Properties of the cardinal proxies constructed based on the KSS approach 
In this appendix I explain how using cardinal proxies, constructed under the KSS approach, in 
place of the true preference parameters can yield unbiased estimates in a linear regression.
30
  I 
also compare the KSS method used in this paper and the individual-level estimation used in 
Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b).  
 Let   denote the true preference parameter.  When   is observable, we can run the 
following regression:  
 y      (1-D.1) 
to estimate the relationship between dependent variable of interest (y) and  .  In this paper, I 
cannot observe  , so instead I use the proxy [ | ]h E R  where R  represents responses to the 
survey questions.  Let u h  .  Then the actual regression I am running is:  
 y h     (1-D.2) 
where u    .  If u  is a classical measurement error such that it is correlated with h , then 
h  is positively correlated with   so the regression yields an attenuation bias.  One important 
virtue of the KSS approach—estimating the population distribution of the parameters first and 
then calculating cardinal proxies as conditional expectations—is that the resulting cardinal proxy 
h  is uncorrelated with u by construction because h is the result of projection and u is the error 
term in that projection.  Instead, u  is correlated with the true preference parameter  . 
 To show this property visually, I run the following simulation.  I assume that the true 
preference parameter is distributed as .  I do not observe this parameter, but I 
                                                          
30
 This discussion is based on Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008).  
2log( ) ~ ( , )i N  
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observe a survey response generated as .  I assume that   are 
unknown while  is known.  I estimate the unknown parameters using the KSS method and 
then construct the cardinal proxy h  for  .  Figure 1-D1(a) shows the scatter plot of h  and  .  
Given any level of h , distribution of observations is symmetric across the 45-degree line, 
showing that there is no correlation between h  and u .  It is also clear that u is correlated with 
 : for large values of   the observations are much more likely to be below the 45-degree line, 
while the opposite is true for small values of  .31  This is because of mean reversion in h , 
which comes from the fact that h  is calculated as a conditional expectation.  A downside of the 
KSS method is that, due to this mean reversion, the proxy values should not be directly used to 
calibrate parameters at the individual level in a heterogeneous agent model.  The degree of 
heterogeneity in h is much smaller than the estimated heterogeneity in the population 
distribution.   
 An alternative approach is the individual-level estimation used in Ameriks, Briggs, 
Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b).  The underlying model—utility functions and survey 
response generation processes—is almost the same as that used in this paper.  The main 
difference is that, instead of estimating the population distribution of the parameters, it directly 
estimates preference parameters at the individual level, using the responses of each individual 
only.  The likelihood function is maximized over individual preference parameters, not over 
moments of population distribution of the parameters.  The parameters estimated in this way can 
                                                          
31
 Note that in a linear regression that also has other covariates in the RHS, u can be correlated 
with those controls through  , resulting in biased estimates.  To correct this, I can make the 
mean of the parameter distributions (  ) a linear function of the controls that will be included in 
the second stage regression.  This would enable us to obtain unbiased estimates in that u would 
not be correlated with any of the controls or with the proxy.  
2,  ~ (0, )i i i iR N     
2, 
2

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also be considered as the cardinal proxies (h) for the parameters for each individual.  One 
advantage of this approach is that it does not make any functional form assumption for the 
population distribution.  Also, there is no mean reversion in h  since h  is not calculated as 
conditional expectation anymore.  The absence of mean reversion makes the estimates attractive 
for calibrating a heterogeneous agent model at the individual level as in Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, 
Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015b).  One main disadvantage is that now h  is positively correlated with 
u , since survey response error directly affects both the point estimate (and hence the proxy) for 
each individual and the difference between the proxy and the true parameter.  The correlation 
between h and u  makes the estimates improper as regressors in a linear regression. Figure 1-
D1(b) shows the scatter plot between h and u under the individual-level estimation, in the same 
exercise as in 1-D1(a).  (In 1-D1(b), h is nothing but R.)  Under this method, u is uncorrelated 
with  : given any level of  , the distribution of observations is symmetrical with respect to the 
45-degree line.  In contrast, this distribution is correlated with h: for a large value of h  the 
observations are more likely to be above the 45-degree line and the opposite is true for a small 
value of h .  
 This discussion shows that the choice of the estimation method should be based on how 
estimates will be used in the analysis.  
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Figure 1-D1.  Scatter plot of true parameter ( ) and cardinal proxy ( h ) 
(a) KSS method 
 
(b) Individual-level estimation 
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1-E.  Estimation of Health State Transition Matrix using the HRS 
I use an approach similar to that in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2013).  To define health status, 
I use the self-reported subjective health data from the HRS:  s G  corresponds to {Excellent, 
Very Good, Good} in the subjective health report and s B  to {Fair, Poor}.  As long as a 
respondent reports that she requires help for at least one activity of daily living (ADL), then she 
is classified as s LTC .32  The transition to death ( s D ) is identified with the exit report in 
the HRS.  
 Let x be a vector that includes a constant, age, gender, and square of age and interactions 
of these variables, as well as indicators for previous health status and previous health interacted 
with age.  I estimate a multinomial logit model, such that for { , , }i G B LTC and 
{ , , , }j G B LTC D ,  
 { , , , }
Pr( ' | )
     = /
1,  
exp( ),  i, { , , }
ij
ij ik
k G B LTC D
iD
ik k
s j s i
i
x k G B LTC

 

 

  
 
  

  (1-E.1) 
where { . , }{ }k k G B LTC   are sets of coefficient vectors and of course Pr( ' | ) 1s D s D   .    
 Note that what I need is an annual transition matrix while the HRS data have information 
on biannual transitions.  These two transition processes are linked, however, by: 
 
, 1 ,
Pr( '' | ) Pr( '' | ' ) Pr( ' | )
                          =
k
kj t ik t
k
s j s i s j s k s k s i
 
      

  (1-E.2) 
                                                          
32
 This definition of the LTC state is the closest to that in the VRI survey.    
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where the subscript t shows that the transition probability is a function of age (which is part of x).  
(1-E.1) and (1-E.2) allow us to estimate 
{ . , }{ }k k G B LTC   directly from the data using maximum 
likelihood estimation.  The transition matrix is built on the estimated coefficients.  
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Chapter 2.  Heterogeneity in Expectations, Risk Tolerance, and Household 
Stock Shares 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The source of heterogeneity in portfolio choices is an important question in household finance 
(Campbell, 2006). Theories, such as consumption CAPM, predict that the share of risky assets 
should be positively related to their expected returns, negatively related to their risk, and 
positively related to investors’ risk tolerance. Heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs are 
therefore natural candidates for explaining heterogeneity in household portfolios.  
The existing literature addresses various aspects of heterogeneity.  Differences in 
experience can cause different portfolio choices of households (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; 
Seru, Shumway and Stoffman, 2010) as well as professional investors (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003; 
Greenwood and Nagel, 2009). These effects may operate through preferences and beliefs as 
experience can influence both.
1
 The association of portfolio allocation with wealth, and 
individual heterogeneity in that association, may also be driven, at least in part, by expectations 
and preferences (Calvet and Sodini, 2014). The recent literature has established the role of risk 
preference and beliefs about future returns in the stock share of household portfolios, although 
most papers examined stock ownership, that is, the extensive margin, because there are 
frequently so many households with no stock holdings in the data. The focus on the extensive 
margin makes quantitative comparisons against benchmark portfolio choice models difficult 
                                                   
1
 See, for example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), Glaser and Weber (2005), Hurd, van Rooij and Winter 
(2011), Hudomiet, Kezdi and Willis (2011), Amromin and Sharpe (2012), Hoffman, Post and Pennings 
(2013), and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2014). Heterogeneity in expectations is also important in other 
contexts, for example, for the housing market (see Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009) and for inflation (see 
Malmendier and Nagel, forthcoming; Armantier et al., 2013; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2011). 
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because their predictions largely concern the magnitude of the intensive margin response of 
portfolio shares to preferences and beliefs.
2
 Indeed, explaining heterogeneity at the intensive 
margin, that is, the share of stocks in the portfolio of stock market participants, has remained 
rather elusive (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008). An important reason behind the scarcity of 
empirical results is the lack of appropriate data. Good data on portfolio composition are needed 
for a large enough sample of stockholding households, complemented with appropriate measures 
of preferences and beliefs. 
This paper takes a comprehensive approach to examining heterogeneity in portfolio 
choice by using a distinctive data set created by the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) that 
combines administrative account data and survey responses for a large sample of Vanguard 
account holders.  The VRI has multiple features that make it especially well-suited for 
examination of heterogeneity in stock holdings. 
First, it is a large sample of stock holders.  Moreover, despite being drawn from the 
account holders of a single company, the characteristics of the sample are broadly representative 
of the targeted population of households with non-negligible financial assets.  Hence, unlike 
                                                   
2
 In papers that examine the extensive margin, Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997), Dohmen, 
Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2010) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2014) show that more risk tolerant 
individuals are more likely to hold stocks, while Dominitz and Manski (2007) and Hurd, Rooij and 
Winter (2011) show that individuals with higher levels of stock market expectations and lower perceived 
risk are more likely to hold stocks. Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008) model the intensive margin. Kezdi 
and Willis (2011) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013) combine the extensive 
and intensive margins in Tobit-type models and establish associations with risk tolerance, expectations 
and ambiguity aversion, respectively. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Amromin and Sharpe (2012) show 
that expectations are related to the share of stocks among stockholders but they do not consider risk 
tolerance. Weber, Weber and Nosic (2013) show that individual measures of risk tolerance and 
expectations predict the share of stocks respondents invest in a hypothetical financial portfolio. 
Hoffmann, Post and Pennings (2013) and Merkle and Weber (2011) analyze the role of expectations and 
risk tolerance in trading behavior of individual investors rather than the share of stocks in household 
portfolios.  
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most studies that focus on the extensive margin for stock holdings, this sample will allow for 
meaningful inferences about the intensive margin of portfolio choice. 
Second, the VRI survey includes batteries of questions that we purposely designed to 
produce estimates of preference and belief parameters that should help to explain the cross- 
distribution of portfolio choices.  These survey questions yield quantitative estimates of 
individual-level moments of subjective returns distribution and of individual-level values of 
preference parameters.  These estimates can then be related to portfolio decisions in ways that 
are quantitatively interpretable relative to benchmark economic models.    
Third, the design of the VRI allows careful consideration of response errors along a 
variety of dimensions.  These include errors in measuring stock shares in both survey and 
administrative data and errors in eliciting preferences and expectations from survey responses. 
These features—a large, broadly representative sample of stockholders together with 
quantitative measurements of the potential sources of heterogeneity in stockholding—make the 
VRI a unique platform for understanding why different households make different portfolio 
choices. 
Section 2.2 describes the VRI sample and the measurements of stock share.  It addresses 
the relationship between Vanguard assets and households’ overall assets.  It also compares 
administrative and survey measures of portfolio shares.  Section 2.3 describes how we measure 
preferences and beliefs.  To get individual-specific estimates of preference parameters, we use a 
modification of the Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) approach of eliciting risk 
tolerance from hypothetical gambles over permanent income.  To get individual-specific 
estimates of the moments of the perceived distribution of returns, we use both the Manski (2004) 
approach of eliciting points in the CDF of perceived returns together with individuals’ estimates 
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of expected returns.  We use a unified procedure accounting for response error to produce 
unbiased estimates of the subjective variables for both preferences and beliefs. Section 2.4 
combines these estimates to explain the cross-section of stock shares.  We find that the stock 
share is positively related to the individuals’ perceived expected stock returns, is negatively 
related to their perceived standard deviation of the returns, and is positively related to their risk 
tolerance.  These relationships are economically and statistically significant, they are robust 
across many specifications, and they are substantially less attenuated than corresponding 
estimates that do not take care of measurement error in the survey answers.  The relative 
magnitude of the importance of expected returns, standard deviation of returns, and risk 
tolerance for explaining portfolio shares is quite close to the predictions of benchmark theory, 
though the absolute magnitudes are much smaller than theory would predict. Additional results 
suggest that the selected nature of our sample is unlikely to explain this attenuation.   
Hence, though the results show that it is possible to use survey responses about 
economically-relevant subjective variables to explain meaningful features of stock holding, the 
actual distribution of stockholding varies less with the subjective variables than theory would 
predict given the measured heterogeneity in subjective variables. We call the finding that 
portfolio shares have a damped response to preferences and beliefs the “attenuation puzzle.” The 
paper uses two benchmark models of portfolio choice to assess the relationship between 
quantitative measures of preferences and beliefs—the classic Merton model and a richer 
lifecycle model that makes more realistic assumptions about the environment for portfolio 
choice.  The paper’s contributions to the measurement of preferences and beliefs address head-on 
potential explanations for the attenuation puzzle based on the measurement and modeling of 
preferences and beliefs: 
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 First, in contrast to measures of risk tolerance and expected returns based on loose or 
vague attitudinal scales, this paper presents quantitative estimates of the preference and 
belief parameters that theory mandates should determine portfolio choice. 
 Second, this paper uses a statistical approach where the estimated individual-specific 
preference and belief parameters are by construction uncorrelated with the measurement 
errors that arise from the response errors that are inherent in eliciting subjective responses 
from individuals. 
Hence, the estimated relationships presented in the paper are not subject to the attenuation biases 
that arise from having regressors that are only loose proxies for the variables of interest or that 
are subject to classical errors in variables.  Consequently, our findings imply that the attenuation 
puzzle is a feature of investor behavior that is not well-captured by benchmark models. 
 
2.2   VRI Data and Stock Share Measurement 
2.2.1 VRI sample 
The Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) consists of linked survey and administrative data of 
account holders who have non-negligible financial assets at Vanguard, are at least 55 years old, 
and use the Internet to access their Vanguard accounts. This last requirement is necessary 
because the VRI is an Internet survey. The VRI is an individual level survey, but it includes 
questions about household-level wealth and income as well as questions about spouses’ or 
partners’ demographics and labor supply. The survey oversampled older account holders and 
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singles.  The VRI draws respondents from two lines of business—individual account holders and 
employer-sponsored account holders.
3
   
 We use responses to three VRI surveys, conducted in the fall of 2013, winter of 2014 and 
summer of 2014.
4
  The main focus of the first survey was to inventory income, wealth and 
portfolio of households as well as to gather basis demographics.  The second survey 
implemented Strategic Survey Questions (SSQs), which ask respondents to make choices under 
hypothetical situations designed to elicit meaningful preference data.  This paper uses the 
questions about risk preference. The third survey includes the questions about beliefs about 
returns used for this paper, and also covers a number of issues not related to this paper.  4,730 
respondents completed all the three surveys.  The item non-response rate of the VRI is 
remarkably low. Our analysis includes the 4,414 respondents with non-missing observations for 
all the variables used in the analysis.   
The VRI sample frame is based on administrative account data for Vanguard.  Having 
such data to create a sample is an important element of the VRI design.  Additionally, 
administrative data are composed of monthly history of Vanguard assets, with information on 
types, balances and stock shares of the accounts linked to the survey measures.  This paper uses 
both survey and administrative measures of assets and their composition.  The survey measure 
covers all assets, not just those held at Vanguard.  See Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro and Tonetti 
                                                   
3
 The employer-sponsored are enrolled at Vanguard through 401(k) or similar defined-contribution 
accounts.  While both individual and employer-sponsored account holders are selected via ownership of a 
Vanguard account, the selection into individual and employer-sponsored accounts is presumably quite 
different.  We will present separate estimates to get a sense of whether selection matters for results. 
4
 The plan is to implement the VRI as a panel.  These three surveys, however, cover distinctive topics 
with little longitudinal content.  They were broken into three surveys of 40 to 60 minutes for the practical 
reason of not overwhelming respondents. 
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(2014a, 2014b) for a detailed discussion of the design of the VRI including sampling and 
response rates, and of the VRI’s approach to wealth measurement.  
 Details of the measurement and distributions of stock shares, preference parameters, and 
stock market expectations will be discussed in the next sections.  Here we briefly describe the 
measurement of wealth and other variables that are used in the analysis: marital status, gender, 
age, education, earnings, annuity income, expectations about longevity and long-term care use..   
The VRI survey measure of wealth is based on a comprehensive account-by-account 
approach.  The survey first asked about types of accounts respondents have (e.g. IRA, checking, 
money market funds) and the number each type of account held by the respondent or her spouse.  
For each account they indicated owning, the respondents were asked to provide the balance as 
well as the share of stock-market assets.  When finished with all accounts, respondents were 
presented a summary table consolidating their responses and were invited to make corrections, if 
any.  
Measuring wealth and stock shares account by account matches the way respondents 
keep track of their own wealth, and it does not require them to sum balances across accounts to 
provide total figures for asset categories that are familiar to economists but less so to survey 
respondents.  In contrast, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF)—other leading surveys with state of the art wealth measurement—use account-
by-account approaches but only for selected sets of account types.  Item non-response in the 
wealth section of the VRI affects less than 1 percent of the observations.
5
  
 
                                                   
5
 Summary statistics of the wealth measures are shown in Table 2-A1 in the Appendix.  Table 2-A2 in the 
Appendix shows the summary statistics of the variables we use as controls in our analysis, together with 
the definition of those variables. 
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Table 2.1 compares the VRI sample to the HRS and SCF.
6
  The HRS and SCF are 
nationally representative samples (of those above age 50 in the case of the HRS). Table 2.1 
compares the VRI sample to the subsample of the HRS and SCF after imposing restrictions 
similar to VRI eligibility: being at least 55 years old, having access to Internet at home, and 
having at least $10,000 financial wealth. The table shows the number of households, the number 
of stock holding households, average financial wealth and total wealth, average stock shares, and 
some demographic characteristics of the individuals responding each survey. 
The number of respondents who completed Survey 1 is substantially larger than the VRI-
eligible subsample of the HRS and the SCF. The difference in the number of respondent in stock 
holder households is even larger: while the parallel sample has slightly over 1,000 stock-holding 
households in the SCF and slightly over 2,000 in the HRS, the entire VRI sample has more than 
8,000 stock holders and the sample used in our analysis has more than 4,000. 
The demographic composition of the VRI sample is very similar to the parallel 
subsamples of the HRS and the SCF. Average total wealth and average financial wealth in the 
VRI are remarkably close to corresponding estimates from the SCF; the HRS estimates are 
lower. The average stock share in financial wealth among stock holders is very similar in the 
VRI and the HRS; the SCF estimates are somewhat smaller. VRI respondents are slightly less 
likely to be married, and they are somewhat older, more educated and more likely to be retired. 
The differences in marital status, age and retirement are largely due to the fact that the VRI 
oversampled older individuals and singles. 65 percent of the VRI sample is male, compared to 79 
percent in the SCF and 56 percent in the HRS. While the respondent-level compositions are 
arbitrary to some degree (account holders in the VRI, financial respondents in the HRS, and 
                                                   
6
 This comparison with the HRS and the SCF draws on Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro and Tonetti 
(2014a). See this for further details about the VRI sample and wealth measurement. 
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household heads in the SCF), the fact men are overrepresented in all samples reflects that they 
are more likely to own accounts with substantial wealth. The sample used in our analysis is very 
similar to the initial VRI sample indicating that attrition between the VRI surveys was close to be 
random. 
2.2.2. Measuring stock shares 
Our analysis focuses on the share of stock market-based assets in total financial wealth.
7
 The 
stock share in financial wealth is the weighted average of the stock shares of the accounts as 
reported by the respondents. Respondents who did not answer all of the account-by-account 
stock share questions were asked the overall stock share of their financial portfolio.  Ninety-five 
percent of respondents answered all the account-by-account stock share questions; the 
distribution of stock share is very similar across the two groups.   
 Besides the overall stock share we also analyze the stock share in wealth held at 
Vanguard based on administrative data. The monthly history of accounts in the VRI 
administrative data breaks down the balance of each account into stock, bond and money market 
holdings.  This break-down is not readily available for all accounts, so we imputed stock share 
when needed using information on the type of fund the account is invested in (e.g., for an 
account invested in a balanced fund, we assume 60% of stock share). The administrative stock 
share measure is available both at around the time when the stock expectation questions are 
asked and also at the time when the survey measure of household portfolio is obtained (the 
wealth survey took place in the fall of 2013, while expectations were asked in the summer of 
                                                   
7 Specifying stock share in financial wealth is standard in the literature. Alternative measures may include 
housing wealth and human capital wealth in the denominator. We include such wealth items as control 
variables in the analysis and show that their inclusion leads to very similar results for the parameters of 
interest. 
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2014). At the same time, the administrative stock share measure corresponds to the subset of 
financial wealth held at Vanguard. 
Figure 2.1 compares the stock share measures based on the survey and the administrative 
data that will be the main dependent variables for our analysis. The horizontal axis shows the 
administrative measure of the stock share in assets held at Vanguard at the time we measured 
expectations in Survey 3, while the vertical axis shows the Survey 1 measure of stock share in 
total financial assets.
8
 The size of the marks on the figure is proportional to the Vanguard 
financial wealth of the respondents. The figure shows that many observations are near the 45-
degree line, so as a practical matter either measure may provide similar inferences for many 
respondents.  At the same time, the two are often different.  Indeed, the correlation coefficient is 
only 0.61.
9
  The two measures can be different for three main reasons. First, they are measured at 
different times, in summer 2014 versus fall 2013. Second, they refer to different sets of assets: 
Vanguard assets versus all financial assets. Third, they are measured in different ways: using 
administrative records versus answers to survey questions.   
It is important to understand which of these differences matter.  Figures 2-2 through 2-4 
compare alternative stock share measures broken down by the time of measurement, the accounts 
covered, and the method of measurement (survey or administrative). First, consider the time 
dimension. The horizontal axis of Figure 2-2 shows the stock share in assets held at Vanguard at 
the time of Survey 1 (fall 2013), while the vertical axis shows the same, measured at the time of 
Survey 3 (summer 2014). Almost all observations are on the 45 degree line, and the correlation is 
very strong (0.95), implying that the stock share changed little over this time period. As a 
                                                   
8
 Due to the imputation used for the balanced funds, there is bunching at 60 percent according to the 
administrative measure.  
9
 All figures and correlation coefficients are weighted by Vanguard wealth. The unweighted correlation is 
0.40, indicating that deviations are somewhat larger if wealth is low. 
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practical matter, this means that changes in portfolios between administration of the VRI surveys 
is very small, so that differences in when the various questions were fielded is likely not that 
important.  It is also of substantive interest that portfolio shares are so sticky, something that we 
see also in much longer intervals of the administrative data.   
Second, consider the issue of whether or not the assets are held at Vanguard.  Figure 2.3 
plots stock share at Vanguard versus overall, both measured as survey responses in Survey 1.  
There is relatively high correlation in the stock shares (correlation = 0.81), so differences in 
portfolio shares across providers, though not trivial, is not the main source of the dispersion 
shown in Figure 2.1. The difference can be small because account holders have most of their 
assets at Vanguard, or that they have asset compositions that are similar across Vanguard and 
non-Vanguard providers.   
Third, Figure 2.4 shows the stock share at Vanguard at the time of Survey 1.  
Administrative data are on the horizontal axis and survey data are on the vertical axis.  The 
dispersion is very much as in Figure 2.1 (correlation = 0.64).  Hence, it turns out that the main 
source of the dispersion is the deviation between survey and administrative measurements, not 
difference in timing or difference arising from Vanguard versus overall portfolios. 
Several findings of independent interest emerge.  First, based on the administrative data, 
portfolio shares are quite sticky over time.  Second, the deviations of survey and administrative 
measures of portfolios suggest that individuals perceive different stock exposure than they have 
at any moment.  Both these findings present challenges to standard theories of portfolio choice 
and therefore affect the interpretation of results relating portfolio choices to preferences and 
beliefs.  We return to these issues after presenting the results. 
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2.3.  Measuring Preferences and Expectations 
2.3.3 Measuring risk tolerance 
Survey 2 of the VRI included Strategic Survey Questions (SSQs) that ask respondents to make 
choices between hypothetical financial products under hypothetical situations.  By specifying 
hypothetical situations that are independent from their own economic, health and family 
conditions, these SSQs enable us to better estimate structural preference parameters. This 
approach to measurement was pioneered by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) for 
measuring risk preference in the HRS and Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh 
(2011) for measuring preferences surrounding long-term care.  The approach is refined and 
extended in the VRI (see Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro and Tonetti, 2015a, b).  In this paper, 
we use the VRI’s risk tolerance questions that pose gambles over consumption.  The VRI risk 
preference questions ask about preference between having a certain level of consumption and a 
50-50 chance of having double that level of consumption versus having it fall by x%.  It then 
alters the downside risk x to partition respondents into risk tolerance groups.10  Table 2-A3 in 
Appendix 2-A gives the exact wording of the risk tolerance question in the VRI.   
The question is asked for two different levels of riskless consumption, $100K and $50K 
per year, and downside risks of 1/10, 1/5, 1/3, 1/2, and 3/4. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of 
the answers to the two questions.  Most respondents have low tolerance for risk.  About half of 
the respondents chose the first two categories, indicating that they would not accept a risk of 
more than 20% drop in their consumption to take a chance to double their consumption. Only a 
small fraction chose the last two categories with a risk of more than a 50% drop. Overall, the 
                                                   
10
 The original HRS question has the same structure, but asks about gambles over life-time income rather 
than consumption.   
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distribution is similar to the distribution of the answers to a similar question in the HRS except 
that the fraction of respondents in the two extreme categories (0-10% and 75-100%) is slightly 
lower in the VRI (see Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro 2008 for HRS).   
The Table 2.1 shows that more respondents fall into the lower risk categories when 
riskless consumption is $50,000 instead of $100,000.  We will handle this increase relative risk 
tolerance by positing a utility function with a subsistence level of consumption.  Following 
Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) and Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008), we will use 
the multiple responses to identify the heterogeneity of the preference parameter and survey 
response errors (see details below). 
Estimation of a cardinal risk tolerance parameter requires specifying a utility function. 
We assume that the flow utility function is a generalization of CRRA with a subsistence level of 
consumption  
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where subscript i denotes heterogeneity across individuals, c is consumption, the negative of κ is 
the subsistence level of consumption, assumed to be the same for all individuals, and γ is the 
parameter of risk tolerance.   
For this utility function, relative risk tolerance (RRTi) is  
i i i
c
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where the risk tolerance parameter  i  is relative risk tolerance in the 0  case. See Figure 1-
A1 in the Appendix for the relationship of relative risk tolerance and γ as a function of 
consumption.  
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 To parameterize the heterogeneity of the risk tolerance parameter, we assume that the 
parameter is distributed lognormally in the population according to  
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We model the measurement error as a log additive term to the parameter, such that 
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where i  is the true risk tolerance parameter for individual i, ij  is measurement error, and ij is 
the risk tolerance parameter that provides the basis for individual i’s response to the jth question.  
Thus, in answering question j given the level of resource c and risk x that are associated with the 
risky gamble, the respondent compares  
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to determine whether to accept the risky gamble or not.  This approach follows Kimball, Sahm, 
and Shapiro (2008). We carried out the estimation procedure jointly for risk tolerance and stock 
market expectations, so will defer discussion of estimation until Section 2.3.3 below. 
2.3.2. Measuring beliefs about stock returns 
Survey 3 of the VRI asked about beliefs about the one-year return of the U.S. stock market, 
represented by a stock market index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). 
Respondents had to answer three questions: the expected return on the stock market in the 12 
months following the interview (m); the percent chance that the stock market will be higher in 12 
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months following the interview (p0) and the percent chance that it will be at least 20% higher 
(p20).  The exact wording of the questions is in Table 1-A4 in the Appendix.11  
Answers to the expected value questions were constrained to be integers. Answers to the 
percent chance questions were constrained to be 5 point increments between 0 and 15 and 
between 85 and 100, and they were constrained to be 10 point increments between 15 and 85 (the 
set  {0,5,10,15,25,35,45,55,65,75,85,90,95,100} ). Answers to percent chance questions tend to 
be rounded to the nearest ten when they are not constrained, with an especially large fraction 
answering 50 percent (Hurd, 2009). The constraints in the VRI survey forced people to round to 
other values; in particular, they don’t allow for 50 percent answers. Another constraint on the 
answers ensured that 20 0p p .12  No constraints were put on m versus p0 and p20.13  
Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics of the answers to the questions about the 
distribution of stock market returns.  The survey responses for expected returns (m) are 
distributed around the historical average of 4 to 7 percent depending on sample period, and their 
dispersion is moderate.
14
 In contrast, most answers to the probability questions are lower than the 
historical probabilities, and they have substantial heterogeneity. A non-negligible fraction of the 
respondents gave a positive number to the expected return question (m) and a less than 50 
percent chance answer to the probability of a positive return (p0). Taken together these answer 
patterns are consistent with many individuals implicitly applying a positive threshold when they 
                                                   
11
 Bruine de Bruin et al. (2011) and Armantier et al. (2013) examine the reliability of the percent chance 
questions for inflation as well as how they relate to questions about point expectations of inflation.  
12
 Respondents whose initial answer to p20 violated this constraint are reminded of the constraint by the 
survey software and asked for a new reply to either p0 or p20 (or both). 
13
 A randomly selected half of the respondents received the m question first, followed by p0 and p20, 
while the other half received p0 and p20 first, followed by m. The distribution of the responses is different 
across the two sequences, but those differences do not affect our main results.  
14
 Individuals may use different sample windows for inferring expected returns (see Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011).  The table shows some different windows for realized returns.  Average returns are quite 
variable owing to the well-known problem of estimating the expected return on the market. 
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answer the p0 question (by thinking that the stock market goes up only if it goes up by at least 
some positive amount).
15
 
In order to use our data more efficiently and in a way that is more informative from a 
theoretical point of view we map the three survey responses, m, p0, and p20 into a perceived 
returns distribution. The procedure closely parallels that for the risk tolerance questions: the 
survey responses are based on individual beliefs drawn from normal distribution plus survey 
response error.  We assume that individual i believes that yearly returns follow a lognormal 
distribution with individual-specific mean and standard deviation of log stock returns of μi and σi.  
Similar to how we handle the cross-sectional distribution of the risk tolerance parameter, these 
parameters are drawn across individuals as 
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Individuals answer the survey questions m, p0 and p20 based on their beliefs, but their answers 
contain survey noise, that is, measurement error specific to the survey situation.  Using the 
structure of the survey questions on expected returns and the two points of the probability 
distribution, applying the assumption of lognormal returns, and adding survey response error 
yields  
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15
 Glaser, Langer, Reynders and Weber (2007) document a similar pattern when they compare stock 
market expectations elicited in terms of returns versus prices. They label the phenomenon as “framing 
effect,” and our explanation can be viewed as a source of such a framing effect. Note that, although 
skewed returns could explain the phenomenon we observe, it is an unlikely explanation. The combination 
mi>0 and p0i<0.5 would correspond to long positive tails, implying mean above the median and 
infrequent large gains. This skewedness is the opposite of what one would expect from a “black swan” 
theory of infrequent stock market crashes. 
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where 
im , 0ip , and 20ip  are the error-ridden variables that determine survey responses. Survey 
error is assumed to be independent across the three answers, with mean zero except for p0 where 
its mean is  , which allows for the documented differences between m and p0. An 
interpretation of   is that, on average, respondents answer the question about positive returns 
(p0) as if they had some positive threshold in mind instead of zero (  / i   , 0  ).  The 
variables 
im , 0ip , and 20ip  are before rounding.  Recall that the VRI probability scale is for 
rounded responses.  Similarly, as discussed above, the risk tolerance questions yield discrete 
responses. The next section discusses how our estimation procedure handles this issue. 
2.3.3. Joint estimation of heterogeneity in stock market expectations and risk tolerance 
Given the models of heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs (equations (2.2) and (2.5)), the 
structural interpretation of the survey questions  together with the additive survey response errors 
((2.3), (2.4), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8)), we can now move to estimation of the model.  The 
parameters to be estimated are 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2, ,  , ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  u u u m p                    .  We 
allow for  , ,  , and   to vary with covariates.  Additionally, we allow the beliefs about 
returns to depend on risk preference, so the covariates of   and   include the latent i . The 
estimation method is maximum likelihood.  It allows for interval responses to the risk tolerance 
question and the returns questions. Appendix 2-B shows the likelihood function.  
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Table 2.4 shows key estimated statistics of the distribution of preferences and beliefs 
based on the estimated statistical model of preferences, beliefs, and response error.  Table 2-A5 
in the appendix shows the estimates of the underlying parameters of the model.
16
  The 
subsistence level of consumption (−κ) is estimated to be $17,000.17  The estimated mean of the 
risk tolerance parameter (γ) implies low risk tolerance on average.  A respondent with the mean 
level of γ and κ has relative risk tolerance 0.34 (relative risk aversion 2.9) when the consumption 
level is $100,000.  In terms of the SSQ question, she would be indifferent between a fixed 
consumption of $100,000 and the 50-50 gamble of doubling that consumption and losing 20 
percent. There is a considerable heterogeneity in risk tolerance.  At the 25th percentile of risk 
tolerance parameter, the point of indifference is the downside risk of losing 13 percent; at the 
75th percentile the point of indifference is the downside risk of losing 29 percent.  These 
numbers indicate higher levels of risk tolerance than in a representative sample of Americans 
older than 50 years of age. Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008) estimate the corresponding risk 
tolerance percentiles (25th, 50th and 75th) to imply indifference to 7, 12 and 20 percent of 
downside risk, respectively. 
Beliefs about mean stock returns are in line with historical mean returns, on average.  
Beliefs about standard deviation are slightly lower than the historical value of 0.16.  
Heterogeneity in perceived mean returns (μ) is substantial, with the lowest 25 percent believing 
expected returns to be 2 percent or less and the top 25 percent believing 12 percent or more. At 
the same time, estimated heterogeneity in the perceived standard deviation of stock returns (σ) is 
                                                   
16
 The summary statistics in Table 2.4 are from estimates without covariates.  Appendix Table 2-A6 
reports the estimates of the statistical model with covariates.   
17
 The design of the SSQ does not allow heterogeneity in κ to be readily identified, although it tightly 
identifies its mean.  
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small, perhaps because it is easier for people to estimate the second moment of the returns 
distribution than the first moment, as pointed out by Merton (1980).
18,19 
Based on the estimated distribution summarized in Table 2.4, 17 percent of the 
population expects negative stock returns. As we will see, this part of the population holds less 
stock than on average, but still has substantial stock market exposure. Symmetrically, 17 percent 
expect returns to be larger than 12 percent, rates of return that should make people hold the vast 
majority of their wealth in stocks given the distribution of risk and risk preferences. Though this 
part of the population holds more stock than on average, very high stock shares are uncommon. 
Taken together, these facts suggest that expectations translate into stock shares in an attenuated 
fashion, a finding that our analysis will verify in the next section. 
The Table 2.4 results take into account substantial estimated survey noise. Again, the 
parameters of the survey noise distributions are presented in Appendix Table 2-A5.  To 
understand the magnitude of noise, consider the differences in terms of the survey responses of 
individuals with the estimated averages of latent preferences and beliefs, one without 
measurement error and one with a positive standard deviation unit shock of measurement error. 
A one standard deviation unit measurement error in the first risk tolerance SSQ would make the 
survey response imply a point of indifference of a 38% drop of consumption instead of the 20% 
                                                   
18
 According to our estimates heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs are weakly related. More risk 
tolerant respondents believe that stock returns are slightly higher, but we don’t find association of risk 
tolerance and beliefs about the standard deviation of returns. Beliefs about the mean and the standard 
deviation of returns are weakly positively correlated.  
19
 Preferences and beliefs are significantly related to observable right hand side variables in our sample 
(Table 2.A5 in the Appendix). However, when interpreting these associations, one has to keep in mind 
that the VRI sample is selected on wealth and stock ownership. For example, sample selection may 
explain the negative correlation of wealth and stock market expectations. Almost all households in the 
VRI sample have nonzero stockholding. With fixed costs of stock market participation wealth should 
matter at the extensive margin on top of expectations. As a result, we expect wealthier stockholders to 
have lower expected returns than less wealthy stockholders. 
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implied by an error-free answer. A one standard deviation unit measurement error in the second 
risk tolerance SSQ would make the response imply an indifference point of 27% instead of 17%. 
One standard deviation unit measurement error in the response to the expected stock returns 
question would result in a response of 14% instead of 6%; one standard deviation unit 
measurement error in the stock market probability answers would change p0 responses to 67% 
from 48% and p20 responses to 25% from 12%. The estimated bias of the measurement error in 
the p0 response (ψ)  suggests that, on average, people think of positive gains only when they 
exceed 4 percent when answering the p0 question.20    
2.3.4. Estimating individual-specific cardinal proxies of risk tolerance and beliefs 
In the previous sections, we show how to separately identify the true heterogeneity in 
preferences and beliefs and the survey response errors in the survey measures of them.  In this 
subsection, we explain how we construct the individual-specific belief and preference parameters 
based on those estimates that are immune from the standard effects of using generated 
regressors. 
1.  Constructing individual-specific preference and belief parameters 
Using the estimation results we calculate individual-specific proxy variables ˆi , ˆ i  and ˆi . 
These proxies are the expected values of the corresponding latent variables: the individual-
specific expected value and standard deviation of the distribution of stock market returns 
perceived by the individual  ,i i  , and the individual-specific latent parameter of risk 
tolerance ( i  ). They are expected values conditional on the individual's responses to the survey 
                                                   
20
 Allowing for covariates (Appendix Table 2-A6), ψ is estimated to be substantially less negative among 
more educated and wealthier people, indicating that their threshold value is closer to the nominal 
threshold zero. 
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questions on stock market returns  0 20, ,i i im p p   and to the SSQ’s with the two hypothetical 
gambles. To get these expected value of the latent individual-specific parameters conditional on 
the survey response and the statistical model, there are two steps.  First, the distribution of the 
latent variables conditional on the observed responses can be obtained from the likelihood 
function using Bayes’ theorem. Second, integrating out this function yields the individual-
specific proxy variables ( ˆi , ˆ i  and ˆi ) as the conditional expectations of the latent variables 
given the observed survey responses. These proxy variables deal with measurement error in 
survey responses. Appendix 2-B spells out these steps in detail. 
2.  Using individual-specific preference and belief parameters in regressions 
Our aim is to use the survey-based estimates of individual-specific parameters to explain 
heterogeneity in portfolio choice. Note that this proxy error is not conventional errors in 
variables.  Because each proxy is a conditional expectation, which is basically a projection, this 
measurement error is uncorrelated with the proxy (and correlated with the true latent variable).  
Hence, it can be included on the right-hand side of a regression without creating an attenuation 
bias (see Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2008).   
When the regressions include other covariates as well the OLS estimates are unbiased if 
the proxies are estimated conditional on those covariates, too.  We therefore estimate two sets of 
proxies. The first set is conditional on the survey answers to the risk tolerance and the stock 
market belief questions only. The second set is conditional on other covariates as well. We use 
the second set of proxy estimates as right-hand-side variables in regressions that also include 
those covariates. In the next section, we present such regressions to explain portfolio behavior 
based on our estimates of preferences and beliefs. 
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2.4  Explaining Heterogeneity in Portfolio Choice  
2.4.1. Stock share and answers to survey questions 
Before turning to the regressions based on our structural estimates of the latent preferences and 
beliefs, we investigate the relationship between the stock share of household portfolios and the 
raw survey responses. Figure 2.5 shows non-parametric regressions of the stock share in total 
financial assets on the survey answers to expected stock market returns (mi), the average between 
the probability that the stock market would go up and that of an increase of 20 percent or more 
(( 0 2 ) / 2)0i ip p , the difference between those two (p0i – p20i), and the answer to the risk 
tolerance question with income level $100,000.  (Figure 2-A2 shows the analogous 
nonparametric regression results on p0i and p20i separately.)  
The results indicate a positive relationship between the stock share of household 
portfolios and expected stock market returns (mi) and the mean of the two probability responses 
(( 0 2 ) / 2)0i ip p . The stock share is also positively related to the difference between the 
responses to the probability questions (p0i – p20i), suggesting a negative relationship with 
perceived risk of stock returns. Finally, the stock share is monotonically positively related to the 
answers to the risk tolerance question except for the last categories that has relatively few 
responses, suggesting a monotonic positive relationship with risk tolerance.  Hence, the 
relationship between the raw survey responses and the stock share has the direction benchmark 
theories of portfolio choice would suggest. 
We also estimate linear regressions with survey measure and the administrative measure 
of stock share as alternative left hand side variables and the same right hand-side variables 
entered with and without the control variables that include detailed measures of demographics, 
education, employment, income, wealth, as well as background risks of long-term care and 
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longevity. The results are included in Tables 2-A7 and 2-A8 in the Appendix. The results imply 
statistically significant relationships of stock share with the survey answers with or without the 
control variables. The magnitudes of the associations are difficult to interpret because not all 
measures have a cardinal interpretation and because of the presence of survey noise.  These 
problems are addressed in the next section. 
2.4.2. Stock share and cardinal proxies of expectations and risk tolerance 
Our more structural analysis has two goals. First, it relates the stock share of household 
portfolios to cross-sectional heterogeneity in preferences and expectations in a way that is related 
to portfolio choice theory thus making magnitudes easier to interpret. Second, it aims at 
incorporating survey noise in the estimation thus reducing its effect on the estimated magnitudes. 
This is a structural analysis in the sense that it makes use of additional assumptions in order to 
relate stock shares to heterogeneity in latent preferences and expectations. The analysis is still 
reduced form in the sense that it aims at uncovering associations without claims for causality.  
Nonetheless, since the explanatory variables are proxies that have cardinal interpretations 
relevant for economic theories, they potentially convey much more information than the 
relationship of raw survey responses to economic outcomes. 
Start from a general function of the solution of optimal stock share 
  * * , , , ; ,i i i i i is s x u      (2.9) 
where μi and σi are the beliefs of person i about the mean and the standard deviation of one-year-
ahead stock returns, γi is the parameter of risk tolerance, xi is a vector of wealth, demographic 
variables and other risk factors that are measured in our data, and ui combines all unobservables. 
We assume that unobservables are independent of observables. 
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The relative deviation of s
*
 around its mean value is related to relative deviations of the 
other variables around their mean values, holding values of xi constant by 
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    
  
   
        (2.10) 
The coefficients approximate the first derivatives of the function around the mean values, with 
*
1 /s     , 
*
2 /s     and 
*
3 /s    , where the tilde denote relative differences from 
mean values. This approximation is a way of log-linearizing the function that allows 
observations with nonpositive values of some of the variables, which is relevant for μi in our 
case.  We linearize about the risk tolerance parameter rather than relative risk tolerance to avoid 
the ambiguity that relative risk tolerance depends on the level of consumption. 
We estimated (2.10) using the observed stock share si to approximate the target stock 
share *
is , and the individual proxies ˆi , ˆ i  and ˆi   approximating the latent variables μi , σi and 
γi as described earlier. We estimated the equation by OLS both with and without covariates.
21
 
When we controlled for covariates in the stock share equation we entered the structural 
parameters that were estimated conditional on the same covariates.  Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro 
(2008) show that it is necessary to construct the proxies conditional on the same covariates as 
included in the main regression to deliver unbiased coefficient estimates. As the proxies are 
generated regressors, we estimated the standard errors by bootstrapping the entire estimation 
procedure including the structural estimation of the model underlying the proxies. We estimated 
two versions of each regression: one with the survey measure of the share of stocks in total 
financial wealth on the left hand side and one with the administrative measure of stock share in 
                                                   
21
 We do not use a Tobit-type procedure to account for the truncation at 0 and 1 because there are very 
few observations (less than 2 percent of the sample) at these boundaries.   
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wealth held at Vanguard. The main results are in Table 2.5. Table 2-A9 in the Appendix shows 
the detailed results.  
The estimates show that the share of stocks is positively related to the perceived mean of 
stock market returns, negatively related to the perceived standard deviation of stock market 
returns, and positively related to the risk tolerance parameter. The estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant with the survey measure of stock shares on the left hand-side, but they are 
smaller and less significant in the administrative stock share regressions. In both cases the 
coefficients are very similar whether we enter them with or without the covariates.
22
   
According to the point estimates, a one percent higher perceived mean is associated with 
one twentieth of a percent higher stock share; a one percent higher perceived standard deviation 
is associated with around one tenth of a percent lower stock share; and a one percent higher risk 
tolerance parameter is associated with one thirtieth of a percent higher stock share.  Converting 
the relative magnitudes to absolute ones, our estimates imply that for the stock share to be higher 
by 1 percentage point expected returns need to be higher by 2.1 percentage points, the perceived 
standard deviation needs to be lower by 2.4 percentage points, or the risk tolerance parameter 
needs to be higher by 0.24.
23
 
                                                   
22
 Table 2-A9 in the Appendix shows that most of the coefficients on the other covariates are in line with 
prior expectations: the stock share is smaller in the employer-sponsored subsample and larger for 
wealthier and more educated individuals, especially for those with an MBA. Some of the other parameters 
are insignificant: the coefficient on the probability of needing long-term care (a factor of background 
risk), for example, is negative but insignificant. 
23
 Comparing our estimates to the literature is not straightforward as most papers do not have cardinal 
proxies for the expectations and risk tolerance variables, and those that do estimate functional forms that 
are different from ours. Wherever we can make the comparison we find magnitudes that are very similar 
to our estimates. The closest to our specification are the estimates of Amromin and Sharpe (2012). On a 
sample of stockholders with positive expected returns they regress the log of the stock share on the log of 
their proxies of μ and σ. Their point estimates are +0.04 and -0.11, respectively. These magnitudes are 
very close to ours. The results of the Tobit model of Vissing-Jorgensen (2003), estimated on a sample of 
investors, imply that one percentage point higher returns expectations are associated with about 0.5 
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Table 2.6 shows results of analogous estimations that do not take care of measurement 
error in the survey answers (Table 2-A10 in the Appendix contains all results). Instead of the 
cardinal proxies ˆˆ ˆ, ,i i i   ,  these regressions include the raw survey answers to the stock market 
expectation question (mi), a crude transformation of the probability answers to approximate 
perceived risk,
24
 and the median value of the CRRA risk tolerance parameter that corresponds to 
the answers to the first set of the risk tolerance questions (   set to zero). The coefficient 
estimates are qualitatively similar to the baseline results reported in Table 2.5 above, but the 
magnitudes are considerably attenuated. The absolute values of the point estimates are one third 
to one half of the baseline estimates. These results are consistent with substantial measurement 
error in the raw survey answers. They show the importance of taking into account measurement 
error in the construction of the proxies and in using them in econometric models. 
Table 2-A11 shows estimates analogous to our benchmark model presented in Table 2.5 
above for the employer-sponsored subsample. Self-selection to Vanguard is arguably 
substantially less severe in this subsample. However, the differences are small, suggesting that 
selection bias is unlikely to have a substantial effect on our main results.
25
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
percentage point higher equity share. Kezdi and Willis (2011) estimate a coefficient of 0.3 in a truncated 
regression model estimated on a representative sample with stock shares on the left hand-side. Our log-
linearized estimates imply that, around its mean, a one point difference in μ is associated with a 0.45 
percentage point difference in stock shares. In a Tobit model of stock shares that combines the extensive 
and intensive margins Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro (2008) find a small magnitude for the association with 
the cardinal proxy of risk tolerance. 
24
  1 10 200.2 / ( ) ( )i i ip p     . The denominator replaced with 0.2 if zero to obtain 1i  , which 
is larger than the maximum of all other values. This imputation affects less than 10% of the observations. 
Alternative imputations that replace the denominator with other values yield very similar estimates. 
25
 Tables 2-A12 through 2-A15 in the Appendix show that results from analogous regressions are very 
similar in various subsamples, such as the sample of individuals that joined Vanguard with their private 
accounts, the sample of individuals with high share of household wealth held at Vanguard, and the sample 
of individuals with directly held stocks. 
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2.4.3. Interpreting the magnitudes 
How might one evaluate the estimates relative to an economic model?  The simplest model of 
Merton (1969) with CRRA utility would imply that the coefficient on log μ should be 1, the 
coefficient on log σ should be -2, and the coefficient on log γ should be 1 again. The same 
implications hold if we modify the utility function in the Merton model to incorporate the 
subsistence level of consumption as in equation (2.1) above.  
The relative magnitudes of the estimated coefficients report in Table 2.5 are remarkably 
close to these theoretical implications of the Merton benchmark. In the regressions on the survey 
measure of stock share, the coefficient on the (approximately log-linearized) expected value and 
risk tolerance proxies are close to each other, and the coefficient on the standard deviation proxy 
is close to be negative two times their magnitudes. At the same time, the magnitudes are indeed 
smaller than in the benchmark model: each estimate is about one twentieth of what a simple 
theory implies. 
In principle, the attenuation bias may arise from classical errors in variables on the right 
hand-side or appropriate non-classical errors in the left hand-side variable. Recall that our 
measures of beliefs and preferences already take care of substantial survey noise that arise from 
noisy responses conditional on the latent variables. While it is of course possible for those latent 
variables to exhibit additional noise, due to, for example, mood effects, that noise would have to 
be extremely large for the observed attenuation. We believe that the magnitude of the attenuation 
and its similar strength across the coefficients call for an explanation beyond these measurement 
issues. 
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We can represent the substantially attenuated response of stock holding to beliefs and 
preferences by expressing observed stock shares as a linear combination of the individual 
optimum *
is  and the average stock share s plus additional heterogeneity 
    * , , 1i i i i i is s s v          (2.11) 
where λ is the weight on the individual optimum given beliefs and preferences, (1- λ) is the 
weight on the average stock share, and vi is heterogeneity in stock shares due to other factors. 
This model can be viewed as a simple statistical representation of the attenuation. It can be also 
interpreted as a behavioral model, in which investors consider the possibility that everyone else 
may choose the right stock share even if their own beliefs and preferences imply a different 
choice, and their decision combines the two.
 26
  Such behavior could account for the finding we 
discussed earlier that those who report negative expected returns in the survey continue to hold 
stock and those who are very optimistic do not have extreme exposure to the stock market.  
Expressing equation (2.11) in deviations from averages, denoting the coefficients of the 
log-linearized optimal stock share by β0 and decomposing heterogeneity due to other factors into 
observed and unobserved parts yields   
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This is a constrained version of equation (2.10), with the Merton solution implying 0
1 1  , 
0
2 2   , 
0
3 1  . We estimate the constrained versions of each unconstrained regression 
presented in Table 2.5 above. Table 2.7 shows the results. The estimated λ is around 0.05 when 
                                                   
26
 A possible reason for this behavior is mean reversion of beliefs combined with a strong inertia in 
portfolio choice.  Some individuals who expect extreme returns currently think returns will revert back to 
more normal in the future, but do not make the high-frequency adjustments to their portfolios to align 
with current extreme expectations. 
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the left hand side variable is the survey measure of stock share, and it is around 0.03 when the 
left hand side variable is the administrative measure of stock share. The proportionality 
restriction holds reasonably well in the data as one would expect from inspection of the results in 
Table 2.5.  The Wald test does not reject the null of proportionality for the survey data, but does 
marginally for administrative data (more so without covariates).  These results suggest strong 
attenuation in the association of stock shares with beliefs and preferences, but that the degree of 
attenuation is well represented by a single factor, as expressed by equation (2.11). 
The forgoing model of attenuation assumes that individuals down-weight both their 
preferences and beliefs in favor of the market average.  A perhaps less radical behavioral model 
is that individuals keep to their preferences, but moderate their reactions to returns beliefs.  In 
Appendix Table 2-A16 we present such estimates by excluding the preference measure from the  
*
is .  The estimated λ increases slightly to 5 or 6 percent and the proportionality restrictions are far 
from the rejection region. 
2.4.4. Alternative Benchmark Model 
The Merton model is a simple and useful benchmark. However, it has assumptions that are very 
far from the way people invest in our sample as it requires continuous rebalancing, no 
background risk, and it allows for unlimited leverage and short sales. We therefore investigate 
whether adding these realistic features would move the predictions of the benchmark model 
more in line with what we observe in the data. 
 The model we use is a life cycle portfolio choice model in discrete time, with 
consumption and investment decisions at the yearly frequency and portfolio shares constrained to 
be between zero and one. The model incorporates background risk in income and longevity. 
Similarly to the Merton model, it has a risky asset (stocks) and a risk-free asset (bonds), and it is 
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a model of demand, taking returns on those assets as given. It has no closed-form solution and is 
solved recursively. Our model can be viewed as a generalization of the model of Cocco, Gomes 
and Maenhout (2005).  Appendix 2-C contains its details and main results. 
 The lifecycle model of portfolio choice implies magnitudes that are similar to the Merton 
model in the range of interior solutions, and it implies corner solutions of zero and 100 percent 
stock shares otherwise. Our estimates of these associations are substantially weaker. Stock share 
is close to fifty percent among those who expect non-positive stock returns in our sample, and it 
is substantially less than 100 percent on average among people with very high expectations even 
with low perceived risk and low risk tolerance. In the theoretical model, the share of stocks 
increases from zero to 100 percent if expected returns raise from the risk-free rate to seven 
percentage points above the risk-free rate even for investors that are in the top third of our 
estimated distribution of risk aversion and perceived risk. Our estimates imply that a seven 
percentage point difference in expected returns corresponds to less than a four percentage point 
difference in stock shares. Again, our estimate is about one twentieth of the magnitude implied 
by theory. Differences between the model and our estimates with respect to the role of perceived 
risk and risk tolerance are similarly large.  
We investigate the attenuation of our estimates compared to the life cycle portfolio 
choice model by estimating equation (2.11) with the solution implied by this model for *
is  , 
estimated for each individual using a linearized version of the model solution. The result is 
0.043   when the left hand side variable is the survey measure of stock share and we do not 
include other covariates. This result is very similar to our estimate based on the Merton solution, 
as presented in column (1) in Table 2.7.  
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Risk preferences, expected stock returns, and the risk of stock returns are fundamental 
elements of any portfolio choice model. People should not hold stocks if they think their returns 
will be lower than returns on risk-free assets, and they should avoid or embrace risk in their 
investment decisions in a way that is in line with their choices in other gambles with money. 
These features are implied both by the very stylized Merton model and our more realistic life 
cycle model, yet our estimates do not deliver them. The two portfolio choice models imply 
similar magnitudes in the range of an interior solution without short sales and leverage, and our 
estimates fall short of those magnitudes. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
There is substantial heterogeneity in portfolio decisions across households.  This paper uses a 
distinctive measurement and analytic strategy that combines high-quality measurement of 
portfolio shares, preferences about risk, and beliefs about returns in an attempt to explain this 
heterogeneity.  The approach uses purposely-constructed measures to elicit measures of 
preferences and beliefs that have quantitative interpretations.  This paper does find that risk 
preference and moments of the subjective returns distribution—both mean and variance—do 
have a role in understanding why portfolio choices differ.  That the survey measures of 
preference and belief do align with portfolio choices provides external validation of our approach 
to measuring them. 
The size of the estimated associations of the risk and belief parameters is, nonetheless, 
substantially smaller in magnitude than benchmark theories would suggest.  We call this finding 
the “attenuation puzzle.”  Our methods produce risk and belief parameters that measure the 
precise, quantitative variables that should explain portfolio choice. Hence, the attenuation cannot 
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be dismissed because the measures of preference and belief are only loosely related to what 
should drive portfolio choice. Moreover, the statistical procedure deals with measurement error 
in these parameters, which is the other most obvious source of such attenuation.  The 
econometric procedure estimates the response error in the survey measures of preferences and 
beliefs and produces individual-specific preference and belief parameters that are immune from 
the standard effects of using noisy estimates as regressors. 
We argue that the selected nature of the sample is unlikely to account for the small 
magnitudes. The results are nearly identical for the subset of the sample who came to Vanguard 
via their employer’s choices, so individual selection to use Vanguard as a provider is not driving 
the findings. 
Another explanation for the attenuated response could be background risk that would 
reduce stockholding given the perception of riskiness of stock returns per se.  This source of 
attenuation, however, mostly affects the coefficient of our measure of perceived risk, and it 
should not lead to substantial bias in the estimates of the coefficients of risk tolerance or 
perceived expected returns. 
The attenuated response of stock shares to beliefs and preferences is responsible for 
observing individuals who think that stocks are dominated in return often holding a high fraction 
of their portfolio in stock.  Symmetrically, this attenuated response makes many individuals who 
think that stocks have very high returns hold too little stocks. What might account for such 
behavior?  Our finding in Figure 2.2 that stock shares are very static suggests an answer:  It is 
possible that people make their portfolio choice decision very infrequently, much less frequently 
than the annual rebalancing of the theory in Section 2.4. If household are cognizant of this inertia 
and if they feel that their preferences and beliefs might change, then it would make sense to have 
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a damped response to them.  We show that the estimated behavior is indeed consistent with 
individuals mixing their own preferences and beliefs with the market average behavior. While far 
from fully worked out as an explanation, our finding that there is a coherent but attenuated 
response to the vector of risk tolerance, mean return, and variance of return does perhaps point 
toward such explanations.  Similarly, the deviations of the survey and administrative measures of 
portfolio shares suggest that many respondents do not follow their portfolios closely.  If they are 
aware of this, that might well be a good reason for them to choose a portfolio closer to what the 
representative individual would choose than the one they would choose based on their 
preferences or beliefs at a particular moment.  
The results are consistent with decision makers mixing their own risk preference and 
beliefs about stock market returns with the preferences and beliefs of the representative 
consumer. On the one hand, people may follow advice or buy what is offered despite their 
preferences and beliefs. On the other hand, changes in beliefs may not translate to changes in 
portfolio composition because of inertia, due to inattention or fixed costs. While our data do not 
allow us to sort out these explanations, our paper makes substantial progress by quantifying the 
role of individual risk preferences and beliefs about stock market returns in the heterogeneity in 
portfolio choice across households, using high-quality and precise measurements of preferences 
and beliefs. 
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Table 2-1. Summary Statistics:  VRI, HRS, and SCF 
 
VRI  HRS SCF 
 
Entire 
sample 
Analysis 
sample 
 VRI-eligible subsample 
Household-level variables     
  
Number of households  8,950 4,414  3,684 1,275 
Number of stockholding households  8,636 4,323  2,356 1,216 
Average financial wealth ($’000) 1,207 1,148  578 970 
Average total wealth ($’000) 1,589 1,551  804 1,764 
Average stock share among 
stockholders 
0.56 0.56  0.55 0.46 
Respondent-level variables    
  
Married 0.67 0.68  0.70 0.71 
Male 0.64 0.65  0.56 0.79 
Age 67.8 67.8  64.9 64.1 
Less than college degree 0.30 0.26  0.51 0.45 
College degree but not more 0.32 0.33  0.23 0.27 
Post-college degree  0.38 0.41  0.26 0.28 
Retired 0.56 0.60  0.53 0.34 
Notes. For the HRS and SCF, the VRI-eligible subsamples are those who are not younger than 
55, have access to the Internet at home, and have at least $10,000 in non-transactional accounts. 
Respondent-level variables for the HRS refer to the financial respondents; for the SCF they refer 
to the household heads. Variables in the VRI measured in 2013; HRS and SCF are from 2012 
and 2013, respectively. Respondent-level variables are {0,1} binary variables except for age. 
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Table 2-2. Risk Tolerance:  Distribution of Responses to SSQ 
Response Downside risk  Percent of answers 
category accepted rejected  
riskless consumption  
$100K 
riskless consumption  
$50K 
1 none 1/10  23 28 
2 1/10 1/5  26 34 
3 1/5 1/3  26 26 
4 1/3 1/2  13   9 
5 1/2 3/4  10   3 
6 3/4 none    2   1 
Total    100 100 
Choice between two plans. Plan A guarantees $W consumption next year. Plan B: doubles $W with 50% 
chance and cuts it by a fraction x with 50% chance. $W=100K or 50K, shown in the two columns; the x 
values are shown in second and third columns. 4414 observations. 
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Table 2.3. Stock Market Returns:  Survey Responses versus Historical Statistics 
 
Survey answers  Historical statistics 
 
Mean 
25
th
 
pctile 
Median 
75
th
 
pctile 
 
1959-
2014 
1995-
2014 
1995-
2009 
2010-
2014 
m 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10  0.04 0.07 0.05 0.13 
p0 0.51 0.25 0.55 0.75  0.58 0.65 0.53 1.00 
p20 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.25  0.18 0.25 0.27 0.20 
Notes.  m is expected one-year ahead returns of the stock market index DJIA; p0 is the probability that the DJIA 
would be higher a year from the date of the interview; p20 is the probability that it would be higher by at least 20%.  
Historical statistics computed from yearly relative returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (year on year 
changes divided by base year value, first days of July in each year), deflated using the PCE chain price index 
(available beginning in 1959). Historical average values shown for m; the fraction of years when positive or greater 
than 0.2 are shown for p0 and p20. 4414 observations. 
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Table 2.4. Distribution of Preferences and Beliefs 
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 pctile Median 75
th
 pctile 
Preferences       
Risk tolerance parameter γi 0.41 0.33 0.20 0.32 0.50 
Subsistence consumption −κ 17,000     
Beliefs        
Mean of return μi 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.10 
Standard deviation of return σi 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.14 
Notes.  Statistics are calculated from the estimated parameters in Table 2-A5; see the notes to Table 2-A5 
for more detail.   
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Table 2.5. Stock Shares versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs 
 
 Survey Stock Share  Administrative Stock Share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ˆ
i  0.058*** 0.055***  0.052*** 0.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) 
ˆ
i  -0.093* -0.083  -0.068 -0.083* 
 (0.046) (0.051)  (0.040) (0.038) 
ˆ
i  0.034*** 0.033**  0.012 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
constant -0.001 1.136  -0.001 0.803 
 (0.008) (0.649)  (0.007) (0.519) 
covariates N Y  N Y 
R
2
 0.019 0.045  0.013 0.038 
N 4414 4414  4414 4414 
Notes. Stock share in total financial wealth (survey measure) and in Vanguard accounts 
(administrative measure) are regressed on proxies for the expected stock returns ( ˆ
i ), perceived 
standard deviation of stock returns ( ˆ
i ), and the parameter of risk tolerance ( ˆi ). All variables 
are expressed as relative differences normalized to their mean values (as specified in equation 
Error! Reference source not found.).  Control variables: married, male, age, whether 
respondent comes from the employer-sponsored subsample, education (below college; college; 
MBA;  PhD, other higher degree); log financial wealth, log wage, dummy for owning a house, 
log annuity income (Social Security and DB pensions) for retired, log expected annuity income 
for non-retired; dummy for retired, log home stock; subjective probability of needing long-term 
care, and longevity expectations. 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 
0.1% level, respectively.  
  
 128 
Table 2.6. Stock Shares Versus Error-Ridden Cardinal Measures of Preferences and Beliefs. 
Estimation without taking care of measurement error in the cardinal proxies. 
 
 Survey Stock Share  Administrative Stock Share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
mi 0.017*** 0.020***  0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
i  -0.029*** -0.019**  -0.025*** -0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
i  0.021*** 0.020***  0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) 
constant -0.001 1.120*  -0.000 0.781 
 (0.007) (0.565)  (0.006) (0.507) 
covariates N Y  N Y 
R
2
 0.013 0.039  0.012 0.038 
N 4414 4414  4414 4414 
Notes. Left-hand-side variables and covariates as in Table 2.5. Main right-hand-side variables are the raw 
survey answers to the stock market expectation question (mi), a crude transformation of the probability 
answers to approximate perceived risk (  1 10 200.2 / ( ) ( )i i ip p     ),  and the median value of the 
CRRA risk tolerance parameter that corresponds to the answers to the first set of the risk tolerance 
questions (    set to zero). 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  
 
  
 129 
Table 2.7. Observed stock shares and theoretically optimal stock shares  
 
 Survey Stock Share  Administrative Stock Share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
λ 0.046*** 0.045***  0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) 
covariates N Y  N Y 
R
2
 0.017 0.044  0.010 0.036 
N 4414 4414  4414 4414 
p-value of Wald test  
on restriction 
0.240 0.258  0.010 0.033 
Notes. Regression results from equation (12) imposing 0
1 1  , 
0
2 2   , and 
0
3 1  . 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 
0.1% level, respectively.  
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Figure 2.1.  Stock Shares 
 
Note:  The figure plots the administrative measure of stock share at Vanguard at the time of Survey 3 
on the horizontal axis versus the survey measure of stock share overall at the time of Survey 1 on the 
vertical axis.  These are the main dependent variables in the analysis. The size of the marks on the 
figure is proportional to the Vanguard financial wealth of the respondents. 
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Figure 2.2.  Stock Shares: Differences in Time 
 
Note:  The figure plots the administrative measure of stock share at Vanguard at the time of Survey 3 
on the horizontal axis versus the administrative measure of stock share at Vanguard at the time of 
Survey 1 on the vertical axis.  The size of the marks on the figure is proportional to the Vanguard 
financial wealth of the respondents. 
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Figure 2.3.  Stock Shares: Total versus Vanguard 
 
Note:  The figure plots the survey measure of stock share at Vanguard on the horizontal axis versus 
the survey measure of stock share overall on the vertical axis. The size of the marks on the figure is 
proportional to the Vanguard financial wealth of the respondents.  
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Figure 2.4.  Stock Shares: Survey Response Versus Administrative 
 
Note:  The figure plots the survey measure of stock share at Vanguard on the horizontal axis versus 
the survey measure of stock share overall on the vertical axis.  The size of the marks on the figure is 
proportional to the Vanguard financial wealth of the respondents. 
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Figure 2.5. Stock Share versus Raw Survey Responses 
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Appendix 2-A.  Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2-A1. Distribution of wealth in the VRI data (N=4414) 
 
Mean Std p10 p25 Median p75 p90 
Financial wealth 1,147,525 1,516,575 164,835 363,000 759,750 1,403,843 2,467,899 
Home stock 360,782 578,045 31,500 125,000 235,000 420,000 1,060,000 
 
Table 2-A2. Summary statistics of the control variables (N=4414) 
 
Mean Standard deviation 
Single male 0.14  
Female in couple 0.17  
Single female 0.18  
Age 67.8 7.4 
Age squared 4649 1023 
In the employer-sponsored sample 0.21  
College degree 0.33  
MBA 0.07  
PhD 0.06  
Other higher degree 0.28  
Log(wealth) 13.4 1.09 
Log(home equity) 11.5 3.37 
Zero home equity 0.07  
Retired 0.60  
Log(Wage) 4.3 5.5 
Log(Annuity Income) 6.5 5.3 
Expected Log(Annuity Income) 4.3 5.3 
Subjective probability of needing long-term care 0.43 0.30 
Subjective probability of survival to target age 0.75 0.23 
Notes. 
Log variables are set to zero if the levels of the variables are zero.  Zero home equity equals 1 (0)  if home 
equity is zero (positive).  Annuity income is the sum of Social Security income, defined benefit pension 
income and immediate annuity income, for retired households.  It is set to zero for non-retired 
households.  Expected annuity income is the sum of expected values of Social Security income, defined 
benefit pension income and immediate annuity income, for non-retired households.  It is set to zero for 
retired households.  Subjective probability of needing long-term care is the subjective probability chance 
that the respondent would need long-term care service at least for one year during her remaining life.  The 
target age in subjective probability of survival question is set to 75 if the respondent is younger than 70, 
to 85 if the respondent is younger than 80, and to 95 if the respondent is younger than 90.  
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Table 2-A3.  The Risk Tolerance Strategic Survey Questions in VRI survey 2  
Set up Suppose you are 80 years old.  Suppose, further, that for the next year:  
 You live alone, rent your home, and pay all your own bills.  
 You are in good health and will remain in good health.  
 You will have no medical bills or other unexpected expenses.  
 You do not work.  
 
Hypothetical 
financial 
products 
 Plan A guarantees that you will have $W for spending next year.  
 Plan B will possibly provide you with more money, but is less certain.  
There is a 50% chance that Plan B would double your money, leaving 
you with $2W, and a 50% chance that it would cut it by x%, leaving 
you with $ (1 0.01 )x W  .   
Rules   You have no other assets or income, and so the only money you have 
available for all your spending next year is from either Plan A or Plan 
B.  
 Any money that is not spent at the end of next year cannot be saved for 
the future.  
 You cannot give any money away or leave it as a bequest.  
 If you need anything next year, you have to pay for it.  No one else can 
buy anything for you.  
 At the end of next year you will be offered the same choice with 
another $W for following year. 
Parameters 
asked 
W =100,000 and 50,000.  
Question Would you choose Plan A or Plan B?  
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Table 2-A4: The stock market expectation questions in VRI survey wave 3. 
Variable name Survey question 
Question Order p-m 
p0 What do you think is the percent chance that the stock market will be higher in 
twelve months than it is today? Think of a stock market index such as 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average and do not adjust for inflation. 
 
p20 And what do you think is the percent chance that it will be at least 20% 
higher in twelve months than it is today? 
 [If answer is greater than the p0 answer: "Please enter a response that is less 
than or equal to you previous response or change your previous response.”]  
 
m Instead of probabilities, we are now interested in your expectation. By what 
percentage do you expect the stock market to increase or decrease in the next 
twelve months? 
Please enter a positive number for increase and negative number for decrease. 
 
Question order m-p 
m By what percentage do you expect the stock market to increase or 
decrease in the next twelve months? Think of a stock market index such as the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average and do not adjust for inflation. 
Please enter a positive number for increase and negative number for decrease. 
 
p0 And what do you think is the percent chance that the stock market will be 
higher in twelve months than it is today? 
 
p20 What do you think is the percent chance that it will be at least 20% higher 
in twelve months than it is today? [If answer is greater than the p0 answer: 
"Please enter a response that is less than or equal to you previous response or 
change your previous response.”] 
Note: The question orders are randomized in the survey instrument.  The distributions of 
responses are slightly different depending on which sequence is used.  
 
 
 
  
 138 
Table 2-A5. Detailed results of the structural estimation model without covariates. (N=4,414) 
 Preference Beliefs Bias in p0 
  γ μ σ   
constant -1.148*** 0.055*** 0.118*** -0.539*** 
 
(0.027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) 
Heterogeneity     
u   0.704*** 0.063*** 0.032*** n.a.  
  (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) n.a.  
Correlation across latent variables   
γ  0.011** -0.004  
  (0.003) (0.002)  
   0.062** 
 (0.021) 
Measurement error  
1e  0.812*** 
 (0.015) 
2e  0.544*** 
 (0.016) 
em  0.079*** 
 (0.001) 
ep  0.487*** 
 (0.008) 
Log-likelihood -48006 
Notes.  
The third line reports how the latent risk tolerance parameter affects means of the belief 
parameter distributions. Statistics reported in Table 2.4 are calculated based on these parameters, 
where the means of belief parameter distributions are adjusted using the mean of the risk 
tolerance parameter multiplied with the numbers reported in the third row.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.  
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Table 2-A6. Detailed results of the structural estimation model with covariates. (N=4,414) 
 Preference Beliefs Bias in p0 
  γ μ σ   
Constant -1.415*** 0.071* 0.181*** -0.373 
 
(0.412) (0.031) (0.024) (0.833) 
Single male 0.038 0.004 0.002 -0.019 
 (0.042) (0.004) (0.003) (0.041) 
Female in couple -0.207*** 0.004 0.001 -0.171*** 
 (0.040) (0.004) (0.003) (0.039) 
Single female -0.191*** 0.011** 0.000 -0.294*** 
 (0.041) (0.004) (0.003) (0.039) 
Age -0.020 0.000 -0.002*** -0.029 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
Age sq.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employer- -0.003 0.015*** -0.005* -0.167*** 
sponsored (0.039) (0.003) (0.002) (0.037) 
College degree 0.039 -0.009** 0.007*** 0.294*** 
 (0.035) (0.003) (0.002) (0.035) 
MBA 0.116 -0.004 0.004 0.222*** 
 (0.060) (0.006) (0.004) (0.064) 
PhD 0.042 -0.019** 0.023*** 0.465*** 
 (0.061) (0.007) (0.006) (0.068) 
Other higher degree 0.079* -0.010** 0.014*** 0.354*** 
 (0.038) (0.004) (0.002) (0.038) 
log(wealth) 0.037** -0.007*** 0.005*** 0.131*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) 
log(home equity) 0.029 -0.002 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) 
No home equity 0.338 -0.018 -0.001 -0.155 
 (0.191) (0.014) (0.010) (0.179) 
Retired 0.386 -0.039 -0.011 -0.016 
 (0.410) (0.030) (0.024) (0.375) 
Log(Wage) -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) 
Log(Annuity  -0.030 0.008*** -0.003** -0.048* 
Income) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) 
Expected 
Log(Annuity  0.015 0.004 -0.003 -0.046 
Income) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.029) 
LTC probability   0.009 -0.016*** 0.002 0.184*** 
 (0.045) (0.004) (0.003) (0.044) 
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Longevity  0.191** 0.028*** -0.004 0.034 
probability (0.063) (0.006) (0.004) (0.062) 
Heterogeneity     
u   0.688*** 0.063*** 0.030*** n.a.  
  (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) n.a.  
Correlation across latent variables   
γ  0.011** -0.003  
  (0.004) (0.002)  
   0.009 
 (0.024) 
Measurement error  
1e  0.810*** 
 (0.015) 
2e  0.557*** 
 (0.016) 
em  0.078*** 
 (0.001) 
ep  0.455*** 
 (0.008) 
Log-likelihood -47656 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.  
Reference categories are male in couple, individual client sample, not having a college degree.  See notes 
to Table 2-A2 for detailed description of the right hand side variables.  
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Table 2-A7. Stock share regressions with raw survey answers on the right hand side (with m as a 
proxy for beliefs of mean returns μ) 
 
Dependent variable: survey 
measure of stock share 
 
Dependent variable: administrative 
measure of stock share 
m 0.126** 0.153***  0.180*** 0.192*** 
 
(0.037) (0.037)  (0.038) (0.038) 
p0-p20 0.107*** 0.085***  0.098*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016)  (0.017) (0.017) 
SSQ1 cat=2 0.026* 0.016  0.016 0.008 
 
(0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
SSQ1 cat=3 0.047*** 0.035**  0.038** 0.028* 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
SSQ1 cat=4 0.054*** 0.044***  0.057*** 0.049*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
SSQ1 cat=5 0.083*** 0.073***  0.080*** 0.075*** 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.015) 
SSQ1 cat=6 0.053 0.045  -0.023 -0.026 
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.031) 
Single male  0.045   0.013 
 
 (0.031)   (0.012) 
Female in couple  0.016   0.021 
 
 (0.012)   (0.011) 
Single female  -0.007   0.019 
 
 (0.011)   (0.012) 
Age  -0.007   -0.014 
 
 (0.012)   (0.009) 
Age sq.   0.000   0.000 
 
 (0.001)   (0.000) 
Employer-  -0.053***   -0.042** 
sponsored  (0.011)   (0.011) 
College degree  0.018   0.023* 
 
 (0.010)   (0.010) 
MBA  0.033   0.022 
 
 (0.017)   (0.018) 
PhD  0.009   0.068*** 
 
 (0.017)   (0.018) 
Other higher degree  0.015   0.029** 
 
 (0.011)   (0.011) 
log(wealth)  0.017***   -0.001 
 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
log(home equity)  0.004   0.008 
 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
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No home equity  0.031   0.080 
 
 (0.054)   (0.055) 
Retired  -0.254*   -0.318** 
 
 (0.116)   (0.119) 
Log(Wage)  0.005   -0.001 
 
 (0.003)   (0.003) 
Log(Annuity   0.002   0.023** 
Income)  (0.008)   (0.008) 
Expected Log(Annuity   -0.023**   -0.002 
Income)  (0.008)   (0.008) 
LTC probability    -0.027*   -0.035** 
  (0.013)   (0.013) 
Longevity   0.042*   0.034 
probability  (0.018)   (0.019) 
Constant  0.371***   1.028*** 
  (0.111)   (0.319) 
R2 0.023 0.040  0.023 0.043 
Observations 4414 4414  4414 4414 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. 
Reference categories are male in couple, individual client sample, not having a college degree.  See notes 
to Table 2-A2 for detailed description of the right hand side variables.  
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Table 2-A8. Stock share regressions with raw survey answers on the right hand side (with 
 0 20 / 2p p  as a proxy for beliefs of mean returns μ) 
 
Dependent variable: survey 
measure of stock share 
 
Dependent variable: administrative 
measure of stock share 
(p0+p20)/2 0.115*** 0.118***  0.097*** 0.089*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024)  (0.025) (0.025) 
p0-p20 0.076*** 0.056**  0.075*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) 
SSQ1 cat=2 0.023* 0.013  0.012 0.005 
 
(0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
SSQ1 cat=3 0.043*** 0.031**  0.033** 0.024* 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
SSQ1 cat=4 0.049*** 0.040**  0.052*** 0.045** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
SSQ1 cat=5 0.079*** 0.069***  0.076*** 0.071*** 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.015) 
SSQ1 cat=6 0.051 0.043  -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.032) 
Single male 0.051 0.043   0.014 
 
(0.031) (0.031)   (0.012) 
Female in couple  0.017   0.023* 
 
 (0.012)   (0.011) 
Single female  -0.006   0.023 
 
 (0.011)   (0.012) 
Age  -0.004   -0.014 
 
 (0.012)   (0.009) 
Age sq.   0.001   0.000 
 
 (0.001)   (0.000) 
Employer-  -0.052***   -0.041*** 
sponsored  (0.011)   (0.011) 
College degree  0.014   0.020 
 
 (0.010)   (0.010) 
MBA  0.029   0.019 
 
 (0.017)   (0.018) 
PhD  0.004   0.064*** 
 
 (0.017)   (0.018) 
Other higher degree  0.011   0.025* 
 
 (0.011)   (0.011) 
log(wealth)  0.017***   -0.001 
 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
log(home equity)  0.004   0.008 
 
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
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No home equity  0.033   0.080 
 
 (0.054)   (0.055) 
Retired  -0.256*   -0.321** 
 
 (0.116)   (0.120) 
Log(Wage)  0.005   -0.001 
 
 (0.003)   (0.004) 
Log(Annuity   0.003   0.024** 
Income)  (0.008)   (0.008) 
Expected Log(Annuity   -0.022**   -0.001 
Income)  (0.008)   (0.008) 
LTC probability    -0.028*   -0.037** 
  (0.013)   (0.013) 
Longevity   0.039*   0.034 
probability  (0.018)   (0.019) 
Constant  0.340**   1.010*** 
  (0.111)   (0.319) 
R2 0.025 0.041  0.022 0.040 
Observations 4414 4414  4414 4414 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. 
Reference categories are male in couple, individual client sample, not having a college degree.  See notes 
to Table 2-A2 for detailed description of the right hand side variables.  
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Table 2-A9. Stock share and preference and belief proxies. Detailed results corresponding to 
Table 2.5.  
 
Dependent variable: survey 
measure of stock share 
 
Dependent variable: administrative 
measure of stock share 
ˆ
i  0.058*** 0.055***  0.052*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) 
ˆ
i  -0.093* -0.083  -0.068 -0.083* 
 
(0.046) (0.051)  (0.040) (0.038) 
ˆ
i  0.034*** 0.033***  0.012 0.013 
 
(0.009) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Single male  0.027   0.022 
 
 (0.022)   (0.019) 
Female in couple  -0.025   0.023 
 
 (0.021)   (0.018) 
Single female  -0.031   0.013 
 
 (0.020)   (0.019) 
Age  -0.042*   -0.027 
 
 (0.017)   (0.015) 
Age sq.   0.000**   0.000 
 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Employer-  -0.115***   -0.081*** 
sponsored  (0.020)   (0.018) 
College degree  0.048*   0.051** 
 
 (0.021)   (0.017) 
MBA  0.072**   0.048 
 
 (0.027)   (0.032) 
PhD  0.057   0.143*** 
 
 (0.032)   (0.025) 
Other higher degree  0.053*   0.069*** 
 
 (0.022)   (0.019) 
log(wealth)  0.044***   0.011 
 
 (0.009)   (0.007) 
log(home equity)  0.008   0.013* 
 
 (0.009)   (0.006) 
No home equity  0.052   0.120 
 
 (0.118)   (0.079) 
Retired  -0.448   -0.496** 
 
 (0.244)   (0.196) 
Log(Wage)  0.007   -0.002 
 
 (0.005)   (0.005) 
Log(Annuity   -0.002   0.032* 
Income)  (0.016)   (0.015) 
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Expected Log(Annuity   -0.045*   -0.006 
Income)  (0.019)   (0.012) 
LTC probability    -0.032   -0.041 
  (0.028)   (0.021) 
Longevity   0.084*   0.050 
probability  (0.033)   (0.032) 
Constant -0.001 1.136  -0.001 0.803 
 (0.007) (0.649)  (0.007) (0.519) 
R2 0.019 0.045  0.013 0.038 
Observations   4414    4414     4414   4414 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.  
Reference categories are male in couple, individual client sample, not having a college degree.  See notes 
to Table 2-A2 for detailed description of the right hand side variables.  
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Table 2-A10.  Stock Shares Versus Error-Ridden Cardinal Measures of Preferences and Beliefs. 
Estimation without taking care of measurement error in the cardinal proxies. 
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
 (1) (2)            (3)     (4) 
mi 0.017*** 0.020***  0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
i  -0.029*** -0.019**  -0.025*** -0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
i  0.021*** 0.020***  0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Single male  0.027   0.021 
  (0.022)   (0.019) 
Female in couple  -0.024   0.025 
  (0.020)   (0.018) 
Single female  -0.026   0.019 
  (0.021)   (0.019) 
Age  -0.040*   -0.025 
  (0.016)   (0.014) 
Age sq.   0.000*   0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Employer-  -0.099***   -0.067*** 
sponsored  (0.019)   (0.017) 
College degree  0.037*   0.040* 
  (0.019)   (0.017) 
MBA  0.066*   0.041 
  (0.031)   (0.028) 
PhD  0.025   0.113*** 
  (0.032)   (0.028) 
Other higher degree  0.036   0.052** 
  (0.020)   (0.018) 
log(wealth)  0.034***   0.002 
  (0.008)   (0.007) 
log(home equity)  0.008   0.013 
  (0.008)   (0.007) 
No home equity  0.054   0.118 
  (0.098)   (0.088) 
Retired  -0.454*   -0.497** 
  (0.212)   (0.190) 
Log(Wage)  0.007   -0.002 
  (0.005)   (-0.005) 
Log(Annuity   0.004   0.037** 
Income)  (0.015)   (0.013) 
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Expected Log(Annuity   -0.041**   -0.002 
Income)  (0.015)   (0.013) 
LTC probability    -0.043   -0.050 
  (0.023)   (0.021) 
Longevity   0.106**   0.065* 
probability  (0.033)   (0.030) 
constant -0.001 1.120*  -0.000 0.781 
 (0.007) (0.565)  (0.006) (0.507) 
R
2
 0.013 0.039  0.012 0.038 
N           4414     4414         4414    4414 
Notes. In these regressions the cardinal proxies ˆˆ ˆ, ,i i i    are replaced with , ,i i im    , respectively, where mi is 
the raw answer to the expected stock returns question,  1 10 200.2 / ( ) ( )i i ip p      (the denominator 
replaced with 0.2 if zero), and i  is the median valie of the CRRA risk tolerance parameter that corresponds to the 
answers to the first set of the risk tolerance questions (   set to zero).  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.  
Reference categories are male in couple, individual client sample, not having a college degree.  See notes 
to Table 2-A2 for detailed description of the right hand side variables.  
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Table 2-A11.  Stock Shares Versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs. Employer-
sponsored subsample 
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
 (1) (2)            (3)     (4) 
ˆ
i  0.067*** 0.062**  0.083*** 0.080*** 
 (0.018) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.015) 
ˆ
i  -0.122 -0.037  -0.014 0.055 
 (0.097) (0.107)  (0.088) (0.087) 
ˆ
i  0.070** 0.068*  0.016 -0.007 
 (0.029) (0.031)  (0.032) (0.040) 
constant -0.074*** 1.930  -0.030 3.388 
 (0.017) (1.896)  (0.015) (1.836) 
control variables              N       Y            N      Y 
R
2
 0.026 0.040  0.033 0.079 
N 923 923           923     923 
Notes.  
Employer-sponsored sample are those who only have 401(k) type accounts at Vanguard.   
 
Table 2-A12.  Stock Shares Versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs. Individual-
client subsample  
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
             (1)       (2)            (3)      (4) 
ˆ
i  0.059*** 0.055***  0.041*** 0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.009) 
ˆ
i  -0.075 -0.089  -0.091 -0.112* 
 (0.051) (0.055)  (0.051) (0.046) 
ˆ
i  0.027** 0.024*  0.012 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.011) 
constant 0.024** 1.099*  0.011 0.765 
 (0.009) (0.525)  (0.007) (0.570) 
control variables              N        Y            N       Y 
R
2
 0.016 0.032  0.008 0.028 
N    3491 3491          3491     3491 
Notes.  
Individual-client sample is the complement of Employer-sponsored sample.  
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Table 2-A13.  Stock Shares Versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs. Share of wealth 
at Vanguard at least 50 percent 
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
 (1)      (2)           (3)    (4) 
ˆ
i  0.057*** 0.053***  0.045*** 0.044*** 
 (0.015) (0.013)  (0.011) (0.011) 
ˆ
i  -0.139* -0.131  -0.008 -0.018 
 (0.067) (0.076)  (0.055) (0.053) 
ˆ
i  0.035** 0.038*  0.029* 0.029** 
 (0.012) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.014) 
constant 0.005 0.776  -0.032*** 1.193 
 (0.009) (0.870)  (0.007) (0.756) 
control variables             N      Y           N     Y 
R
2
 0.020 0.034  0.018 0.042 
N 1909    1909         1909   1909 
 
 
Table 2-A14.  Stock Shares Versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs. Share of wealth 
at Vanguard at least 70 percent 
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
 (1)    (2)          (3)    (4) 
ˆ
i  0.058*** 0.054**  0.060*** 0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.017)  (0.013) (0.013) 
ˆ
i  -0.127 -0.107  -0.018 -0.008 
 (0.084) (0.075)  (0.061) (0.067) 
ˆ
i  0.041** 0.045**  0.036** 0.039** 
 (0.013) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.014) 
constant 0.004 0.470  -0.046*** 0.698 
 (0.015) (1.225)  (0.012) (1.032) 
control variables             N     Y           N     Y 
R
2
 0.019 0.036  0.003 0.061 
N 1241   1241         1241   1241 
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Table 2-A15.  Stock Shares Versus Cardinal Proxies for Preferences and Beliefs. Households 
with directly held stocks 
 LHS variable: 
survey measure of stock share  
in total financial wealth 
 LHS variable: 
administrative measure of stock share  
in Vanguard 
 (1)     (2)          (3)     (4) 
ˆ
i  0.051* 0.067**  0.045* 0.039* 
 (0.024) (0.023)  (0.020) (0.019) 
ˆ
i  -0.147 -0.136  -0.169 -0.095 
 (0.156) (0.126)  (0.149) (0.107) 
ˆ
i  0.023 0.022  -0.001 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.036) 
constant 0.070*** 1.321  0.045* 3.797** 
 (0.018) (1.771)  (0.018) (1.600) 
control variables             N     Y           N      Y 
R
2
 0.013 0.026  0.011 0.042 
N 639    639          639     639 
 
 
Table 2-A16. Observed stock shares and theoretically optimal stock shares.  Attenuation to belief 
heterogeneity.   
 
 Survey Stock Share  Administrative Stock Share 
     (1) (2)      (3)     (4) 
λ 0.063*** 0.059***  0.052*** 0.049*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.008) 
control variables     N      Y       N      Y 
R
2
 0.015 0.042  0.012 0.038 
N   4414   4414    4414    4414 
p-value of Wald test  
on restriction 
0.605 0.520  0.386 0.644 
Notes. Regression results from equation (12), imposing  0
1 1  , 
0
2 2   , and omitting risk 
tolerance term (
0
3
i 


).  The correlation between the distribution of the risk tolerance 
parameter and that of belief parameters is estimated to be negligible (see Table 2-A5 and A6), so 
omitting risk tolerance term does not affect inferences on the effect of belief heterogeneity.  λ in 
this exercise can be interpreted as the attenuation factor to belief heterogeneity only.  
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** implies significance at 5%, 1% and 
0.1% level, respectively.  
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Figure 2-A1.  Difference between relative risk tolerance and γ (as a fraction of γ) over different 
levels of consumption and  .  
 
 
Notes.  
The vertical line shows the mean level of household income in the VRI (before retirement), to 
approximate the average level of household consumption.  
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Figure 2-A2. Bi-variate non-parametric regression of stock share in total financial wealth on each 
probability questions on stock market expectation   
 
 
 p0 
 
 
 
 
 
p20 
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Appendix 2-B.  Details on Structural Estimation Procedure 
The distributions of the true latent variables are assumed as (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) in the main 
text: 
 
2
2
0
, ,
0 .
i i i u u u
i i i u
u u
N
u u
     
  
     
  
   
         
 (2-B.1) 
 
2log( ) ,  ~ (0, )i i i uu u N        (2.B.2) 
We allow the beliefs about returns to depend on risk preference, so the covariates of   and   
include the latent i .  
 These latent variables are related to observed survey responses in the following way. 
 
2
log( ) log( )        for 1,2
~ (0, )
ij i ij
ij j
j
N

 
  
 
  
  (2.B.3) 
 
1 1/ 1 1/ 1 1/
( ) (2 ) ((1 ) )
  vs. 0.5 0.5
1 1/ 1 1/ 1 1/
i i i
i i i
W W x W
    
  
     

  
  (2.B.4) 
 2,  ~ (0, )i i mi mi mm N       (2.B.5) 
 
2
0 0 0( ),  ~ ( , )
i
i i i p
i
p N 

   

   (2.B.6) 
 
2
20 20 20
0.2
( ),  ~ (0, )ii i i p
i
p N 

  


   (2.B.7) 
 
The variables 
im , 0ip , and 20ip  are before rounding.  Actual survey response im  is a rounded 
version of 
im as im  is restricted to take an integer value. Survey responses 0ip  and 20ip  are to 
take a value from the set {0,5,10,15,25,35,…,75,85,90,95,100}, we assume that 
0ip  and 20ip  are 
rounded to the closest values allowed for each response.  Also note that the survey does not 
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allow for 
20ip  to be larger than 0ip .  Hence when we observe 20ip = 0ip , we consider the 
possibility that the survey response error actually generated 20 0i ip p  but after imposing the 
constraint we observe the equality in the actual responses.  Together with interval responses, 
these formulae tell the range of survey response error terms that generate the responses of 
individual i that we observe, given ,  ,i i   and i .  The parameter values governing the 
distribution of the survey response errors allow us to calculate the conditional probability of the 
joint responses.   
The parameters to be estimated are 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2, ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , ,  ,  ,  ,  u u u m p                    .  We 
allow for  , ,  , and   to vary with covariates.   
Algorithm of likelihood function calculation  
We use the Gaussian quadrature approximation of the normal distribution to numerically 
integrate the density functions over multiple dimensions.  Let   be the vector of parameters.  
Given a fixed 0  the likelihood function is calculated through the following algorithm:  
(1) Based on the parameter values that govern the true belief and preference parameter 
distributions in 0 , and using Gaussian Quadrature approximation, generate K nodes 
1{ , , }
K
k k k k     of belief and preference parameters, with corresponding probabilities 1{ }
K
k k   such 
that 
1
1
K
k
k


 .  
(2) For each  { , , }k k k    and each individual, calculate 
0 0 20 20 1 1 2 2[ , ],  [ , ],  [ , ],   [ , ],   [ , ]
low high low high low high low high low high
mi mi i i i i i i i i              such that survey response error 
terms realized in these ranges generate the observed responses after rounding and corresponding 
constraints.  
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(3) For each  { , , }k k k    and each individual, calculate the joint likelihood of the realization of 
the error terms in the range found in (2), using Gaussian CDF under the parameter values 
governing the error term distributions in 0 .  Let ki
  denote this joint likelihood.  
(4) The likelihood for each individual is calculated as integration over k nodes as following:  
 
1
K
i ki k
k
L  

   (2.B.8) 
Then the joint likelihood is calculated as products of iL  over individuals.  
 
Calculation of the proxy variables  
Under the estimated parameters, the proxy variables are calculated as expected values 
conditional on the observed responses.  The individual-specific proxy variables are obtained 
using the econometric model outlined above. The likelihood function of the model specifies the 
probability distribution of the observed responses conditional on the latent beliefs and 
preferences. The distribution of the latent variables conditional on the observed responses can be 
obtained from the likelihood function using Bayes’ theorem. Integrating out this function yields 
the individual-specific proxy variables ( ˆi , ˆ i  and ˆi ) as the conditional expectations of the 
latent variables given the observed survey responses. We use the same numerical approximation 
for this calculation.  Using the Bayes’ Rule, ˆi  is calculated as:  
 
0 20 1 2
1
1ˆ [ | , , , ]
K
i i i i i i i k ki k
ki
E m p p SSQ SSQ
L
    

   .  (2.B.9) 
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Appendix 2-C. Details on Structural Life-Cycle Model of Portfolio Choice 
Health Transition and Preferences The model starts from age 55, which is the lowest value in 
the VRI, and the household can live up to age 110 at most.
27
  The probability of survival up to 
next period (1 D ) is a function of age.  The household evaluate flow utility from the 
consumption using (2.1).  It discounts next period utility by time discount factor  . When it dies, 
it leaves the bequest, and bequest utility is modeled as:  
 
1 1/
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1 1/
i
Beq
Beq i Beq
i
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U B






  (2-C.1) 
where 
Beq determines the strength of the bequest motive and Beq determines whether it is 
necessity or luxury, compared to its own consumption.  
Labor Income Process The household retires at age 65.  Until then, the labor income is 
exogenously determined as:  
 2log( ) log( ) ,  ~ (0, ) for 65.it i it itY y N t       (2-C.2) 
Given that households have only 10 years until retirement in this model, we abstract from 
permanent income shocks.  After retirement, the household receives annuity income which 
captures Social Security income and defined benefit pension income and hence is not exposed to 
any uncertainty.  This annuity income is modeled as a fraction (  ) of the mean income before 
retirement:   
 log( ) log( ) log( ) for 65.it iY y t      (2-C.3) 
                                                   
27
  To avoid the complications arising from the joint survival process, we assume that the household dies when 
the head dies.  Essentially, the model is looking at the single households’ portfolio choice.  Stock share 
regression using singles only give the essentially the same results as our baseline results using the full sample.   
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Financial Assets Households can invest in two different assets, a riskless asset and a risky 
asset where the latter represents stocks.  The gross real return on a risk free asset is set as a 
constant 
fR .  The subjective belief on distribution of the real gross return on a risky asset, tR ,  is 
modeled as:  
 2
1, 1 1,  ~ (0, )t i i t t iR N         (2-C.4) 
where 1t   is an i.i.d. stock return shock.  Note that this subjective belief process is 
heterogeneous across households.  We assume that the aggregate stock return shock is 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic labor income shock, following Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout 
(2005).  
Optimization problem of the households Let Wit be beginning-of-period cash in hand of a 
household and it  be share of savings of this period invested to stocks.  We assume that short 
sales and leveraged stock holdings are not allowed.
28
  Then the household solves the following 
optimization problem (we drop the subscripts i and t):   
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  (2-C.5) 
Computation We solve for the optimal policy function numerically using backward induction.  
The last period (at age 110) maximization is a static one so the value function is trivially 
obtained.  This value function is used as a continuation value for the maximization program of 
                                                   
28
 Optimal stock share could go over 100% if we allowed leveraging, since labor earnings and retirement 
income are close substitutes to the risk-free asset, due to zero correlation with stock return for the former 
and the absence of risk for the latter.  In addition, when we approximate the labor income process as a 
discrete process, even the worst possible realization of income guarantees positive resources net of the 
subsistence level of consumption (as in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005)) since mean level of labor 
income is much higher than the subsistence level of consumption. 
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the penultimate period.  We repeat this until we solve for the maximization problem at the first 
period.  For the choice over continuous spaces, i.e. over C and  , the optimization is done using 
grid search.  With the curvature parameters the problem is no more homogenous to the scale, so 
it cannot be normalized as typically done in the literature (see Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout 
(2005) and Pang and Warshawsky (2010) for example).  This does not increase computational 
burden too much since we abstract from permanent income shocks.  
Calibration We solve this model for various sets of subjective belief and risk tolerance 
parameter values that are in the range supported by the evidence from the VRI, to understand the 
effects of heterogeneous belief and preference on the optimal stock share.  The curvature 
parameter for the ordinary utility function ( ) is fixed at the value estimated from the VRI (-
17K).  Time discount factor (  ) is set to be 0.96, a value that is typically used in the literature 
for annual models.  
The probability of survival D  is estimated from the HRS (1994 – 2010).   For the 
parameters for the bequest utility function we use the median values ( 32,  64Beq Beq K    ) 
from Ameriks et al. (2015) who estimate heterogeneity in preferences regarding long-term care 
expenditure and bequests.  The parameters imply that a bequest is a luxury good compared to the 
ordinary consumption, but once the bequest motive kicks in for wealthy households the marginal 
utility from leaving bequest is large.  Risk free return (
fR ) is set to be 1.02.  In the baseline 
model we use $90,000 for the mean income before retirement ( y ) and assume 0.5 for the 
replacement rate after retirement (  ).  These values are close to means from the VRI data.   The 
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variance of transitory income shocks ( 2
 ) is set to be 0.07, which is close to the value used in 
Cocco et al. (2005).
29
  
 Table 2-C1 summarizes the calibration of the parameters, and figure 2-C1 summarizes 
the results. 
  
                                                   
29
 They estimated it to be 0.058 for college graduates.  We set it slightly larger here given that our model does 
not have permanent income shocks.  
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Table 2-C1.  Calibration of Parameters for the Life-Cycle Model 
Parameters Value Target/Source 
  -17K VRI estimation 
  0.96 Standard 
D   HRS estimation 
fR  1.02 
Cocco, Gomes and 
Maenhout (2005) 
Beq  32 Ameriks et al. (2015) 
Beq  64K Ameriks et al. (2015) 
y  $80,000 VRI data 
  0.5 VRI data 
2
  0.07 
Cocco, Gomes and 
Maenhout (2005) 
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Figure 2-C1. Stock share and the expected value of stock returns (μ) at different levels of the 
standard deviation of stock returns (σ) and risk tolerance (γ). Results from the life cycle portfolio 
choice model. 
 
  
Portfolio choice model,  
medium level of risk tolerance (γ = 0.32) 
Portfolio choice model,  
low level of risk tolerance (γ = 0.16) 
 
Figure 2-C2. Stock share and the risk tolerance (γ) at different levels of the standard deviation of 
stock returns (σ) and expected value of stock returns (μ).  Results from the life cycle portfolio 
choice model. 
  
  
Portfolio choice model,  
medium level of expected return (μ = 0.06) 
 
Portfolio choice model,  
low level of expected return (μ = 0.03) 
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Chapter 3. The Wealth of Wealthholders 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As defined benefit pension plans become rare and as the generosity of a pay-as-you-go Social 
Security system becomes increasingly limited by aging of the population, households are 
increasingly responsible for financing their own retirement. Hence, understanding how 
individuals’ financial assets affect their retirement decisions and well-being in retirement is of 
utmost importance for understanding behavior and the welfare of the retired population, as well 
as policy changes that may affect them. Though the transition from a defined benefit to a defined 
contribution retirement system has been underway for decades, about half of households 
approaching or in retirement have relatively low financial assets. Datasets designed to represent 
the population, therefore, have surprisingly little information on older Americans with wealth 
sufficient to finance a non-trivial fraction of their retirement consumption. Our research fills this 
gap by producing an innovative new dataset containing a large number of households with 
significant financial assets to potentially use in retirement. To highlight the value of these new 
data, the paper shows that the relationship between wealth and retirement plans differs 
dramatically over the range of wealth that is sufficient to sustain consumption in retirement 
compared to that in the population reflected in standard datasets such as the Health and 
Retirement Study and the Survey of Consumer Finance.  
This paper presents results from a collaboration between the Vanguard Group, Inc. and 
academic researchers to provide measurements and analysis surrounding the behavior, 
preferences, expectations, and information of older Americans managing spending in retirement. 
Specifically, the paper presents findings from the Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI), which 
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provides high-quality, linked administrative and survey data on a large sample of households that 
face or will soon face the problem of managing assets in retirement. The VRI attempts to 
improve on measurements from surveys that are justifiably called the gold standard for wealth 
measurement—namely, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF)—along multiple dimensions:   
 First, we target the population of interest—i.e., older Americans with nontrivial financial 
assets. Even though the overall sample sizes are similar, the HRS and SCF actually have 
relatively small samples of the population of interest. The HRS—since it is representative of 
the entire age-eligible population—has many respondents with trivial wealth. The SCF—
since it is representative of the overall population—has many respondents who are younger.  
 
 Second, using a combination of administrative and survey data, we can address the question 
of whether—apart from having non-negligible wealth—the Vanguard population is different 
from the overall population. We draw respondents from two lines of business—those with 
individual and those with employer-sponsored accounts. We find that, especially for the 
employer-sponsored sample, the Vanguard population is broadly representative of the U.S. 
older population with non-negligible financial wealth and Internet eligibility. The VRI is 
broadly representative of households in the upper half of the wealth distribution. 
 
 Third, we take a comprehensive account-based approach to measuring assets. Under this 
approach, respondents are asked to report their financial assets account-by-account. The aim 
of this approach—which is used selectively in the HRS and SCF—is to get information from 
respondents in the form that they have it or think of it rather than by requesting responses 
using accounting or economic categories that may not be meaningful to them. 
 
 Fourth, we employ a set of survey techniques designed to elicit more accurate survey 
measures of financial assets. Respondents give meaningful nicknames to their accounts. The 
survey provides a summary of accounts and balances at various stages, so respondents can 
check whether they missed or double-counted accounts or misreported balances. 
Respondents can then make corrections without having to reenter correct items.  
 
 Fifth, we use the administrative data to validate the survey responses. We are able to show 
that our novel survey approach provides unbiased measures of the level of assets as opposed 
to the understatement typically observed in survey responses. Additionally, we can show that 
our correction mechanism does reduce the variance of response errors. 
  
Given the cost and difficulty of collecting asset data from respondents, our use of account data 
and survey data in tandem provides a roadmap for augmenting or replacing survey-based 
measures of assets in large-scale surveys. Therefore, in addition to its specific findings, this 
165 
 
paper documents and analyzes an approach that could be applied very broadly for improving 
measurement of wealth.
1
 
 This paper shows the importance of having ample observations in the relevant range of 
wealth by analyzing non-linear relationship between wealth and retirement horizon. There is a 
puzzling finding in the literature on wealth and retirement: even following very large stock 
market declines—such as in 2000 to 2002 and 2007 to 2009—changes in wealth have either a 
small or no effect on retirement or on retirement plans of older Americans. Comparing changes 
in retirement rates between defined-contribution (DC) and defined-benefit (DB) pension holders 
for the period 1992–1998 using the HRS, Sevak (2002) finds that DC pension holders tended to 
reduce retirement age more during the stock market boom in the 1990s. Coronado and Perozek 
(2003) and Kthitatrakun (2004), by comparing expected and actual retirement age, show that a 
wealth gain caused by a stock market boom reduces retirement age compared to households’ 
previous expectations. In contrast, Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2012), Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder 
(2012) and Kezdi and Sevak (2004), using risky asset holdings in the HRS data as a measure of 
exposure to the stock market, estimate the wealth effect on the retirement decision and find no 
evidence of such an effect. Coile and Levine (2004) focus on aggregate labor supply measures 
from the HRS and Current Population Survey and also find no evidence. Using pre- and post-
crash interviews from the CogEcon survey conducted in 2007 and 2009, McFall (2011) finds a 
                                                   
1
 This research is therefore related to an emerging program to augment or replace survey data with 
administrative records, including private account data. See Gelman et al. (2014) for high-frequency 
spending and income data; Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) for earnings data; Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 
(2007) for credit card data to measure the response of spending to income; Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for 
linking administrative data on price paid to survey data on demographics and time use. For the difficulties 
of measuring wealth and earnings in surveys, see Juster and Smith (1997). For systematic bias in 
economic measurement in surveys, see Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) and Hurst, Li, and Pugsley 
(2014). See Krimmel, Moore, Sabelhaus, and Smith (2013) for problems with the timeliness of asset data, 
which are addressed by the VRI approach. 
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relationship between wealth change and retirement age in the expected direction, though the 
estimated size of the effect is modest.
2
 
The VRI is designed to have greater power to detect these effects by collecting a large 
amount of high-quality asset data for households where such changes in wealth might be more 
relevant. Therefore, it addresses the problem, identified by Poterba (2014), Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise (2011) and Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010), that in the survey datasets 
commonly used in this literature, most households do not have significant retirement wealth or 
stock market exposure. In this paper, we estimate the relationship between wealth and retirement 
plans in the VRI, HRS, and SCF. We demonstrate that this relationship is highly non-linear and 
that we can estimate the effect of wealth at the relevant range of wealth levels to be significant 
only when we have dense observations in that range. We then show, for households with enough 
wealth to typically have significant stock market exposure, that the expected retirement horizon 
varies significantly with wealth.  
 Admittedly, such estimates from the VRI are “out of sample” for the population of older 
Americans in the US—about half of whom have little wealth and little exposure to the stock 
market. Making such out-of-sample inferences is precisely the aim of the VRI. As noted at the 
outset of the paper, policy changes and changes in employer offering of pensions are pushing 
older Americans to save and invest for their retirement through 401(k) and similar accounts. To 
understand the ultimate effects of this transformation of the retirement landscape, data such as 
those from the VRI are essential. There is the concern, however, that the VRI respondents are 
different—not just because they have significant retirement savings, but because they are 
                                                   
2
 Some studies use other sources of variations in wealth changes. Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) use 
lottery windfall gains, while Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993) use inheritance information in IRS 
data and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) use inheritance data in the PSID. Estimated effects are mostly 
modest, with the exception of Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993), who find a sizeable effect. 
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different from the population in terms of their demographics, socioeconomic status, or other 
characteristics. Are Vanguard clients so special that they are not a valid population for drawing 
inferences more generally?  We address this question head-on in the paper. We show that 
Vanguard clients are different from the HRS and SCF respondents mainly because they have 
more financial wealth. For HRS and SCF respondents of similar wealth, education and other 
attributes are not that different. This is particularly true in the subsets of HRS and SCF 
respondents with 401(k) plans, compared to the Vanguard employer-sponsored sample. Our 
approach to sampling Vanguard respondents—drawing separately from individual clients and 
those in employer-sponsored plans—substantially obviates concerns about selection. The VRI 
employer-sponsored sample has a retirement/wealth relationship that looks quite similar to the 
overall VRI sample. We conclude that the findings from the VRI are driven by having dense 
observations of households with significant levels of wealth and stock market exposure, not by 
differences in households that select Vanguard as a financial institution. 
 
3.2 Innovations in Wealth Measurement:  Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) Approach 
What makes the VRI innovative?  First, it surveys financial wealth by accounts, not by asset 
classes. Its aim is to ask respondents to report numbers that closely correspond to how they 
receive statements and to how they might classify assets. The approach avoids asking 
respondents to map their balances into accounting or economic constructs, and does not require 
them to do addition or distribution of amounts. Second, after each step where the survey 
instrument elicits the composition or amount of assets, it shows a summary of responses in 
tabular form and allows respondents to modify their answers. Third, the survey is integrated with 
administrative data. Administrative data create the sample frame, allow validation of survey 
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responses, and create a high-frequency panel of asset data. In this section of the paper, we 
describe the design of the VRI sample and how the wealth measurements are implemented in the 
VRI survey.  
Table 3.1 shows in tabular form the main survey design elements and how they compare 
with those of the HRS and SCF. Section 3.4 provides a detailed comparison of these surveys.
3
   
3.2.1. The VRI Sample Design 
The administrative data and, more generally, the collaboration with Vanguard are critical in 
achieving the VRI objective of creating a large sample of older wealthholders. By construction, 
Vanguard clients have some wealth. Additionally, information in the Vanguard administrative 
data on customer type, account balances, age, geography, and use of the Internet are all essential 
for creating the sample. This information allows us to reach a large population of relevant 
households.  
The population for the VRI is Vanguard Group account holders aged 55 and older who 
are Web-survey eligible (must be registered for use of the Vanguard website, have a valid email 
address, and have logged on in the past six months). We stratified the sample based on the 
following characteristics from the administrative data: individual versus employer-sponsored 
accounts; age; and administratively-single status. We sampled evenly from five-year age 
intervals from 55 to 74 and from 75 and above. For those under 65, we divided the sample 
evenly between the two client types. After age 65, those in the employer-sponsored line tend to 
exit this group as they roll over their employer-sponsored accounts into IRAs accounts (either at 
Vanguard or elsewhere). For this age group, we sample the types in the proportion they appear in 
the population.  
                                                   
3
 Ameriks et al. (2014) describes the VRI in greater detail. Readers interested in the specifics of sampling, 
testing, and design, as well as in more-detailed tabulations, are referred to that paper. 
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 A variety of research questions are more difficult to answer in the context of multi-person 
households. There are relatively few single households in the Vanguard population. Thus, we felt 
it useful to oversample singles to secure an adequate sample size of singles. The administrative 
data contain an imperfect indicator of single status. In particular, Vanguard constructs a 
household indicator by using common address and joint registration. Being in a single-member 
household using this indicator is strongly, but not perfectly, correlated with the survey measure 
of single status. Using information on the relationship between the survey and administrative 
measures of single status in a pilot survey, we increased the sampling rate of administratively-
single accounts in the production survey. See Ameriks et al. (2014).  
 These sampling criteria are all imposed ex ante based on the administrative data. To draw 
the sample that we invited to complete the survey, we randomly selected from the specified 
populations of account holders. We monitored our success at hitting the desired sample 
proportions, but made no adjustments after drawing the sample. We did not impose quotas of any 
kind on responses. 
3.2.2. Survey Measurement of Wealth in the VRI 
A key innovation of the VRI approach is to elicit assets on a comprehensive, account-by-account 
basis. This section describes this approach. The next section will show that it yields highly 
accurate measurements of assets.
4
 Appendix 3-A shows screen shots of the wealth section for a 
hypothetical respondent. The steps in the wealth section are as follows.  
                                                   
4
 The VRI approach is unique in taking a comprehensive, account-based approach to wealth 
measurement. The HRS and SCF take approaches that mix the account- and asset-class approaches. For 
non-retirement assets, the HRS asks respondents to aggregate the balances across accounts into the 
following asset classes:  stocks and stock mutual funds; bonds and bond mutual funds; checking, savings, 
and money market accounts; and CDs, government bonds, and Treasury bills. The SCF takes a mixed 
approach. For checking, savings/money market, and mutual funds, it asks for the number of accounts and 
the balance for each account. For CDs, savings bonds, individual stocks, and brokerages, it asks for asset-
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Step 1:  Account Type. The respondents are shown a list of 15 account types divided into 
groups. The rows in Table 3.2 after Total Financial Assets show the types. The major groups are 
“Tax deferred-retirement accounts” (IRA, employer sponsored plans, pension with account 
balance, and other retirement assets); “Savings/Investment accounts that are not in a tax-deferred 
retirement plan or account”  (checking, savings, money market mutual funds, CDs, brokerage, 
and directly held securities); “Insurance-related accounts” (annuities with cash value and life 
insurance with cash balance); “Educational accounts”; and “Other.”  The survey displays a table 
with these account types and a checkbox for having each type. 
Step 2. Number of accounts. The survey shows a list of account types that the respondent 
has checked in step 1. The respondent is asked to indicate the number of each type of account 
using a drop-down menu.  
Step 3.  Nicknames of accounts; verification. The survey then shows a list of accounts. 
The respondent is asked to give a nickname for each account. After the respondent enters all the 
nicknames, the survey displays a summary table (see Appendix 3-A, Figure 3-A4). Respondents 
are then asked whether all the information is correct. If not, they are asked whether they want to 
correct the list of accounts (either add or delete an account type or change the number of 
accounts for any type). Depending on their answers, they are brought back to either step 1 or step 
2.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
class totals as in the HRS. For IRAs, it asks for an inventory of types of IRA (regular, Roth, rollover) and 
then asks for total by type.  
    For pensions, the HRS and SCF take a pension-by-pension approach. The SCF household head reports 
up to three separate pension accounts for each household member; the HRS respondent and spouse report 
up to three separate pension accounts. The HRS 2012 has taken a step toward creating a longitudinal 
record of pensions. The HRS asks about IRAs (up to three accounts per respondent and spouse) as part of 
the pension module. The bifurcated structure of the HRS wealth measures (household basis for non-
retirement assets and individual basis for pensions and retirement accounts) results from a strategic design 
decision made at the outset of the HRS to collect pension data as part of the labor section rather than the 
wealth section.  
171 
 
Step 4. Balances. The survey then loops over accounts. Respondents are asked to input 
the balance of each account by its nickname.  
Step 5. Summary table of balances; verification. The survey displays a summary table of 
accounts as well as a total (see Figure 3-A6). For each account, there are checkboxes for 
“referred to records.”  There is also a checkbox at the bottom of the table that asks whether 
everything is correct. If the respondent checks “No, I need to go back and make an update,” the 
screen updates with two checkboxes asking whether the respondent needs to add/delete accounts 
or correct the dollar amount. (Both can be checked. See Figure 3-A7.) If the respondent indicates 
a need to correct amounts, the account summary table updates with a new column of checkboxes 
asking which need to be corrected. (See Figure 3-A8.)  The survey asks only for the required 
corrections. Specifically, if the respondent clicks on the “add/delete account” box, they are taken 
back to step 1 with all previous responses pre-filled. On the other hand, if the respondent needs 
to correct only the amounts, the survey returns to step 4. Once the respondent returns to step 5, 
the respondent is again asked if the answers are correct and again allowed to make corrections. 
There is no limit on the number of times respondents can go through the correction sequence.  
 After the respondent indicates that the summary table of balances needs no correction, the 
survey presents follow-up questions about the composition of the accounts. First, for accounts 
other than saving/checking/MMMF, the respondents are shown the table with balances and asked 
to enter the share of stock held in each account. The table updates and translates the share into 
dollars of stock for each account.   
Finally, the respondent again sees the table with balances. The table presents a checkbox 
for indicating whether or not each account is held at Vanguard. This table excludes account 
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categories not offered at Vanguard (e.g., life insurance). This step enables comparison of 
responses with the administrative data.  
 At the end of the wealth section, the survey displays a summary table of financial wealth 
combined with two pie charts showing the stock share in the overall portfolio and the share of 
wealth at Vanguard (see Figure 3-A13 for an example). The survey prompts respondents to print 
out this page, if desired. This summary was provided in the hope that this potentially useful 
measurement for survey respondents would increase the likelihood of their continued 
participation in the survey.   
3.2.3. Summary of VRI Wealth Measurements 
Table 3.2 summarizes the distribution of financial assets from the survey. The mean of total 
financial assets (sum of accounts surveyed as described above) is over a million dollars. The 
median is about $660,000. Other than checking accounts, IRAs are the most common asset class 
and account for about one third of total assets. Employer-sponsored plans are by construction 
held by almost all employer-sponsored plan respondents, but are also common among individual 
Vanguard account holders. Similarly, mutual funds and brokerage accounts are significant non-
retirement assets in the population of Vanguard account holders.  
 Ameriks et al. (2014) describes how we collected data on non-account-based assets 
(housing, businesses, etc.). That paper also describes in greater detail the findings from the 
account-by-account approach. Notably, respondents were perhaps surprisingly willing to provide 
details on many accounts. The median respondent provided information on seven accounts. One 
quarter provided information on 12 or more accounts. The respondents were also willing to refer 
to records, with the strong majority referring to records for all accounts. Hence, it appears that 
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our approach gives us a comprehensive and accurate measure of assets. We provide evidence for 
that contention in the next section. 
 
3.3 Comparing Administrative and Survey Measures of Assets 
A key feature of the VRI is its combination of administrative account data and survey 
measurements of assets. As discussed above, the administrative data are a powerful tool for 
obtaining a sample frame for a wealth survey. Additionally, administrative data can supplement 
survey data by providing alternative measures of wealth, potentially at very high frequency. The 
administrative data also can be used to verify the survey measures. This section of the paper 
investigates the joint measurement properties of the survey and account data both to evaluate the 
quality of the VRI and to guide future use of administrative account data in surveys. 
3.3.1. Quantifying Response Errors 
The VRI contains administrative data on the account holders’ total wealth and information about 
its composition. The administrative data, though exact, are not perfect. The linking of accounts to 
clients might not be perfect, especially for married clients. Additionally, the administrative data 
are end-of-month, so intra-month transactions and changes in value can cause discrepancies 
between survey and administrative data. Nevertheless, the administrative wealth data give an 
unusually good reference point for evaluating the quality of the survey data and vice versa.  
The administrative data are, of course, limited to accounts at Vanguard. The survey was 
designed to capture all assets. To facilitate comparison of survey and administrative data, at the 
end of the account section of the survey the respondent is shown a table listing each account and 
the survey report of its balance. Using the same format as shown in Figure 3-A6 (used records), 
the respondent is asked to check a box indicating whether or not the account is at Vanguard. In 
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this section, the survey measure of Vanguard wealth relies on these survey responses. Figure 3.1 
shows the distribution of the survey reports of Vanguard assets relative to the administrative 
data. For each decile of administrative assets, the figure shows a box and whiskers diagram of 
the distribution of the survey report of Vanguard assets. The responses are tightly bunched along 
the 45-degree line, though there are also substantial outliers. There is a slight over-reporting of 
assets in the survey relative to the administrative data. The fraction over-reported declines as 
assets increase. 
To shed some light on the difference between the administrative and survey measures, 
Table 3.3 splits the sample by line of business and single status. The first line of each panel 
shows the survey data, the second line the administrative, the third line the survey minus the 
administrative data, and the last line the percent difference.
5
  For the employer-sponsored 
sample, the median difference is $890, or 0.6%; for the individual client sample, the median 
difference is $2,623, or 1.4%. Yet, for both samples, the interquartile ranges of the differences 
are substantial.  
A long-standing concern in wealth measurement is that assets are under-reported—
because individuals forget about accounts and because they are reluctant to share account 
amounts (see Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999)). The VRI, with its account-by-account approach, 
builds on the insights of Juster and the designers of the HRS and SCF by presenting the 
respondents with a detailed list of asset types, so that they do not neglect to report certain items. 
                                                   
5
 The administrative data are the weighted average of the end of month before the survey and after the 
survey with the weight equal to the fraction of the month elapsed on the survey date. Percentage 
difference is calculated in the following way. Let SW and AW denote the survey wealth and the 
administrative wealth. Following Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) formulation from the gross flow 
literature, we define the percentage difference as 2 × (𝑆𝑊− 𝐴𝑊)/(𝑆𝑊+ 𝐴𝑊). The main advantage of 
this formula is that it can be applied even when either SW or AW is 0.  
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Remarkably, the VRI data show no evidence of such under-reporting on average, so this 
approach appears to be effective. 
A potential reason for survey over-reports is that some accounts might not be linked to 
the survey respondent in the administrative data. Since the administrative records are at the 
account-holder level, they will not include a spouse’s account if it is registered solely under the 
spouse’s name. To address this issue, we conduct the same comparison only for singles, that is, 
respondents who report in the survey that they are not married or partnered. The results are 
reported in Table 3.3, Panels C and D. For singles, the tendency to over-report is essentially 
gone. For the singles in the individual account holder sample, median deviation is almost zero (-
0.03%) and the interquartile range of the deviation is -2.9% to 2.2%. The difference is most acute 
for the individual client sample because employer-sponsored respondents are less likely to have a 
family-level relationship with Vanguard. In particular, note that the large upper tail of difference 
in the individual sample is dramatically reduced for singles relative to the overall sample in 
Panel B.
6
  
3.3.2   Corrections and Wealth Measurement 
In this section, we examine how the VRI’s correction mechanism works to enhance the accuracy 
of the account data. The survey instrument not only captures the final responses, but also saves 
the initial answers. Therefore, for respondents who modified their answers after seeing the 
summary tables, we can check whether or not their answers got closer to the administrative data. 
Figure 3.2 summarizes the paths respondents took through the wealth section given that they 
have multiple opportunities to correct their account inventories and balances:   
                                                   
6
 We are also able to examine whether checking records matters for accuracy of survey responses. 
Interestingly, checking records shrinks the deviation of administrative and survey reports, but being 
logged on to the Vanguard website during the survey does not play a significant role in this result. See 
Ameriks et al. (2014). 
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Path 1. No corrections. About two thirds of the sample (62.49%) completed the wealth 
section without making any corrections.  
Path 2. Inventory corrected before balance entered; balance not corrected. About 15% of 
respondents corrected their inventory (the first checkpoint in step 3 described in Section 
3.2.2), but did not correct balances.  
Path 3. Only balance corrected. About 11% of respondents corrected their balances (the 
second checkpoint in step 5) without either previously correcting their inventory or going 
back to correct after entering balances.   
Path 4. Inventory corrected, then balance corrected. About 5% of respondents corrected 
their inventory, entered their balances and then corrected their balances, but did not go 
back to revise inventory subsequent to entering balances.  
Path 5. Non-sequential corrections. About 6% of respondents made complex corrections.  
 
Specifically, these respondents typically went back to the start of the wealth section to correct the 
inventory of their accounts after having entered balances. Hence, about one third used the 
correction mechanism in some way.  
 In Table 3.4, we again show the percentage difference between the survey and the 
administrative Vanguard wealth, but for the initial and the final survey answers separately. 
Respondents are grouped according to the correcting paths they took. Again, the comparisons are 
done only for singles.  
 When respondents did not make any corrections, their initial responses were already very 
close to the administrative information. The interquartile range is -3.3% to 2.6% for those who 
made no corrections; for those who corrected account inventory only, it is very similar, -3.5% to 
2.5%. For respondents who corrected their balances, their initial responses seem to be noisier. 
Though the median percentage difference is close to that of those who do not correct balances, 
the pre-correction interquartile range for those who correct balances is much larger. After the 
corrections, however, the width of the interquartile range shrinks dramatically toward that with 
no corrections. Indeed, the corrected range is a bit smaller than for those who made no 
corrections at all. Therefore, the correction mechanism did prove to be effective. 
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3.4 Representing Wealthholders versus Representing Households: VRI, HRS, and SCF 
This paper studies households with non-negligible financial wealth approaching or in retirement. 
The previous sections document that the VRI provides accurate and comprehensive data on this 
group. This section addresses two interrelated questions. First, why is the VRI needed?  The 
answer is that leading surveys aimed at measuring wealth contain remarkably few respondents in 
the relevant age range with significant levels of wealth. Second, is the VRI—having achieved the 
aim of representing such wealthholders in significant numbers—unrepresentative of the 
population apart from having targeted individuals with non-negligible wealth?  We answer these 
questions through a detailed comparison of the VRI with the HRS and SCF. 
3.4.1. Comparing VRI, HRS, and SCF Design 
Table 3.1 summarizes and compares the overall features of the VRI, HRS, and SCF. The VRI is 
composed of Vanguard clients at least 55 years old with non-negligible assets. The HRS is a 
representative sample of those at least 50 years old and their spouses. The SCF aims to be 
representative of wealth across all age groups. Because high-wealth individuals are hard to 
survey, its frame includes a list sample of high-income households.  The VRI oversamples 
singles and, as discussed above, screens for Web-survey eligibility and stratifies the samples by 
Vanguard line of business. The HRS and SCF do not impose these screens, but we use relevant 
variables on the HRS and SCF to construct subsets that match VRI sampling criteria.  
 The last panel of Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the three surveys for 
observations that meet the VRI age-eligibility (age 55 years or older). For HRS, we use the age 
of the financial respondent. The VRI is comparable in size to the HRS in this age range—about 
9,000 households in the VRI and about 11,500 in the HRS. The SCF has less than a third the 
number of respondents in this age range compared to the VRI.  
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The VRI sample is much more affluent than the HRS or SCF samples. Of course, by 
design the VRI targets wealth holders while the HRS and SCF are representative, that is, they 
include the older Americans with very low assets, who are about half the population. The next 
set of results explores these differences and shows the extent to which they derive from VRI 
sampling restrictions.  
3.4.2. Comparing VRI, HRS, and SCF Respondents  
Table 3.5 shows the distribution by wealth and age of raw household counts in the VRI age-
eligible range of 55 years and older for the VRI, HRS, and SCF.
7
  It reminds us how little 
financial wealth the lower half of older households has. The total number of observations in the 
VRI and HRS are comparable, but their distributions of wealth are very different. Ninety percent 
of the VRI respondents have financial wealth of more than $100,000, and one third of them have 
more than a million dollars. In contrast, the HRS distribution has a very fat left tail. One third of 
the HRS sample has a negligible amount of financial wealth (less than $10,000) and only about a 
third has more than $100,000.  
The SCF, which is age-representative overall, has less than a third of the number of 
observations in the age-eligible range compared to the VRI and HRS. With the list sample of 
high-income households, the SCF has disproportionately high-wealth respondents. Even so, 
given that the SCF is not aiming at the population near or after retirement, for most of the 
wealth-age bins with non-negligible wealth, the number of households in the SCF is much 
smaller than in the VRI.  
The age distributions are also quite different across surveys. The VRI, by construction, 
has a similar number of observations for age bins 55-64 and 65-74, and about half the size for 
                                                   
7
 The wealth measure used in the comparisons is total net financial wealth. Values of houses and 
mortgages are excluded. See Appendix 3-B for the definition of the total financial wealth for each survey 
and how we impose similar sampling screens in the VRI, HRS, and SCF.  
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age 75+. The HRS has relatively more observations in the oldest age bin, while the SCF has 
about half in the youngest.  
 These tabulations illustrate vividly how the VRI is targeted for studying the financial 
decisions of those approaching or in retirement with non-trivial financial wealth. Given the stark 
differences in the VRI wealth distribution relative to the population, we need to understand the 
main determinants of these differences. In particular, does the relative affluence of the VRI 
sample derive mainly from our sampling screens or, even taking into account these screens, is a 
sample based on Vanguard clients very different from the U.S. population?  In the following, we 
try to disentangle these effects by examining the effect of VRI eligible screens in the HRS and 
SCF. The screen requires Internet eligibility and that households have at least $10,000 in a non-
transactional financial account.  
 These screens are restrictive in the HRS and SCF samples in this age group. Table 3.6 
shows how the screens affect the number of eligible households by age. For the HRS and SCF, 
the first columns of counts impose just age-eligibility. The second columns impose “VRI 
eligibility” (Internet eligibility and the $10,000 minimum balance in non-transactional financial 
accounts). The third column imposes “401(k) subset” (at least $10,000 in a DC pension account). 
Note that these screens are imposed ipso facto in the VRI for both employer-sponsored and 
individual client groups.
8
  For the HRS and SCF, the screen yields relatively small subsets of 
age-eligible respondents. For the HRS, only about a third satisfy VRI eligibility. In the SCF, a 
relatively larger fraction of households satisfy these conditions owing to oversampling of high-
income households. The size of the 401(k) subset group is much smaller in both the HRS and the 
SCF. In VRI, the age distribution is flat by design. (Everywhere, there are few of the oldest 
                                                   
8
 The two screens in VRI are constructed to be mutually exclusive to avoid inviting respondents 
twice. Therefore, the second and third columns of VRI counts sum to the first column.  
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groups represented in the employer-sponsored samples because most retirees roll over their 
401(k) to an IRA and therefore are represented in the individual client sample.)  In the HRS and 
SCF, the screen has more of a bite for older groups. See Appendix 3-C for implications for 
wealth by age. 
In Table 3.7, we show that the effects of the VRI screens are similar in the HRS and SCF 
in terms of weighted sample.
9
 Imposing Internet eligibility alone reduces the weighted sample by 
about half in both HRS and SCF. The asset cut-off has a similar effect. Because these two 
conditions are highly correlated, there is an only incremental additional effect when taken 
together. Within the VRI-eligible samples in both the HRS and the SCF, only half of the 
weighted sample has at least $10,000 in DC pension accounts.  
 A key question is, after imposing comparable sampling screens, how similar are the 
characteristics of VRI compared to those of the subsamples of the HRS and SCF?  The answer is 
that they are not so different under VRI-equivalent sampling screens. Table 3.8 shows the wealth 
distributions from the VRI, HRS and SCF. From this point forward, HRS and SCF tabulations 
use sampling weights. With only age eligibility, median values from the HRS and SCF are an 
order of magnitude smaller than the corresponding numbers from the VRI. When we impose the 
VRI eligibility screen, the gaps are dramatically reduced, though there are still important 
differences. The remaining gap is smaller if the HRS and SCF subsamples are compared with the 
employer-sponsored sample in the VRI. The 90th
 
percentile from the VRI-eligible subsample of 
the SCF is actually larger than the one from the VRI employer-sponsored group. Recall that for 
                                                   
9
 Up to now, we have focused on raw counts of observations in order to give a concrete sense of the size 
of the samples across the surveys. Since the SCF oversamples high-income individuals, these households 
are assigned smaller sampling weights. Similarly, the HRS oversamples blacks and Hispanics (in order to 
make statistically significant inferences by groups) and residents of Florida (because of the cost saving in 
reaching older respondents there). In the following analysis, all the comparisons are made after weighting 
observations from the HRS and SCF with the corresponding sampling weights.  
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the employer-sponsored group the potential self-selection issue is mitigated, since the availability 
of Vanguard funds in their retirement plan results from their employers’ decision making. To 
more closely mimic the asset cut-off imposed on the employer-sponsored group in the VRI, we 
also made tabulations on the HRS and SCF subgroup composed of households with at least 
$10,000 in their 401(k) or similar pension accounts. The results are reported in the third row of 
the HRS and SCF panels. On average, the 401(k) subset of the HRS is wealthier than the overall 
HRS VRI-eligible sample, while the 401(k) subset in the SCF is less wealthy. The means of the 
401(k) subsets in the SCF and HRS are closer to those of the VRI employer-sponsored sample, 
though the VRI is less right-skewed. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that there is broad similarity 
between the 401(k) subsets of the SCF and HRS and the VRI employer sample.  
 Appendix 3-C provides a more detailed comparison across the surveys. It compares 
across dimensions including income and demographics. Compared to the total population of the 
HRS and SCF in the same age range, the VRI sample has much more wealth, a much higher 
education level, better health, and a greater likelihood of being coupled.  Most of these 
differences, however, can be explained by the effect of the sampling screens we imposed in the 
VRI panel. What is special about the VRI sample is that it is selected for non-trivial asset holding 
and use of the Internet. Once these criteria are imposed, the VRI looks quite similar to the upper 
half of the wealth distribution in the HRS and SCF. There is a bit of residual higher education, 
better health, and high wealth-to-income ratio in the VRI compared to the relevant HRS and SCF 
populations. Yet the principal differences between the VRI and the general populations do not 
appear to be attributable to selection to Vanguard participation per se. For the employer-
sponsored sample, the differences in the characteristics essentially disappear once VRI-eligible 
criteria are imposed on the HRS and SCF.  
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3.4.3.  Stock Share 
The extent of stock ownership looms large in discussions of how individuals will manage under 
defined-contribution retirement plans. The VRI wealth survey asks for stock share on an 
account-by-account basis. Table 3.9 compares the stock share of the VRI with those of the HRS 
and SCF. Panel A reports stock shares while Panel B reports stock amount. Again, we see the 
importance of having a relevant sample. Compared to the VRI, if we impose only age eligibility, 
the HRS and SCF have much lower stock shares across almost all of the distribution. Compared 
to the median share of 55% in VRI, the median share is 0% in the HRS and close to 0% in the 
SCF. Conditioning, however, on the VRI sample screens, the median shares in HRS and SCF are 
still lower, but much closer to those of VRI. The left tail in the HRS still shows less stock 
ownership, but SCF and VRI are similar across the distribution.
10
  The picture is similar with 
regard to the amounts of stock in panel B of Table 3.9. Hence, as with the level of wealth, the 
Vanguard respondents are less unrepresentative once the screen is imposed. But again, note that 
the VRI has a much larger sample of stock holders, so any analysis of portfolios should be much 
more precise. 
 
3.5 Wealth and Retirement:  Lessons from Data on Wealthholders 
We have established that the VRI approach leads to substantially larger samples of older 
households with relevant levels of wealth for many important decisions surrounding retirement 
and well-being in older age. Having dense observations across the relevant ranges is particularly 
important if the relationships between wealth and other behaviors are non-linear. Poterba, Venti 
and Wise (2011) show that for the majority of households surveyed in the HRS, the lack of 
                                                   
10
 Note that the HRS 2012 stock shares in 401(k) or similar accounts are not yet cleaned and imputed, so 
they are excluded (numerator and denominator) from these HRS stock shares.  
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demand for additional annuity income simply comes from having very low annuitizable wealth. 
Similarly, there is a substantial literature on how wealth and shocks to wealth affect retirement 
(e.g., Sevak (2002), Bosworth and Burtless (2010), Goda, Shoven and Slavo (2012), McFall 
(2011), and Coronado and Dynan (2012), among others). Again, for the majority of households 
that approach retirement with little financial wealth, how levels or changes in wealth affect 
decision-making is a very different question than for those who have significant savings for 
retirement.  
In this section, we demonstrate that for the relationship between expected retirement date 
and wealth, having data that are dense in the VRI wealth ranges yields substantially clearer 
inferences than is possible with existing datasets. In particular, we investigate the relationship 
between current accumulated financial wealth and how long individuals plan to keep working.  
The VRI is designed as a panel, though this paper analyzes the first survey. To study the 
wealth/retirement relationship, we use the relationship between retirement expectations and 
wealth in the cross-section.
11
  Thus, we build on the tradition of using expectations rather than 
realizations as the outcome variable. See McGarry (2004), Chan and Stevens (2004), and 
Szinovacz, Davey, and Martin (2014). The use of subjective probability variables relies on 
substantial experience showing the validity of these measures in the HRS and other surveys. See 
Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Hurd and McGarry (2002). 
                                                   
11
 The VRI holds the promise to examine reaction to events as the panel builds over time. We do, 
however, have a panel aspect even with the cross-section of wealth from the survey from the 
administrative data. We have done some exploratory work using the administrative data panel to examine 
the effect of the financial crisis on VRI respondents. Note that the VRI was collected in 2013. By then, 
the stock market had recovered from the 2008/9 decline. By consulting the administrative data, we find 
that most VRI respondents invested passively over the financial crisis. That is, their stock share moved by 
roughly the amount consistent with little rebalancing. As a consequence of this prudent investment 
strategy and the recovery of the market, there is, in fact, little lasting effect of the crisis on VRI 
respondents’ wealth overall. 
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3.5.1. Specification 
In this section we present an exploratory analysis that is designed to reveal how data such as the 
VRI can shed light on variables that determine retirement decision-making. The estimates should 
not be taken as a structural relationship because of the obvious joint determination of retirement 
and saving. 
To measure current financial wealth in a way that is meaningful for thinking about 
expected retirement, we construct normalized financial wealth R
iW as 
  
 65
(0.06 1.03 ) /

   i
ageR
i i iW W Y  
where iW  is annuitizable financial wealth, iY  is current income, and agei  is the current age of 
the main earner of the household.
12
  Normalized wealth is a rough-and-ready measure of how 
much current wealth could replace current income assuming no additional saving. See Brown 
(2001) for a similar measure, but converting flows to a stock. The calculation assumes a 0.06 
annuitization rate and a 3 percent real rate of return. The use of a fixed rate of return and a 
uniform annuity rate is a simple way to put current wealth of future retirees into common units. 
We compound returns until age 65 rather than the expected retirement date to avoid putting 
expected years of work on both sides of the equation. We estimate the relationship 
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R R R
i i i i i iH W W Y Z        (3.1) 
where iH  is the difference between the expected age of retirement and current age, 
R
iW is  
normalized financial wealth, R
iY  is expected DB pension plus Social Security divided by current 
                                                   
12
 Annuitizable financial wealth is the sum of retirement and non-retirement financial assets. To put these 
on the same tax basis, we use another rough-and-ready approximation. Specifically, we presume a 25 
percent average tax rate on withdrawals from qualified plans. Note that we do not have good data 
separating Roth and non-Roth treatment, so all qualified plans are combined in this calculation. The main 
findings are robust with respect to the assumed tax rate.  
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income, and Zi  is a vector of covariates (age, dummies for education and health, and marital 
status).
13
  The coefficient
1( )
R
iW is a potentially non-linear function of normalized wealth.  
3.5.2.  Variables and Sample for Wealth-Retirement Analysis 
We focus on estimates of this relationship in the VRI and HRS. We also show the same analysis 
using the SCF data, but due to the small number of observations in the relevant age group and 
lack of some variables used—health of respondents and expected Social Security income—the 
results are not entirely consistent with the specification used for the VRI and HRS and the 
estimated relationship is much less precise. In the VRI, expected retirement is measured using 
the response to a question, “At what age do you expect to completely retire?”14  Both VRI and 
HRS have questions about current and expected pension and Social Security income. For singles, 
R
iY  is simply the sum of expected pensions and Social Security divided by current income. For 
couples, it is this sum across the couple.
15
  
For simplicity, we limit the sample to households with just one main earner who has not 
yet retired and is aged 65 or younger. For singles, anyone not retired and is aged 65 or younger is 
in the sample. For single worker couples, the household is included if the worker is aged 65 or 
younger. These include single-worker households or dual-worker households in which one is 
now retired. For both these households and singles, the retirement decision is for a single worker. 
The assets and income used in the analysis reflect any retirement income or assets of the already-
retired spouse. For dual-worker households, the joint retirement is more complex. We only 
                                                   
13
 We assume that DB pension is taxed at the same 25 percent average rate as distributions from qualified 
plans. To account for the partial non-taxability of Social Security benefits, we apply a 15 percent average 
tax rate to them. The main findings are again robust with respect to different tax rates assumed.  
14 In HRS, the expected retirement age is the result of a complex sequence starting with whether an 
individual plans to retire and at what age or date. 
15 If one member of the couple is retired, we use the current retirement income for that person plus the 
expectations for the non-retired person. 
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include households that appear to have only one primary earner, and we base the retirement 
decision on that household member.
16
  There are 2,026 households in the VRI sample and 1,053 
in the HRS sample. See Appendix 3-D for details.  
3.5.3.1 Estimates: Entire Sample 
Figure 3.3 compares the distribution of normalized wealth across the VRI and HRS. The curves 
shown are kernel densities where the solid lines are for the VRI while the dashed lines are for the 
HRS. Panel A shows the entire sample analyzed in this section, while Panel B examines the 
employer-sponsored subsets. Panel A shows the stark difference in the wealth distribution 
between the two surveys documented in Section 3.4. Recall that normalized wealth is roughly the 
extent to which current wealth could replace current income at retirement if all assets were 
devoted to retirement income. In the VRI, observations are dense and fairly uniformly spread in 
the range from 0 to 0.5, and observations with normalized wealth between 0.5 and 1 are not rare. 
A non-negligible fraction of households have normalized financial wealth larger than 1. In 
contrast, in the HRS the vast majority of the households have a replacement rate lower than 0.5. 
A trivial fraction of observations has a replacement rate close to or higher than 1. This 
observation confirms the point made by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011): relatively few 
households in the broad population have significant levels of potentially annuitizable wealth. 
Now consider the relationship between this measure of current assets and plans for 
continued work. To capture the non-linear relationship between retirement horizon and wealth 
                                                   
16
 To determine the primary earner, we use expected Social Security income and defined benefit pensions 
as a proxy for who has larger lifetime earnings. If one of the members has expected Social Security and 
DB pension at least four times larger than the other earner, he or she is classified as the main earner and 
the household is included in the sample. Otherwise, the household is dropped from this analysis. 
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holdings without imposing a restrictive functional form, we estimate LOESS regressions.
17
 
Figure 3.4 shows the results for the VRI and HRS. Again, Panel A shows the entire sample 
analyzed in this section. Panel B examines the employer-sponsored subsets.
18
  In Figure 3.4, “x” 
denotes HRS (orange/dashed) and “o” denotes VRI (blue/solid). The LOESS curve is shown as a 
line with the shaded area indicating the 95% confidence interval. The y-axis of Figure 3.4 is 
measured in expected remaining years of work (mean zero because it is a residual). In the VRI 
for the entire sample in Figure 3.4A, we see the clear negative relationship between normalized 
wealth and retirement horizon up to the full replacement rate around 1. Moving from zero 
annuitizable wealth to annuitizable wealth that could replace current income corresponds to a 
reduction in expected years of work by about 1.7 years. After that level, the estimated 
relationship flattens out. (For very high levels of annuitizable wealth, the bulk of wealth likely 
will not be used for routine consumption in retirement.) Over the entire range, the estimates are 
quite precise. In the HRS, the estimated relationship is very different. It shows a negative 
relationship up to the replacement rate 0.3, a slightly positive correlation in the range of 0.3 to 
0.4, and then becomes flat after that. The change in years worked is about the same as in the 
VRI, but it occurs at much lower levels of annuitizable wealth. Given the low density of data in 
this range, the flattening of the LOESS line for higher levels of wealth occurs by construction. 
The HRS data simply cannot capture how the relationship changes over this range because there 
are so few observations. 
Having ample data over the relevant ranges of wealth clearly affects the precision of the 
estimates. The VRI confidence interval is narrower due to the larger number of observations. The 
                                                   
17
 LOESS is a bivariate procedure. To deal with the covariates, we first project the retirement horizon on 
the variables in equation (3.1) excluding normalized wealth. The LOESS estimate is the regression of this 
residual on normalized wealth. For the HRS sample, both stages used sampling weights. 
18
 The ranges of the horizontal and vertical axes are truncated to exclude outliers. Appendix 3-D, 
Figure 3-D1, shows the data in Figure 3.4A for the entire sample including outliers. 
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HRS confidence interval gets wider after the replacement rate of 0.25, as the number of 
observations gets smaller very quickly for individuals with annuitizable wealth sufficient to 
replace even a quarter of their income prior to retirement.  
3.5.3.2. Estimates:  Employer-Sponsored Sample 
One concern about the VRI design is that the behavior of Vanguard clients might be very 
different from that of the general population. We can address this issue by considering whether 
or not the behavior of the VRI employer-sponsored sample differs from that of the individual 
client sample. Because the employer-sponsored clients come to Vanguard owing mainly to their 
employers’ choices, they are much less self-selected than the individual account holders. This 
prior is borne out by the Section 3.4 results, which show that the characteristics of the VRI 
employer-sponsored sample are quite similar to subsets of the HRS and SCF with DC pension 
accounts. Figure 3.3B confirms that after imposing similar screens, the distribution of 
normalized wealth looks much more similar across the VRI and HRS.  
In Figure 3.4B, we show the relationship between wealth and retirement plans for the 
employer-sponsored samples of the VRI and HRS. The general inference drawn by comparing 
the VRI and HRS for the entire sample also holds for this subset, though the HRS curve is 
somewhat closer to the VRI curve. The HRS relationship in Panel B has a steep decline for lower 
levels of wealth, but then goes essentially flat as in Panel A.  Likewise, the change in retirement 
plans shown in Panel B for the VRI is larger than in the HRS over the relevant range, e.g., 0.25 
to 0.75, and the HRS LOESS line is below the VRI confidence interval in this range. Hence, 
although the HRS estimates are quite imprecise for the 401(k) subset in Panel B owing to the 
paucity of data, the basic message of the entire VRI sample holds in the employer-sponsored 
samples. Therefore, the key results derived from the VRI appear to be driven by having dense 
189 
 
data over relevant wealth ranges and not by self-selection by individuals into a relationship with 
Vanguard. 
In Appendix 3-D, we estimate the version where we include 𝑌𝑖
𝑅 in normalized wealth 
instead of treating it as a control. Since HRS households have significant pension and Social 
Security wealth, the support of retirement resources is different—but less so—from the VRI than 
for financial resources alone. Nonetheless, a similar picture emerges in the analysis that includes 
𝑌𝑖
𝑅 because of the difference in financial wealth.  
3.5.3.3. Estimates: SCF 
Figure 3.5 reports the result from the SCF for the entire sample (Panel A) and the 401(k) subset 
(Panel B). Due to a small number of households in the relevant age interval, we have only 233 
observations satisfying all the criteria to be included in the analysis (we use only one replicate 
from each household). The SCF does not have expected Social Security benefit information, so 
the estimates are not entirely parallel with those for the VRI and HRS, which is why we do not 
plot the VRI in Figure 3.5. The small sample size makes the estimates extremely imprecise. The 
LOESS curve moves substantially, but not statistically significantly.  The SCF was not 
specifically designed to study retirement saving, so it is not a criticism of that dataset that it has 
little power to address the relationship between wealth and expected retirement. Nonetheless, our 
finding points to the importance of collecting data that are relevant for the question. 
3.5.4.  Would a Stock Market Crash Significantly Impact Retirement Plans? 
In the future, as workers increasingly rely on DC pension plans, they will need to have sufficient 
DC wealth in order to sustain retirement consumption. If history is precedent, many will invest 
significantly in equities during their working years. As such, ever more households will find their 
retirement finances to be vulnerable to equity-market crashes. How these crashes affect 
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retirement horizons is therefore of great interest. In this section we show that the VRI panel is far 
better suited than is the HRS to understanding these effects.  
An important approach to estimating the relationship between wealth and the retirement 
horizon is to examine how individuals react to stock market crashes. In their HRS-based work on 
this topic, Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2012) estimate the difference in the retirement horizon 
associated with the reduction in wealth associated with a 40% drop in the stock market to be 
essentially zero, even when they condition on stock ownership. In Figure 3.6, we use the LOESS 
estimates presented in Figure 3.4 to make a parallel calculation.  Specifically, we take a 
representative stockholder to have mean normalized wealth of 0.51 and mean stock share of 
55%. These are the means from the VRI sample used in the LOESS estimation. When we apply 
the 40% drop in the stock market to this representative stockholder, the effect on wealth is 
0.4 × 0.51 × 0.55 = 0.112. This 11 percent drop in the replacement rate of income is non-
negligible. Using data from the HRS, the LOESS estimates suggest a flat relationship between 
wealth and the retirement horizon at the wealth level of the representative stockholder. Hence, 
our calculation confirms the finding of Goda, Shoven, and Slavov that there is no clear effect of 
stock market crashes on the retirement horizon in HRS data. The estimated relationship in HRS 
data is much steeper at the wealth level of the typical HRS individual, but the effect is still 
limited due to lower mean wealth and stock share.  
In the VRI, the relationship is quite different because it shows a strong correlation 
between wealth and the retirement horizon at the wealth level of the representative stockholder. 
Since a significant wealth change is combined with the steep slope of the wealth-retirement 
horizon relationship estimated in the relevant wealth range, the implied change in the retirement 
horizon corresponds to an additional 4 months of work. Also, the narrow confidence intervals in 
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this wealth range that we observed from the VRI curves in Figure 3.4 imply that the estimated 
effect would be statistically significant. (Panel B of Figure 3.6 considers alternative scenarios 
under the VRI estimate. With a higher stock share (70%) the increase in retirement horizon is 
about 6 months. At a higher replacement rate (1.0), however, the effect is smaller due to the 
flatter LOESS curve.)  Hence, the representative stockholder is so poorly represented in the HRS 
that estimates of effects of stock market crashes on expected retirement will be very misleading 
using HRS data.  
As the analysis in this section makes clear, with the HRS and SCF it is hard to capture the 
relationship between wealth and retirement behavior of those with high levels of annuitizable 
wealth. The bottom line is that VRI respondents have far more potential in exploring the effect of 
wealth on the retirement behavior of the population under an institutional and policy regime in 
which DC plans are the dominant source of retirement income. Developing and estimating a full 
structural model that can capture the impact of exogenous stock market shocks on labor market 
behavior is one of the many tasks ahead of us in further developing the VRI. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This paper has introduced a new approach and new dataset—the Vanguard Research Initiative—
for measuring the wealth of wealthholders. Based on a partnership between academic researchers 
and the Vanguard Group, we have developed a new survey-administrative dataset. It provides a 
large, high-quality sample of households that have substantial wealth for financing retirement 
corresponding to the upper half of the wealth distribution of older Americans. Wealth 
measurement is based on a comprehensive account-by-account approach that is designed to elicit 
accurate information in the form that respondents think about it and have at their disposal. The 
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data infrastructure makes use of high-quality administrative data at all stages of the analysis—
establishing the sample frame, sending invitations, evaluating selective responses, evaluating 
quality of survey responses, and—ultimately—providing a distinct dataset. By collecting survey 
and administrative data in tandem, this project aims to demonstrate how large-scale surveys can 
make increasing and effective use of administrative data for wealth measurement. Given the 
challenges and costs of collecting surveys, these advances should inform measurement practice 
going forward. Based on the approach presented in this paper, it may be possible to replace 
expensive, infrequent, and error-ridden survey measures of wealth with administrative account 
data.  
The research also informs practice for collecting wealth data within surveys. In particular, 
the account-based approach to survey measurement of wealth yields measurements that are 
unbiased relative to administrative measurements. In contrast, many surveys appear to 
undercount assets. Additionally, the paper demonstrates that the correction mechanism 
significantly reduces the variance of errors relative to the administrative account data. 
 Administrative data are by definition free from reporting error, so tend to have much less 
measurement error. Administrative data alone, however, might not provide enough information 
for research. In many cases, they do not include a rich set of important demographic variables. 
Sometimes they capture only a part of the household balance sheet (examples include the 
administrative Vanguard wealth data used in VRI and TIAA-CREF data used in Ameriks and 
Zeldes (2004)). Measurement error can also occur while processing data. Browning, Crossley 
and Winter (2014) provide a valuable summary of these issues. Hence, to get a better picture of 
households’ economic conditions, it is often necessary to link survey data to administrative data 
so that we can address the shortcomings of both types of data. As a linked dataset with, on the 
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one hand, detailed survey measures of household finance and other economically important 
characteristics and, on the other hand, monthly-frequency observations on balances and 
compositions of their Vanguard assets, the VRI enables us not only to validate survey responses 
with the administrative data, but also to conduct research that requires high-frequency data on 
financial situations. 
The design of this VRI infrastructure is targeted at measuring the wealth of households 
with sufficient financial assets so they face wealth allocation and accumulation decisions 
concerning whether to work longer, whether to annuitize, whether to buy long-term care 
insurance, how much to bequeath, and so on. In other papers that also leverage the VRI, we are 
investigating some of these questions in detail. In this paper, we make several substantive 
contributions beyond evaluating the quality of the VRI measurement. We show that the VRI is 
dense in data on older Americans in the upper half of the wealth distribution compared to other 
excellent surveys with wealth data, namely the HRS and SCF. We show that for one key 
variable—how much longer they expect to work—the VRI indeed provides a very different 
picture from the HRS and SCF precisely because it has sufficient observations with households 
with substantial financial wealth as they approach retirement. 
  
194 
 
REFERENCES 
Agarwal, Sumit, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles (2007) “The Reaction of Consumer 
Spending and Debt to Tax Rebates: Evidence from Consumer Credit Data,” Journal of 
Political Economy 115, 986-1019. 
Aguiar, Mark and Erik Hurst (2007) “Life-Cycle Prices and Production,” American Economic 
Review 97, 1533-1559. 
Ameriks, John and Stephan P. Zeldes (2004) “How Do Household Portfolio Shares Vary with 
Age?” Unpublished manuscript. 
Ameriks, John, Andrew Caplin, Minjoon Lee, Matthew D. Shapiro, and Christopher 
Tonetti (2014) “Vanguard Research Initiative: Survey 1 Documentation and 
Tabulations,” Vanguard Research Initiative Working Paper. 
Bosworth, Barry P. and Gary Burtless (2010) “Recessions, Wealth Destruction, and the 
Timing of Retirement,” Center for Retirement Research Working Paper 2010-22. 
Brown, Jeffrey R. (2001) “Private Pensions, Mortality Risk, and the Decision to Annuitize,” 
Journal of Public Economics 82, 29-62. 
Browning, Martin, Thomas Crossley, and Joachim Winter (2014) “The Measurement of 
Household Consumption Expenditures,” IFS Working Paper, W14/07. 
Bucks, Brian and Karen Pence (2014) “Wealth, Pensions, Debt, and Savings: Considerations 
for a Panel Survey,” Unpublished manuscript. 
Chan, Sewin and Ann Huff Stevens (2004) “Do Changes in Pension Incentives Affect 
Retirement? A Longitudinal Study of Subjective Retirement Expectations,” Journal of 
Public Economics 88, 1307 – 1333. 
Coile, Courtney, and Phillip B. Levine (2004) “Bulls, Bears and Retirement Behavior,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 59, 408-429. 
Coronado, Julia L. and Maria Perozek (2003) “Wealth effects and the consumption of leisure: 
Retirement decisions during the stock market boom of the 1990s,” Federal Reserve Board 
Working Paper, 2003-20. 
Davis, Steven J. and John Haltiwanger (1992) “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction, 
and Employment Reallocation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 819-863. 
195 
 
Dominitz, Jeff and Charles F. Manski (1997) “Using Expectations Data to Study Subjective 
Income Expectations,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 92, 855-867. 
Gelman, Michael, Shachar Kariv, Matthew D. Shapiro, Dan Silverman, and Steven Tadelis 
(2014) “Harnessing Naturally Occurring Data to Measure the Response of Spending to 
Income,” Science 345, 212-215. 
Gustman, Alan L., Thomas L. Steinmeier, Nahid Tabatabai (2010)  “What the Stock Market 
Decline Means for the Financial Security and Retirement Choices of the Near-Retirement 
Population,” Journal of Economics Perspective 24, 161-182. 
Goda, Gopi Shah, John B. Shoven, Sita Nataraj Slavov (2012) “Does stock market 
performance influence retirement intentions?” Journal of Human Resources 47, 1055-
1081. 
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Klara Sabirianova Peter (2007) “Public Sector Pay and 
Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data” Journal of Public Economics 91, 963-
991. 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen (1993) “The Carnegie 
Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 413-435. 
Hurd, Michael D. and Kathleen McGarry (2002) “The Predictive Validity of Subjective 
Probabilities of Survival,” Economic Journal 112, 966 – 985. 
Hurd, Michael, Monika Reti, and Susann Rohwedder (2009) “The Effect of Large Capital 
Gains or Losses on Retirement” in David A. Wise ed.,  Developments in the economics of 
aging, University of Chicago Press, 127-163.  
Hurst, Erik, Geng Li, and Benjamin Pugsley (2014) “Are Household Surveys Like Tax 
Forms? Evidence from Income Underreporting of the Self-Employed,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 345, 212-215. 
Imbens, Guido W., Donald B. Rubin, and Bruce I. Sacerdote (2001) “Estimating the Effect of 
Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, and Consumption: Evidence from a 
Survey of Lottery Players,” American Economic Review 91, 778-794. 
Joulfaian, David and Mark Wilhelm (1994) “Inheritance and Labor Supply,” Journal of 
Human Resources 29, 1205 – 1234. 
196 
 
Juster, F. Thomas and James P. Smith (1997) “Improving the Quality of Economic Data: 
Lessons from the HRS and AHEAD,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 92, 
1268-1278. 
Juster, F. Thomas, James P. Smith, and Frank Stafford (1999) “The Measurement and 
Structure of Household Wealth,” Labour Economics 6, 253-275. 
Kapteyn, Arie and Jelmer Y. Ypma (2007) “Measurement Error and Misclassification: A 
Comparison of Survey and Administrative Data,” Journal of Labor Economics 25, 513-
551. 
Kennickell, Arthur B. (2000) “Wealth Measurement in the Survey of Consumer Finances: 
Methodology and Directions for Future Research,” Working paper, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
Kezdi, Gabor and Purvi Sevak (2004) “Economic Adjustment of Recent Retirees to Adverse 
Wealth Shocks,” MRRC Working Paper 2004-075. 
Khitatrakun, Surachai (2004) “Wealth and the timing of retirement,” Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Krimmel, Jacob, Kevin B. Moore, John Sabelhaus, and Paul Smith (2013) “The Current 
State of U.S. Household Balance Sheets,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 95, 
337-359. 
McFall, Brooke Helppie (2011) “Crash and Wait? The Impact of the Great Recession on the 
Retirement Plans of Older Americans,” American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings 101, 40-44. 
McGarry, Kathleen (2004) “Health and Retirement: Do Changes in Health Affect Retirement 
Expectations?” Journal of Human Resources 39, 624-648. 
Poterba, James M. (2014) “Retirement Security in an Aging Population,” American Economic 
Review 104, 1-30. 
Poterba, James M., Steven Venti, and David Wise (2011) “The Composition and Drawdown 
of Wealth in Retirement,” Journal of Economic Perspective 25, 95 – 118. 
Sevak, Purvi (2002) “Wealth Shocks and Retirement Timing,” Working paper, Michigan 
Retirement Research Center. 
197 
 
Szinovacz, Maximiliane E., Adam Davey, and Lauren Martin (2014) “Did the Great 
Recession Influence Retirement Plans?” Research on Aging 36, 1-31.
198 
 
Table 3.1. Design of VRI, HRS, and SCF 
 VRI HRS SCF 
Sampling    
Population  Vanguard clients  U.S. Population U.S. Population 
Frequency Multiple surveys per year; monthly admin. data Biennial Triennial  
Panel/cross-section Panel Panel Cross-section
1 
Main target Age 55+ with non-negligible financial assets Age 50+ and spouses Representative of wealth 
Oversampling Singles Blacks and Hispanics; 
Residents of Florida 
High-income list sample 
Additional screens Internet eligible; 
Employer-sponsored and individual client samples 
  
Wealth measurement    
Account-based approach Comprehensive 401(k)/IRA
2 
Transactional and pension 
accounts 
Administrative data  Yes No No 
Summary (age>55)    
Households  8,950 11,595  2,624 
Median Financial Wealth $663,100 $60,000 $33,200 
Median Income $121,481 $30,400 $42,610 
Note: Table refers to most recent wave of each survey (VRI 2013, HRS 2012, and SCF 2013).  Observations are restricted to 
respondents aged 55 and older.  The VRI and SCF survey only one member of couples.  The age of the household is determined by the 
age of respondent.  The HRS surveys HRS respondents and their spouses.  The age of the household is determined by the age of the 
financial respondent as defined by the HRS. 
1 
The SCF occasionally (1983-89, 2007-09) has a panel structure. 
2 
HRS implemented account-based approach for retirement accounts in 2012. 
  
199 
 
Table 3.2. Survey Financial Assets:  All respondents 
 
  
Conditional on having positive amount 
    
Percentiles 
Account type Mean N Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Total financial assets 1,189,358 8,948 1,189,358 122,000 296,673 656,962 1,266,651 2,254,000 
IRA 359,181 7,303 440,184 29,000 83,931 234,033 556,527 1,021,000 
Employer sponsored 215,620 4,630 416,803 26,000 83,000 222,000 475,000 842,402 
Pension 25,365 1,016 223,437 10,518 34,000 100,000 251,000 590,714 
Other retirement asset 13,237 602 196,801 10,000 26,136 80,466 213,000 450,000 
Checking 16,888 8,637 17,500 1,000 2,200 5,500 15,000 40,000 
Saving 23,020 6,162 33,436 500 2,100 10,000 32,000 84,382 
Money market 28,308 4,076 62,158 1,200 5,367 22,177 69,303 151,023 
Mutual fund 231,577 3,942 525,777 8,500 30,000 114,000 309,000 690,000 
Certificate of deposit 16,576 1,634 90,794 4,000 11,000 34,450 100,000 230,803 
Brokerage 181,872 4,184 389,042 6,400 27,100 110,000 347,000 854,000 
Directly held 
securities 
22,634 1,801 112,477 2,000 10,000 30,000 100,000 235,664 
Annuity  20,811 1,163 160,150 13,000 35,000 94,500 200,000 365,000 
Life insurance 21,053 2,696 69,891 5,000 10,000 26,000 70,000 150,000 
Educational related 3,022 613 44,119 3,400 8,300 20,000 48,000 100,000 
Other accounts 9,930 429 207,165 1,500 10,000 46,000 195,000 478,000 
Note:  Pension, annuity, and life insurance are current cash values. 
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Table 3.3. Total Vanguard Assets:  Survey versus Administrative Data 
 
A.  Employer-Sponsored (N=2,243) 
 
 
Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 331,753 27,000 75,000 195,485 432,000 755,000 
Administrative 299,540 29,519 69,668 181,375 400,707 656,832 
Difference 32,213 -27,394 -4,093 890 12,999 95,978 
% Difference 3.92% -17.44% -2.48% 0.63% 9.10% 47.83% 
 
B.  Individual client (N=6,705) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 517,724 29,000 87,017 260,000 615,081 1,178,158 
Administrative 380,277 25,345 67,382 193,682 472,732 900,747 
Difference 137,447 -23,315 -1,637 2,623 91,950 380,262 
% Difference 18.53% -14.42% -1.20% 1.44% 32.89% 100.32% 
 
C.  Employer-Sponsored, Singles (N=585) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 240,488 22,000 49,000 125,000 300,000 574,000 
Administrative 231,306 22,757 46,236 127,630 282,362 529,760 
Difference 9,183 -24,297 -3,867 365 7,483 35,390 
% Difference 2.05% -22.06% -3.04% 0.33% 6.21% 29.68% 
 
D.  Individual client, Singles (N=2,349) 
 
  Percentiles 
 
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
Survey 317,004 21,000 57,000 165,400 420,000 790,000 
Administrative 305,997 22,501 58,759 160,638 406,609 744,563 
Difference 11,008 -32,803 -4,180 -19 3,902 39,677 
% Difference -0.64% -22.23% -2.91% -0.03% 2.18% 24.34% 
201 
 
Table 3.4. Comparison of Total Vanguard Wealth: Different Correction Paths (Singles only)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Percent Difference 
      
Correction paths N Measure 
25 
percentile 
median 75 
percentile 
None 1927 Final -3.3 -0.0 2.6 
Accounts only 426 Initial -3.5 0.1 2.5 
  
Final -3.5 0.1 2.5 
Balances only 308 Initial -12.2 -0.0 13.6 
  
Final -2.6 -0.0 2.7 
Accounts and 
balances 121 Initial 
-5.3 -0.1 12.1 
(restarted) 
 
Final -1.1 0.2 2.1 
Accounts and 
balances 153 Initial 
-18.1 -0.1 2.7 
(other paths) 
 
Final -1.4 0.1 2.7 
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Table 3.5.  Comparing VRI to Age-Eligible HRS and SCF Households (unweighted counts):  Age and Financial Wealth 
 
  Financial Wealth  
Age  <$0 $0-10K $10K-100K $100K-500K $500K-1M $1M-2.5M >$2.5M All 
55-64 
VRI 48 36 292 1,147 871 762 181 3,337 
HRS 1,459 586 933 897 287 160 41 4,363 
SCF 228 170 196 254 102 119 212 1,281 
65-74 
VRI 16 19 258 1,117 985 1,066 377 3,838 
HRS 746 487 727 817 290 162 35 3,264 
SCF 93 114 118 155 68 91 178 817 
> 74 
VRI 2 4 95 549 461 472 192 1,775 
HRS 800 712 1,030 927 284 172 43 3,968 
SCF 60 93 115 107 31 30 90 526 
Total 
VRI 66 59 645 2,813 2,317 2,300 750 8,950 
HRS 3,005 1,785 2,690 2,641 861 494 119 11,595 
SCF 381 377 429 516 201 240 480 2,624 
Note: Numbers are raw counts (unweighted) of households. Note that only age-eligible households are included in the table. For SCF, 
only one replicate is included. For HRS, only those households surveyed in both the 2010 and 2012 waves are included. Age of HRS 
households based on financial respondent.  Financial wealth is the sum of financial assets (both retirement and non-retirement assets) 
minus non-mortgage debt.  
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Table 3.6.  Comparing Age-eligible VRI, HRS, and SCF Households (unweighted counts):  VRI Sampling Screens 
 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age All 
Employer- 
Sponsored 
Individual 
client 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
401(k) 
subset 
 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
401(k) 
subset 
All 8,950 2,244 6,706   11,595 3,684 1,553  2,624 1,275 665 
55-59 1,549 810 739   2,364 976 628  668 397 280 
60-64 1,788 823 965   1,999 756 411  613 350 205 
65-69 1,931 419 1,512   1,282 535 214  462 257 112 
70-74 1,907 157 1,750   1,982 638 178  355 161 51 
75-100 1,775 35 1,740   3,968 779 122  526 110 17 
Note:  Table shows total age-eligible number of households in total and after imposing the VRI-equivalent screen.  VRI-eligible screen imposes Internet 
eligibility plus having at least $10,000 in any non-transactional financial accounts.  The 401(k) subset imposes $10,000 wealth cut-off on DC type pensions.  See 
text for details. See also the note to Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Fraction of weighted observations 
 
Screens HRS  SCF 
Age-eligible 100%  100% 
Internet eligibility 56%  58% 
$10,000 asset cut-off 58%  45% 
Internet eligible and $10,000 cut-off 41%  35% 
401(k) subset 19%  18% 
Note:  Table shows the fraction of the sample in HRS and SCF (measured by the fraction of weighted observations) remaining after 
imposing VRI sampling screens.  See text and note to Table 6 for descriptions of screens.   
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Table 3.8.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Wealth distribution 
 
   Percentiles 
  
Mean 10 25 50 75 90 
VRI 
All 1,206,594 115,337 292,000 663,100 1,286,000 2,291,235 
Employer-sponsored 847,349 65,050 185,600 496,350 1,029,700 1,856,005 
Individual client 1,326,807 140,100 330,636 715,790 1,383,209 2,421,840 
HRS 
Age eligible 293,596 -900 500 60,000 300,000 745,000 
VRI eligible 578,069 34,000 98,036 272,000 660,000 1,247,800 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 623,954 46,300 130,000 342,700 733,000 1,364,000 
SCF 
Age eligible 404,668 -6,300 320 33,200 220,550 794,700 
VRI eligible 970,294 28,860 96,350 262,100 792,400 2,109,000 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 871,897 18,000 76,870 219,500 674,000 1,953,500 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
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Table 3.9.  Stock Ownership 
 
A.  Share:  VRI, HRS, and SCF (Percent) 
  Percentiles  
 Sample Screen 10 25 50 75 90 N 
VRI 
All 14.96 35.12 54.76 74.71 91.14 8905 
Employer-sponsored 8.42 28.88 50.00 72.04 90.00 2233 
Individual client 18.55 37.37 56.06 75.33 91.52 6672 
HRS 
Age eligible 0 0   0 40.32 81.48 11595 
VRI eligible 0 0 29.20 70.75 90.54 3684 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 0 0 20.93 67.86 89.05 1553 
SCF 
Age eligible 0 0   0.70 43.39 71.24 2624 
VRI eligible 2.77 19.94 42.34 61.85 84.74 1275 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 6.98 21.51 40.66 61.04 83.33 665 
Note:  See text and note to Table 4 for sample screens.  Respondents with less than $1000 in financial assets are coded as having a 
zero stock share. 
 
B.  Amount: VRI, HRS, and SCF (Dollars) 
  Percentiles  
 Sample Screen 10 25 50 75 90 N 
VRI 
All 30,000 113,800 326,162 712,200 1,397,710 8905 
Employer-sponsored 13,500   65,428 221,443 551,365 1,047,212 2233 
Individual client 41,415 138,220 365,174 765,400 1,477,515 6672 
HRS 
Age eligible          0            0            0   45,000    270,000 11595 
VRI eligible          0            0   30,000 200,000    520,000 3684 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset          0            0   15,000 150,000    453,700 1553 
SCF 
Age eligible          0            0            0   78,000    360,000 2624 
VRI eligible   3,000   22,750 105,000 357,000 1,227,600 1275 
 VRI eligible, 401(k) subset   4,500   21,000   86,000 306,500 1,168,500 665 
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Figure 3.1. Administrative versus Survey Financial Assets at Vanguard 
 
Note:  The figure compares Vanguard administrative assets with survey report of Vanguard 
assets.  See the text for how Vanguard assets are determined in survey.  The chart shows box and 
whiskers figures for each decile of administrative assets (diamond is the mean; middle line is 
median; box is inter-quartile range [IQR]; outer lines upper and lower fences [1.5 times the IQR 
from the box]; and circles denote outliers). Amounts on the horizontal axis are medians of each 
decile ($1000).   Log scale is used on both axes. 
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Figure 3.2.  Correction Paths through Wealth Section. 
 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows the fraction of respondents taking various paths through the account-
based wealth section.  Other includes those who started over and then took various paths to 
complete. 
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Figure 3.3.  Distribution of normalized financial wealth (kernel estimation) 
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset  
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Figure 3.4.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange/dashed line) and o denotes VRI (blue/solid line). 
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset  
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange/dashed line) and o denotes VRI (blue/solid line). 
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Figure 3.5.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
A. SCF 
 
B. SCF 401(k) subset 
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Figure 3.6.  Implied Changes in Retirement Horizon: 40% Decline in Stock Market 
A. Comparison of VRI and HRS Estimates 
 
B. Alternative Scenarios using VRI Estimates 
 
Note: Lines are LOESS estimates from Figure 4 (confidence intervals and observation not shown).  The figure 
shows the predicted change in the retirement horizon (years to retirement) resulting from a 40% decline in the stock 
market.  In panel A, the HRS-overall applies the mean HRS wealth and stock share to the HRS estimates.  The HRS-
average stockholder applies the mean VRI wealth and stock share to the HRS estimates while the VRI-average 
stockholder applies the same mean VRI wealth and stock share to the VRI estimates.  In panel B, the VRI-average 
stockholder is same as in panel A.  The other two treatments show high stock exposure and high-wealth households.  
See text for details. 
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Appendix 3-A. Account Sequence Example 
Section 3.2.2 of the main text explained the structure of the wealth section of the survey in detail.  
In this appendix, we show actual screen shots from the wealth section for a hypothetical 
respondent who has two IRAs, one 401(k) pension, one checking account and one mutual fund 
account.   
 The respondent starts the wealth section by entering all the types of accounts she has  
(Figure 3-A1).  She answers how many accounts she has for each type using a drop-down menu 
(Figure 3-A2) and then gives each of the accounts a nickname (Figure 3-A3).  The survey shows 
the summary of responses so far (Figure 3-A4) and asks whether all the information given is 
correct.  If the respondent clicks no, then she can either add/delete the account type or add/delete 
accounts within each type.   
 After this first check point, the survey then loops over the accounts and asks the balance 
of each (Figure 3-A5 is one example).  After the loop, the survey displays a summary table of 
account balances as well as a total (Figure 3-A6).  In this example, the respondent did not 
provide a response to the balance question for the second IRA account (“Roth IRA”), so she sees 
“No response provided” for Reported Value under that account.  Let us say that the respondent 
clicks “No” to “Is this correct?” under the summary table.  Then the respondent is asked whether 
she wants to add/delete accounts or correct balances (Figure 3-A7).  In this example, the 
respondent chooses to correct balances, indicates that she wants to correct the balance for “Roth 
IRA” (Figure 3-A8), and then corrects the balance for that account (Figure 3-A9).  During the 
corrections, the previously provided answers are shown above the question (in this case “Not 
answered”).  The respondent comes back to the summary screen again, indicates whether she 
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referred to records to provide information on each account, and then confirms that all the 
responses are correct (Figure 3-A10).  
 The survey then asks two follow-up questions for each account: stock share (Figure 3-
A11) and whether that account is held at Vanguard (Figure 3-A12).  Note that the survey does 
not ask these questions about the checking account that this respondent reported since it is a 
transactional account not offered at Vanguard.  Based on these responses, the survey calculates 
the share of wealth held at Vanguard and the stock share of the total portfolio, and it shows these 
as charts along with the summary table of balances (Figure 3-A13).  The respondent can print 
this summary page as a record.  
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Figure 3-A1. Types of Accounts 
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Figure 3-A2. Number of Accounts 
 
Figure 3-A3. Nickname Accounts 
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Figure 3-A4. Account Verification 
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Figure 3-A5.  Account Balance 
 
Figure 3-A6.  Balance Verification 
 
Figure 3-A7. Indicate What Type of Correction(s) 
 
Figure 3-A8.  Indicate What Needs to Be Corrected 
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Figure 3-A9.  Correction of Previous Response(s) 
 
Figure 3-A10.  Revised Balance Summary 
 
 
Figure 3-A11. Account-by-account Stock Share 
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Figure 3-A12. Which Accounts at Vanguard 
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Figure 3-A13.  Summary Table and Charts 
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Appendix 3-B.  Definition of concepts 
This appendix defines concepts used for the VRI and how we measure them in the HRS and 
SCF. 
Total financial wealth.   In the VRI, total financial wealth is the sum of all financial 
account balances (the items listed in Table 3.2) plus miscellaneous financial items (in non-
account, cleanup questions) minus non-mortgage debt.  For the SCF, financial wealth is total 
financial assets (FIN in the public version of data) minus non-mortgage debt (sum of CCBAL, 
INSTALL and ODEBT in the public version of data).  For the HRS, financial wealth is the sum 
of total financial wealth (atof in RAND version), IRA wealth, and employer-sponsored plan and 
pension account balances. For the HRS 2012, we constructed these variables using RAND 
definitions. (We are grateful to Margaret Lay for sharing her construction of these variables.)  
Web-survey eligibility. For the VRI, respondents are Web-survey eligible if the client is 
registered for Web access with Vanguard, if the registration has a valid email address, if the 
client logged in to the Vanguard Website at least once in the last six months, and if the client was 
not been recently included in another survey by Vanguard, and if the client had not requested 
exclusion from contacts for surveys.  We need to simulate this set of screens in the HRS and SCF 
in order to select comparable respondents. We designate HRS respondents as Web-survey 
eligible if they use the Internet regularly.  In the SCF, respondents are designated Web-survey 
eligible if they use the Internet to obtain information about borrowing/investing.   
Asset cut-off.  In the HRS, we impose a $10,000 cut-off on total financial assets net of 
checking, saving and money market balances.  In the SCF, we impose a $10,000 cut-off on the 
sum of IRA, mutual funds and account type pensions. 
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Appendix 3-C. Detailed Comparisons: VRI, HRS and SCF 
This appendix compares the VRI with the most recent waves of the HRS (2012) and SCF (2013) 
in more detail.  It compares surveys along dimensions including wealth, income and 
demographics.  For each dimension, we also provide comparisons conditional on age groups to 
control for the effect of different age compositions across surveys.  
Recall that the age distribution differs across the samples.  Table 3-C1 compares median 
value of wealth by age group to see whether the difference in the overall wealth distribution is 
caused by differences in age.  Even after imposing the similar sampling screens, the VRI sample 
has a higher median wealth for almost all the age groups.  Again, the gap is much smaller when 
the HRS and SCF samples are compared with the employer-sponsored sample of the VRI.  For 
the HRS, the gap shrinks further if we condition on respondents with at least $10,000 in 401(k)s 
or similar pension accounts.  (Statistics for the age group 65+ under employer-sponsored 
conditions or 401(k) subset conditions are not very informative due to the small number of 
observations.)   
 Income.  Tables 3-C2 and 3-C3 compare household annual income across samples.  
Compared to the overall population of the HRS and SCF, the VRI sample is not only wealthier, 
but also has higher income.  The difference in income is, however, much smaller than the 
difference in wealth.  If we impose the VRI screens, except for the oldest age group, income 
levels from the SCF are actually higher than the VRI; those from the HRS are quite comparable 
to those from the VRI.  As a result, the wealth-to-income ratio is much higher for the VRI 
sample, as shown in Tables 3-C4 and 3-C5.  This suggests that the high level of wealth of in the 
VRI sample is not just due to the high level of lifetime income.  They likely also save more, 
though other differences (e.g., inherited wealth) might be relevant.   
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 Demographics.  Table 3-C6 compares education, health and marital status across 
samples.  Tables 3-C7, 3-C8 and 3-C9 compare the distributions of each of these variables by 
age bins.  The VRI sample has a very high education level.  Approximately 70% of the sample 
has a college degree with over half of those having an advanced degree.  The education level is 
higher for the individual client sample.  In contrast, only about 30% of that sample has a college 
degree in the HRS and the SCF.  If we impose the VRI-equivalent screen, however, this gap 
almost disappears when compared to the employer-sponsored sample in the VRI.  The college 
degree rates from the SCF and HRS are, under VRI-eligible conditions, similar to the VRI rate.  
For the HRS, the gap is further reduced for the 401(k) subset.  Compared to the individual client 
sample, the HRS and SCF rates are still lower, though the gap is reduced considerably under the 
VRI-eligibility condition. 
 The VRI respondents are much healthier than the overall population with more than 70% 
reporting that their health is either excellent or very good.  The corresponding percentage in the 
total HRS is about 40%. The SCF uses a different four-point scale, without the “very good” 
category.  The fraction of respondents with excellent health is much higher in the VRI (31%) 
than in the SCF (18%).  The gap is much smaller, though does not fully disappear, after imposing 
the VRI sampling screens on the HRS and the SCF.     
 The fraction of coupled households (defined as either married or partnered) in the VRI is 
67%, which is roughly what was targeted by oversampling administrative singles.  Even after 
this oversampling of singles, the fraction of coupled households is larger than that in the overall 
sample of the HRS and the SCF.  Without imposing the VRI screens, the corresponding 
percentages are about 51% in the HRS and 53% in the SCF.  After imposing the VRI sampling 
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criteria, coupled rates from the HRS and the SCF overshoot the VRI levels for most of the age 
groups owing to the VRI’s oversampling of singles.  
 Table 3-C10 compares retirement rates.  Because the incidence of retirement changes so 
much with age, it makes sense to compare by age groups.  Overall, once the VRI screens are 
imposed, the retirement rates are quite similar across the SCF and VRI.  HRS respondents retire 
somewhat earlier relative to both the SCF and the VRI. 
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Table 3-C1.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median wealth by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
All 663,100 496,350 715,790   60,000 272,000 342,700  33,200 262,100 219,500 
55-59 518,289 428,280 607,900   55,000 226,400 283,000  21,940 208,700 197,070 
60-64 601,556 521,245 669,000   58,600 276,000 364,000  36,580 236,100 225,100 
65-69 715,627 574,250 750,750   83,000 350,000 435,000  57,000 299,400 463,500 
70-74 746,000 671,000 755,550   64,000 310,000 434,000  52,000 410,700 348,000 
75-100 726,604 605,300 729,950   50,000 284,000 334,500  27,000 275,500 143,000 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
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Table 3-C2.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Income distribution 
   Percentiles 
  
     Mean       10       25       50     75     90 
VRI 
All 121,481 27,004 50,000 82,017 125,000 191,616 
Employer-sponsored 122,800 42,370 65,000 100,000 146,000 218,201 
Individual client 121,040 24,000 45,000 76,655 119,133 180,000 
HRS 
Age eligible 65,856 8,476 15,384 30,400 70,300 145,604 
VRI eligible 110,274 17,532 31,600 63,000 123,240 230,000 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 134,119 25,927 48,001 87,030 153,010 262,000 
SCF 
Age eligible 90,848 13,189 22,320 42,601 85,221 160,296 
VRI eligible 177,786 36,219 54,785 91,308 160,296 295,229 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 197,214 43,625 66,959 101,453 173,484 320,592 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table 3-C3.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median income by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 92,100 100,000 84,943   50,500 84,003 97,000  57,785 94,351 96,380 
65-74 79,704 100,698 75,130   29,756 46,659 62,051  45,654 91,308 115,657 
75- 71,755 73,343 71,703   18,660 30,432 38,437  28,407 66,553 92,322 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
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Table 3-C4.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Wealth to income ratio 
   Percentiles 
  
  Mean      10      25      50    75    90 
VRI (SCF measure) 
All 42.97 1.95 4.28 8.37 15.15 24.13 
Employer-sponsored 57.63 0.96 2.25 4.93 8.87 14.31 
Individual client 38.05 2.74 5.31 9.77 17.17 26.30 
HRS 
Age eligible 44.89 -0.04 0.04 1.46 5.95 16.39 
VRI eligible 95.97 0.59 1.50 3.80 10.39 24.49 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 25.30 0.64 1.54 3.35 8.04 17.38 
SCF 
Age eligible 3.13 -0.21 0.02 0.76 3.34 7.94 
VRI eligible 5.70 0.42 1.20 3.01 6.51 13.00 
VRI eligible, 401(k) subset 4.02 0.26 1.01 2.21 4.90 8.24 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table 3-C5.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Median wealth to income ratio by age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 5.90 3.79 7.13 
 
1.01 2.70 2.88  0.53 2.24 2.01 
65-74 9.53 5.16 10.1 
 
1.71 5.89 5.88  1.01 4.38 3.27 
75- 11.36 9.36 11.11 
 
2.55 9.08 9.85  0.92 4.87 1.41 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
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Table 3-C6.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Education, Health, and Marital Status. 
  
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
  
Total 
Employer- 
Sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) 
subset 
 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) 
subset 
Education College grad.  32.18% 33.69% 31.67% 
 
14.25% 22.62% 23.26%  16.26% 27.43% 25.87% 
 
Post grad. 38.45% 26.24% 42.53% 
 
14.64% 26.36% 30.54%  14.32% 28.39% 28.55% 
Health Poor 0.84% 0.53% 0.94% 
 
7.60% 2.25% 1.71%  10.32% 2.50% 2.42% 
 
Fair 4.77% 3.48% 5.20% 
 
19.10% 11.10% 9.01%  26.19% 15.67% 17.02% 
 
Good 21.77% 22.33% 21.58% 
 
31.81% 29.39% 30.29%  45.34% 55.46% 53.51% 
 
Very good 41.84% 42.25% 41.71% 
 
31.43% 41.30% 42.27%     
 
Excellent 30.78% 31.42% 30.57% 
 
10.06% 15.95% 16.71%  18.14% 26.37% 27.05% 
Marital Coupled 67.21% 73.88% 64.97% 
 
52.46% 69.89% 77.82%  53.18% 71.04% 74.97% 
Status Single 32.79% 26.12% 35.03% 
 
47.54% 30.11% 22.72%  46.82% 28.96% 25.03% 
Note:  HRS and SCF education is based on years of schooling (college grad is exactly 16 years and post-grad is more than 16 years). VRI education is based on 
degree attainment.  SCF health has a four-point scale, while VRI and HRS health have five-point scales.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
 
 
Table 3-C7.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Fraction with College Degree by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF  
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 68.38% 57.61% 78.69% 
 
32.12% 48.92% 50.30%  40.83% 61.96% 60.04% 
65-74 73.08% 66.83% 74.18% 
 
26.67% 46.78% 55.18%  39.48% 66.64% 68.12% 
75- 69.52% 54.27% 69.82% 
 
21.28% 46.03% 64.19%  20.85% 52.82% 29.06% 
Note: Education is based on attainment.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights.  
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Table 3-C8.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens:  Fraction with Very Good or Excellent Health by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 75.61% 73.43% 77.70% 
 
43.82% 57.82% 59.73%  19.81% 25.92% 24.77% 
65-74 75.35% 74.30% 75.54% 
 
43.69% 58.74% 57.26%  23.67% 32.43% 38.77% 
75- 61.13% 74.29% 60.87% 
 
34.85% 51.38% 56.25%  10.96% 8.91% 0.28% 
Note:  SCF does not have ‘Very Good’ category, so the fraction captures respondents with Excellent health only.  HRS and SCF 
tabulations use sampling weights. 
Table 3-C9.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens:  Fraction Married or Partnered by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
client  
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
55-64 66.05% 73.72% 58.69% 
 
58.88% 72.05% 77.28%  58.45% 71.78% 73.27% 
65-74 68.65% 74.82% 67.57% 
 
56.60% 69.95% 79.06%  56.26% 72.70% 78.88% 
75- 66.26% 65.72% 66.26% 
 
36.46% 60.74% 80.57%  40.23% 60.82% 97.12% 
Note:  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling weights. 
Table 3-C10.  Effect of Imposing VRI Sampling Screens: Retirement Rate by Age 
 
VRI 
 
HRS  SCF 
Age Total 
Employer- 
sponsored 
Individual 
Client 
Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
 Age 
Eligible 
VRI 
Eligible 
VRI eligible, 
401(k) subset 
All 55.80% 17.78% 68.52%   63.99% 53.23% 36.70%  56.56% 33.92% 16.87% 
55-59 9.43% 4.57% 14.75%   24.42% 19.61% 13.84%  19.88% 7.65% 5.34% 
60-64 26.68% 12.39% 38.86%   50.25% 42.05% 34.10%  38.62% 24.56% 15.90% 
65-69 62.14% 34.13% 69.91%   76.50% 73.16% 66.15%  59.72% 44.39% 34.15% 
70-74 81.23% 57.96% 83.31%   87.18% 85.16% 80.70%  77.06% 67.07% 49.44% 
75-100 91.38% 74.29% 91.72%   91.57% 92.95% 90.84%  92.16% 87.37% 69.44% 
Note: HRS retirement rate includes respondents with partial retirement. For SCF retirement rate variable ‘OCCAT1’ in the public version of data is used.  
Households are defined to be retired if ‘OCCAT1=3’, which also includes disabled, age +65 and not working, etc.  HRS and SCF tabulations use sampling 
weights.
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Appendix 3-D.  Estimating Retirement/Wealth Relationship 
HRS sample.  Table 3-D1 shows how many observations we lose in the HRS by imposing each 
additional condition on samples used.  As we have seen from Table 3.5, the majority of the HRS 
samples are older than 65.  Among those households in which the main breadwinner satisfies the 
age condition, some are retired while some have dual main breadwinners.  In addition, for many 
households that are not retired, responses for the expected retirement age are missing.
 19
  All of 
these conditions account for the small sample size used in the HRS.   
LOESS curve and scatter plots including outliers.  In Figure 3-D1, we show the estimated 
relationship between retirement plan and wealth from the VRI (Panel A) and the HRS (Panel B) 
for the full range.   
Estimation with future DB pension and Social Security income included in the normalized 
wealth.  In the LOESS estimation in Section 3.5, expected DB pension and Social Security 
income are included as a control (𝑌𝑖
𝑅).  Here, we estimate another version of the model where we 
define the normalized wealth as the sum of the replacement rate from the annuitizable financial 
wealth and that from the expected annuity income (𝑌𝑖
𝑅).  Figure 3-D2 shows the distribution of 
newly defined normalized wealth and Figure 3-D3 shows the new LOESS estimates.  For both 
figures, Panel A is for the entire sample used in Section 3.5.  Panel B is for the employer-
sponsored subsets.  
 Figure 3-D2A shows that the VRI sample still has higher replacement rates, though the 
gap is less stark than in Figure 3.3A.  The VRI has many observations in the range between 1 
and 2, while for the HRS, most of the observations have normalized wealth smaller than 1.  The 
                                                   
19
 Some breadwinners who are not retired report that they are not currently working, leading to missing 
responses for expected retirement age.  In addition, questions about retirement age are asked only when 
the respondents said that they plan to retire or stop working.  
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LOESS estimate (Figure 3-D3A) shows basically the same relationship as the baseline model 
(Figure 3.4A).  With the VRI sample, we can estimate a negative and statistically significant 
relationship for a wider range (between 0 and 2), while the HRS sample shows a steeper slope up 
to about 0.5 but then becomes flat and statistically insignificant. With the employer-sponsored 
subset, the distributions of normalized wealth are pretty similar across the VRI and HRS (Figure 
3-D2B).  Figure 3-D3B shows that conditioning on this subset does not affect the estimated 
relationship between wealth and retirement plan for the VRI, while for the HRS, the estimates 
get very noisy due to the small number of observations.    
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Table 3-D1. HRS Sample Size for Retirement Horizon Analysis: Effect of Each Condition 
Condition Number of observations 
(1) None 11,595 
(2) Main breadwinner age ≤ 65 5,206 
(3) (2) + Main breadwinner not retired,  
No dual breadwinner 
 
2,442 
(4) (3) + Have expected retirement age 1,053 
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Figure 3-D1.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
(full range of data) 
 
A. VRI 
 
B. HRS 
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Figure 3-D2.  Distribution of normalized financial wealth (including future DB pension and SS 
income) 
 
A. VRI vs HRS  
 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset 
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Figure 3-D3.  Retirement horizon versus normalized financial wealth:  LOESS  
(Normalized wealth including future DB pension and SS income) 
 
A. VRI vs HRS 
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange) and o denotes VRI (blue). 
B. VRI employer-sponsored versus HRS 401(k) subset 
 
Note:  x denotes HRS (orange) and o denotes VRI (blue). 
